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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION POLICY 
DEVELOPMENT: STRUCTURES, PROCESSES AND OUTCOMES 
by 
Liguang Liu 
Florida International University, 2011 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Allan Rosenbaum, Major Professor 
Climate change is one of the most important and urgent issues of our time. 
Since 2006, China has overtaken the United States as the world’s largest greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emitter. China’s role in an international climate change solution has gained 
increased attention. Although much literature has addressed the functioning, performance, 
and implications of existing climate change mitigation policies and actions in China, 
there is insufficient literature that illuminates how the national climate change mitigation 
policies have been formulated and shaped. This research utilizes the policy network 
approach to explore China’s climate change mitigation policy making by examining how 
a variety of government, business, and civil society actors have formed networks to 
address environmental contexts and influence the policy outcomes and changes.   
The study is qualitative in nature. Three cases are selected to illustrate structural 
and interactive features of the specific policy network settings in shaping different policy 
arrangements and influencing the outcomes in the Chinese context. The three cases 
include the regulatory evolution of China’s climate change policy making; the country’s 
involvement in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) activity, and China’s 
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exploration of voluntary agreement through adopting the Top-1000 Industrial Energy 
Conservation Program. The historical analysis of the policy process uses both primary 
data from interviews and fieldwork, and secondary data from relevant literature. 
The study finds that the Chinese central government dominates domestic 
climate change policy making; however, expanded action networks that involve actors at 
all levels have emerged in correspondence to diverse climate mitigation policy 
arrangements. The improved openness and accessibility of climate change policy network 
have contributed to its proactive engagement in promoting mitigation outcomes. 
In conclusion, the research suggests that the policy network approach provides a 
useful tool for studying China’s climate change policy making process. The involvement 
of various types of state and non-state actors has shaped new relations and affected the 
policy outcomes and changes. In addition, through the cross-case analysis, the study 
challenges the “fragmented authoritarianism” model and argues that this once-influential 
model is not appropriate in explaining new development and changes of policy making 
processes in contemporary China. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Climate change has risen to dominate environmental and development agendas. 
As a result of its rapid economic development and high dependency on carbon-intensive 
energy sources, China has surpassed the United States as the largest greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emitter in the world. Since China is still in the process of industrialization and 
urbanization, given the country’s current technological capacity and energy supply mode, 
there is no indication that its GHG emissions will decrease in the near future. 
Consequently, China’s role in a climate change solution has gained increased 
international attention.  
The international community has established the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and created the Kyoto Protocol during the 
1990s to coordinate international actions and meet the long-term GHG emission 
reduction targets. As a developing country, China has no legally-binding commitments to 
reduce GHG emissions for the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol from 2008 
to 2012. However, the country is facing more domestic and international pressures than 
ever before to address climate change issues. Domestically, China is vulnerable to 
climate change which will pose great negative impacts on China’s development pattern 
(NDRC 2004; 2007), and the rapid domestic economic growth has been confronting 
serious environment and resource constraints. Internationally, China’s commitment in 
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mitigation has become more important because of its increased share in the world’s GHG 
emissions and its growing economic influence around the world. 
What lies behind the international climate change regime negotiation is the less 
eye-catching fact that China has made remarkable and continuous progress in combating 
climate change. The efforts include establishing and restructuring an inter-ministerial 
coordination committee, developing relevant climate change policies, and initiating 
mitigation and adaptation activities. Dozens of policies at the national level have been 
adopted to implement international climate change mitigation agreements, improve 
energy efficiency, diversify its energy sources and reduce polluting emissions. In the 
following, these policies are categorized as climate change mitigation policies. Examples 
of climate change mitigation policies at national level include China’s National Climate 
Change Program developed in mid-2007 and a number of policy instruments, measures, 
and programs having been developed since 2004 (IEA 2010; Leggett et al. 2008). With 
the institutional development and policy implementation, a variety of state, business, and 
civil society actors have formed networks to develop stable relationships between actors 
and contribute to the mitigation of carbon emissions. 
Whereas it remains a question what commitment China will accept in the future 
climate regime, the understanding of the working mechanism of how China has 
formulated and processed these current climate change mitigation policies can definitely 
provide some useful indications of what the future will bring. Employing the policy 
network approach, this study investigates the forces that drive China’s climate change 
policy development and the impacts of the actor networks on the policy outcomes.  
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This chapter introduces the background, research objectives, research 
significance, and the methods that have been adopted in the study. Section 1.2 provides 
background information about China’s climate change policy development and action. 
This leads to a presentation of the objectives and significance of the research in sections 
of 1.3 and 1.4. Following a brief description of research methodology in Section 1.5, the 
structure of this dissertation is introduced in Section 1.6. 
1.2 Research Background 
Global climate change threatens the sustainability of human civilization, and 
remains one of the most important and urgent issues of our time. Internationally, the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was established 
in 1992 to form policy architecture to address the issue. In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol, 
initiated at the Third Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 3), was signed to 
mandate developed countries to achieve quantified emission reduction targets during the 
first commitment period of 2008-2012. The Protocol also allows for three market-based 
mechanisms, in which industrialized countries can cooperate with other counterparts, 
including developing countries, to trade surplus emission reduction credits and achieve 
their commitment targets with lower costs. These three flexibility mechanisms include 
the International Emission Trading (IET), the Joint Implementation (JI), and the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM). Although currently there has been no quantified 
emission reduction commitment for developing countries, many developing countries 
have initiated policies and taken actions to mitigate their carbon emissions and adapt to 
future climate impacts. The international community is working intensely to negotiate a 
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new climate change regime, which would be more comprehensive than the Kyoto 
Protocol and with stronger commitments for more countries. 
Over the past three decades, China’s market-oriented reform has brought 
remarkable economic growth. The rapid economic growth not only gives China a heavy 
burden to restructure its energy supply and protect the environment, but also exerts an 
increasing share of responsibility in mitigating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. China’s 
share in the global energy-related CO2 emissions increased from 10.6% in 1990 to 20.6% 
in 2006 (EIA 2009). Since 2006, China has overtaken the United States as the world’s 
largest GHG emitter (EIA 2008; Heggelund 2007; Gallagher 2007) and it is estimated the 
growing trend will continue in the coming decades (Levine and Aden 2008). In addition, 
China has played a major and influential role in forming the developing countries’ 
position in the international climate change negotiations (Bjørkum 2005).  
China’s political regime has also experienced significant changes with the 
economic reform. On the one hand, the policy making is still highly state-led, in which 
most issues are considered and discussed among elites within party and government 
organizations (Peng 2003; Brown 2010); on the other hand, there has been a progressive 
decline of the state control over economy, with powers devolved towards “groups, new or 
reformed institutions, households and perhaps even individuals” (Saich 2004, 223), and 
meanwhile lower levels of the state in general enjoy greater financial freedom from 
higher levels for decision-making within their jurisdictions. Over time, greater social 
mobility and interaction among these actors affect outcomes and changes of public policy 
development. With the transition from planned economy to market economy, the role of 
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government in China has been experiencing continued transformations. How has the 
policy been shaped and evolved in China to address the climate change challenges?  
In climate change policy discussions, “mitigation” and “adaptation” are two 
important terms. Mitigation is defined as “an anthropogenic intervention to reduce the 
sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases” (IPCC TAR 2001). Examples include 
promoting the use of renewable energies, enhancing industrial energy efficiencies, and 
expanding forest to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Adaptation refers to the 
“adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic 
stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities” (Op 
cit.). Adaptation aims at reducing vulnerability to climate change. Examples include 
defending against sea level rise, changing patterns of land use, and developing drought 
tolerant crop varieties. Mitigation tackles the causes of climate change, while adaptation 
deals with the effects of the phenomenon. Both have extensive economic, social and 
environmental implications. For many years, mitigation options have dominated the 
international climate policy discussions, but in recent years, adaptation has become an 
equally important topic. Although experts believe mitigation and adaptation strategies 
can and should be pursued simultaneously and in coordination, most of the current 
international cooperation and negotiations are oriented towards mitigation policy 
development and implementation. This study concentrates on the mitigation approach of 
China’s climate change policy.  
As a matter of fact, the importance of climate change mitigation action has been 
echoed by a series of climate-specific and climate-related policies endorsed and 
implemented by the Chinese central government (Gallagher 2008; NDRC 2007; 
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Richerzhagen and Scholz 2008). Since 1996, under the umbrella of climate change 
mitigation policy, China has adopted 27 policies and measures to address climate change 
impacts, as shown by the International Energy Agency data (IEA 2010). These policies 
and measures are taken in various forms. Some are regulatory instruments promulgated 
by the State Council or its affiliated ministries; some are formulated and approved by the 
National People’s Congress as laws. Furthermore, the voluntary agreement, which 
involves some agreements between government and industry to achieve environmental 
objectives beyond compliance to regulated obligations, has emerged as a pragmatic and 
flexible approach to encourage energy-saving and emission reduction actions in industrial 
sectors. A large amount of literature has dealt with the evaluation of these mitigation 
policies and tried to predict the policy trends; however, the conclusions and suggestions 
of these studies often differ significantly, mainly because there is no consensus regarding 
the country’s mitigative capacity, and a realistic, agreed-upon baseline of carbon 
emissions China does not seem to exist. Simultaneously, China’s arguments of its status 
as a developing country and its refusal to implement a quantified GHG emission 
reduction commitment in climate negotiations have intensified the concerns.   
Given that the existing literature on China’s climate change mitigation policy 
primarily focuses on the assessment of domestic mitigation policy performance and the 
analysis of policy potentials and prospects, there is a paucity of publications on how the 
existing mitigation policies have been formulated and developed, and why they are 
processed in such manners. This study will attempt to fill in this gap by analyzing 
China’s climate change mitigation policy making process through case studies. Three 
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representative cases are selected from the population of mitigation policies or programs 
that have been adopted by the Chinese central government and implemented nationwide. 
Policy development can be convoluted process and frequently exists in a 
constantly changing and specific political environment. Within this process, a range of 
actors from government, business and civil society shape relations and organize their 
interactions toward achieving collective goals. The policy network approach captures 
such main features by conceptualizing policy making as a process through which a 
variety of independent and interdependent actors form networks to address the 
environmental context and determine the policy outcomes and change.  
Given that an expanded network of actors has emerged in China’s climate 
change policy process, this study employs the Adam and Kriesi’s policy network 
framework (Adam and Kriesi, 2007) as an analytic toolbox to examine the country’s 
climate change policy development and investigate the influences of actor networks to 
policy outcomes and change. Such an arrangement is consistent in logic with some most 
important literature that focuses on the roles of the structures and interactions of public 
and private actors in explaining Chinese economic and energy policy processes 
(Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Saich 2004).    
1.3 Research Objectives  
The central research objectives of this study are to gain a better understanding 
of the nature of the process of China’s climate change mitigation policy making and 
implementation, and of the role and influence of the state and non-state actor networks 
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involved in the process. To achieve these objectives, the answers to the following 
research questions are sought. 
 Q1. How do the policy networks influence the proactiveness of developing 
climate change mitigation policies in China?   
Q2. How does the political reform influence the choices of innovative 
mitigation policy tools, such as market-based measures and voluntary agreements? 
Q3. How are the non-state actors involved in China’s climate change policy 
making process? 
Q4. Under the rapidly changing international and domestic contexts, how does 
China arrange its institutions to organize and coordinate climate change mitigation 
actions? 
On the basis of insights from the initial field study and the understanding of 
policy network theory, four hypotheses were suggested to predict the possible outcomes 
of the research questions.  
Hypothesis 1: Increasing interaction between government, business, and civil 
society actors will increase the likelihood of China’s taking a more proactive approach to 
develop climate change mitigation policy.  
Hypothesis 2: More fragmentation in the distribution of regulative power will 
increase the likelihood of China’s utilizing more innovative policy instruments and 
measures.   
Hypothesis 3: Decreasing political control in policy development and 
implementation will encourage other actors, in particular non-state actors, to exert greater 
effort in shaping mitigation policy.     
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Hypothesis 4: Increasing demand for shared responsibilities among ministries 
and provincial governments will increase the likelihood of stronger coordination by the 
central government.  
Exploring dynamics of China’s climate change mitigation policy development 
opens a window to a better understanding of the policy making process in contemporary 
China. Among many models that have been used to analyze the Chinese policy process, 
the fragmented authoritarianism model is the most influential and frequently referred one. 
The model, developed by Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988) and through cases studies of 
China’s energy policy development, argues that the Chinese political system, though no 
longer totalitarian, is still authoritarian; and the authority has been fragmented both 
horizontally and vertically to the lower-level administrative units, making the policy 
process “disjointed, protracted and incremental” (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; 
Lieberthal 1992). The fragmented authoritarian model is taken as the most influential 
model through which to understand Chinese politics and policy process; however, recent 
studies show that the fragmented authoritarianism model cannot well explain the 
fundamental changes in Chinese policy development that has happened over the past 
decade (Lema and Ruby 2007; Wang 2006; Yu 2008; Mertha 2008). Does the generic 
fragmented authoritarianism model still capture the main features of China’s climate 
change mitigation policy development? By generalizing empirical findings from the three 
cases of different climate change mitigation policy arrangements and through a historical 
and institutional tracing of some large scale shifts in China’s climate change mitigation 
policy development, this study also tests the validity of the fragmented authoritarianism 
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model in contemporary China and, through the use of the policy network approach, 
provides an improved understanding of the policy making process in contemporary China.    
1.4 Significance of the Research 
The study has much academic and practical significance. First, this study will 
improve our understanding of China’s climate change policy making process under its 
unique political and institutional circumstances. Due to lack of study on the domestic 
climate policy process issues, debates and disputes have not been mitigated with regard to 
the evaluation of Chinese climate change policy performance. The study on China’s 
policy making process will provide useful insights for domestic policy innovation and 
international climate regime negotiations.  
Second, although the policy network approach has become one of promising 
theoretical frameworks to simplify the complexity of the policy process, much remains to 
be done to enhance its explanatory power and move from a general, relatively simple 
framework to a denser, more logically interconnected framework or theory (Borzel 1998; 
Sabatier 2007b). This study will contribute to the development of the approach by 
generating a set of logically interrelated propositions and empirically testing the validity 
of these propositions.  
Third, the study will provide an empirical application of the policy network 
approach in the Chinese context. The applications of the policy network theory and 
approach have largely been limited to the liberal democracies for which it was originally 
developed. However, the exploration of applying this approach to study Chinese policy 
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process has begun, as shown in the journal papers by Li et al. (2003) and Zheng et al. 
(2010). This study will continue the discussion on the usefulness of such application.  
Last but not least, with the transition towards market-based economy and the 
rise to the position of a major economy on the global stage, the political system and 
governance in China are under continuous changes. The study will promote theoretical 
discussions and gain a better understanding of dynamics of policy making process in 
contemporary China, thus providing useful indications of future policy trends.  
1.5 Overview of Methodology 
The study is qualitative and inductive in nature. The historical development of 
China’s climate change mitigation policy and action will be analyzed, as well as its 
relevance with policy outcomes. The case study approach is used to illuminate structural 
and interactive features of the specific policy network settings in shaping different policy 
arrangements and influencing the outcomes in the Chinese context. Three cases, from the 
pool of adopted climate mitigation policies, are selected to interpret the features of the 
policy processes. The three cases include the development of China’s national climate 
change strategy; China’s involvement in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
regime; and the initiation of a voluntary industrial efficiency program, i.e., the Top-1000 
Industrial Energy Conservation Program.   
The policy network analytical framework is adopted to guide the empirical data 
collection and analysis, and the subsequent interpretation. Informative data are gained 
from literature, interviews and field study. The detailed description of research design 
and methods will be provided in Chapter 3.  
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1.6 Outline of the Dissertation 
This research consists of nine chapters. Following this introductory chapter, 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on global climate change politics, China’s political 
regime and policy process, policy process theories, in particular the policy network 
approach to be employed in the study. Chapter 3 describes the design of the research and 
methodologies used for data collection, measurement and analysis. Three cases, including 
one generic case and two nested cases about specific mitigation policy arrangements have 
been selected to address the research questions and to test the relevant hypotheses. The 
data come from governmental documents, scholarly journals and books, site visits, 
observations, and interviews. The fieldwork and some related interviews were taken in 
two Chinese cities of Beijing and Shenyang from November 2009 to February 2010.   
Chapter 4 provides a historical overview of China’s climate change mitigation 
policy development. It provides a timeline for the first generic case and sets a boarder 
context for the other two nested cases. Chapters 5 to 7 contain the findings from the three 
cases. The first case in Chapter 5 focuses on the regulatory evolution and network 
development in China’s climate change mitigation policy making. The time period ranges 
from 1988 to the present and will be divided into four phases. The second case in Chapter 
6 focuses on China’s involvement in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) regime, 
a market scheme under the Kyoto Protocol that allows China to initiate carbon reduction 
projects and trade certified credits in the global carbon market. The formal rule for 
initiating the scheme in China was issued in June 2004 and revised in October 2005. 
Chapter 7 presents the third case, which highlights China’s initiation of a voluntary 
public-private agreement: the Top-1000 Industrial Energy Conservation Program. The 
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program, modeled on international sectoral target-setting programs, is a voluntary, 
mitigation-related program implemented since March 2006. The industries included in 
the program are large-scaled enterprises from nine energy-intensive sectors. The program 
requires provincial governments to sign contracts with local enterprises and oversee the 
enterprises to reach the energy efficiency goals.  Chapters 5 to 7 describe the formation 
and implementation of mitigation policies in the areas of concern, and examine the 
interrelations between policy environmental context, actor networks and policy outcomes 
and changes. The three cases are framed by the policy network approach introduced in 
Chapter 2.  
Chapters 8 and 9 analyze the results and present the conclusions. Chapter 8 
draws together findings of the review studies and the three case studies to verify the 
raised hypotheses and examine the appropriateness of the fragmented authoritarianism 
model in depicting China’s policy process. The final chapter, Chapter 9, lists the overall 
conclusions, the limitations of the research, and the recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE  
This literature review covers the topics of public policy process, global climate 
change governance, China’s political regime change, and relevant theories of the policy 
network approach. It is divided into two main parts. Sections 2.1 to 2.3 constitute the first 
part. Section 2.1 presents selected research on the policy process and the relevant theories. 
It also explains when the policy network approach is taken in this study to guide the 
investigation. Section 2.2 focuses on the literature of China’s policy process and political 
regime change because of reforms it has experienced, as well as reviews of the 
fragmented authoritarianism model. Section 2.3 addresses the topic of climate change 
regime and governance, highlighting the impacts of international climate change 
governance and China’s efforts in taking climate change mitigation actions.  
The second part reviews literature related to policy network concept and theory.  
Section 2.4 reviews literature of policy network theory, as well as the progress on 
enhancing its explanatory functions. Subsequently, an explanatory framework built on 
discussions of policy network is developed in Section 2.5. Building connections between 
contextual factors, policy networks and policy outcomes, this framework will be applied 
to guide the empirical study and interpret the related results. Next, in Section 2.6, several 
hypotheses are suggested and will be tested through case studies. Finally, Section 2.7 
summarizes the chapter. 
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2.1 Theories of Public Policy Process 
2.1.1 Public Policy and Policy Process  
There are various definitions of “public policy”. The term always refers to “the 
actions of government and the intentions that determine those actions” (Cochran et al. 
1999, 1). Thomas Dye (2005, 1) defines public policy as “whatever the government 
chooses to do or not to do” and policy analysis is to describe and explain causes and 
consequences of government activity (Op. cit., 4). Cochran et al. (1999, 1-2) characterize 
public policy as “an intentional course of action followed by a government institution or 
official for resolving an issue of public concern.” It consists of “political decisions for 
implementing programs to achieve societal goals” (Cochran and Malone 1995, 1). Peters 
(1999, 4) adds that public policy is the “sum of government activities, whether acting 
directly or through agents, as it has an influence on the life of citizens.” Seeking to 
emphasize the dynamic, interdependent relationship between government and citizens, 
Gerston (2004, 7) defines public policy as “the combination of basic decisions, 
commitments, and actions made by those who hold or affect government positions of 
authority.” Although there is no consensus on the precise definition of public policy, all 
the variants of definition imply that public policy is the output of the government and 
firmly grounded in politics. Birkland (2001) suggests in studying policy issues, the 
researchers should “look at the broader sweep of politics, not simply the written laws and 
rules themselves.”   
Policy process is “the process through which the policy is formed” (Gupta 
2001). It has a “perpetual, dynamic, and evolutionary quality” (Gerston 2004, 6). In this 
process of policy making, “problems are conceptualized and brought to government for 
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solution” and “governmental institutions formulate alternatives and select policy 
solutions; and those solutions get implemented, evaluated and revised” (Sabatier 2007a, 
3). The policy cycle model provides a similar understanding. Under this approach, the 
policy making process is segmented into series of continuous stages, such as agenda 
setting, policy formulation, policy adaptation, policy implementation, policy evaluation, 
and policy change (Gupta 2001). However, most of the time, the process is not as neatly 
segmented as the policy cycle model suggests.  
Other scholars also explain the complexity of understanding the policy process. 
According to Sabatier (2007a, 3-4), an extremely complex set of elements interacts over 
time in the process of public policy making. These complicating factors include: 
hundreds of state and non-state actors involved, time span of a decade or more, 
interrelationship of different policy arrangements, and possible technical and legal 
involvement. Birkland (2001) points out that structural and historical factors influence the 
policy making and constitute the environment in which public policy is made. These 
environmental factors are not fixed in time, but the change in environment is rather slow. 
Mol et al. (2001) use the term “policy culture” to describe politico-institutional factors 
that influence policy making and implementation. Further, accepting the irrational nature 
of policy process, Gerston (2004, 7-15) argues the interaction of key ingredients of policy 
process, such as institutions, actor, issues, resources and political regime, has made 
policy making a challenging process.   
2.1.2 Models of Public Policy Process  
In explaining the policy making process, “the emphasis is much more on the 
unfolding than on the authoritative decision, with attention devoted to the structure, 
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context, constraints and dynamics of the process, as well as to the actual decisions and 
events that occur” (Schlarger 2007). To simplify the situation and develop general 
concepts that apply to more than one case or problem, policy analysts have developed a 
number of theories and models to study the policy process. Easton (1965) provides a 
model that views policy process as the product of a system, influenced by and influencing 
the environment in which it operates. The policy environment contains the features of 
structural, social, political and economic systems. As the input of the policy making 
system, societal demands involve public opinion, interest groups, mass media, political 
parties, and community elites. It is the political system within government that translates 
the societal demands into specific policy outcomes, consisting of laws, regulations and 
other policy arrangements. However, the major criticism of the Easton’s model is that it 
treats the internal workings of political system as a black box and does not provide 
further explanation (Birkland 2001, 221).   
Related to Easton’s system model is the most commonly-used policy cycle 
model, also termed as stages heuristic (Jones 1970). The model represents the policy 
process as a cycle, or series, of linearly connected stages, i.e., agenda setting, policy 
formulation, decision-making, policy implementation, and policy evaluation. According 
to Sabatier (2007a, 6-7), the policy cycle approach served a useful purpose in the 1970s 
and early 1980s and stimulated some excellent research within specific stages, 
particularly, agenda setting and policy implementation. However, the model is subject to 
some criticisms, such as lack of causal drivers, oversimplification of practical interacting 
process, and possible inaccurate description of the stages.  
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Over the past three decades, more sophisticated and useful models and 
frameworks have been developed or extensively modified by political scientists to study 
the policy process. Some representative models include Kingdon’s multiple streams 
metaphor (Kingdon 1995), Ostrom and her colleagues’ institutional analysis and 
development (IAD) model (Ostrom 1990), Sabatier’s advocacy coalition framework 
(Sabatier 1988), Baumgartner and Jones’ punctuated equilibrium model (Baumgartner 
and Jones 1993), and the policy network approach (e.g., Knoke 1990; Adam and Kriesi 
2007). According to Sabatier (2007b, 321), although all these frameworks are relatively 
promising general frameworks, they “need to be developed into more logically coherent 
and ‘denser’ theoretical frameworks and, eventually, into fully developed theories”.      
These models, derived from the practice of Western democracies and developed 
by Western academics, provide diversified ways to order and simplify reality. Dye (2002, 
45) claims that models have strengths and limitations; however, a good model should 
keep congruence with the reality, direct inquiry and research, and suggest causes and 
consequences of public policy. Sabatier (2007b) further clarifies the criteria of a more 
robust theory or framework, such as logical coherence, clear causal process, empirical 
falsifiability, and broad coverage in scope.   
2.1.3 Application of the Policy Network Approach in the Research 
Among a set of models and approaches to analyze policy processes, in this 
study, the policy network approach is chosen as the analytic tool to historically and 
institutionally examine China’s climate change mitigation policy making process. This 
choice was made primarily due to the following four considerations. 
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First, policy network theory takes into account various types of actors that affect 
the development of public policy. Although government, as the key state agency, is often 
the leading institution in steering non-state action in the political process; businesses and 
social institutions also affect preferences and actions of state actors. By treating public 
policy as the product of interdependent interactions between state and society, the 
researcher can characterize the roles of actors in policy processes from a broad spectrum, 
ranging from a closed, access-restricted structure to an open, loosely-organized, and 
unstable issue networks (Rhode and March 1992; Mol et al. 2000). In the case of China, 
although the decision making may still be characterized as centralized and top-down, it is 
by no means monolithic (Saich 2004; Li 2005). With the rapid socio-economic change 
under the reform, there has been more bargaining, negotiation and collaboration among 
state actors, private actors and civil society actors in the policy process (Saich 2004). 
Second, policies are generated under specific political-institutional contexts. 
These contexts influence the actors and ideas in most policy making processes. Among a 
number of approaches to using the network concept (to be described in detail in Section 
2.3), this study takes Adam and Kriesi’s approach (2007) of proposing a casual model to 
conceptualize the policy process. Under this approach, a variety of interdependent actors 
form networks to address environmental contexts and determine policy outcomes and 
changes. Such a causal model of policy network is helpful in generating logically-
coherent propositions which will be tested empirically (Sabatier 2007b).   
Third, the complexity of the policy process calls for an examination of historical 
development of the networks and relationship between networks and policy outcomes.   
By identifying the dimensions of policy networks (introduced in Section 3.3), 
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development of structures, functions, and changes of networks over time can be studied. 
Further, more general features of policy style and policy outcomes can be connected with 
the specific structures and interactions of actor networks. The present research treats 
policy process as a dynamic cycle that involves various actors and is consistent with the 
development of actor networks.  
Fourth, although the institutional development and analysis (IAD) framework 
and the advocacy coalition framework are the most impressive models having been 
empirically tested in many different settings, no study has applied these frameworks to 
study Chinese policy processes. However, there have been growing academic endeavors 
in recent years that employ the policy network approach to study Chinese policy issues. 
Li et al. (2003) applies Rhodes’ typology to analyze Chinese housing and real estate 
policy. Tang (2004) uses conflict of interest among actors to analyze tax reforms in the 
countryside. A recent study by Zheng and her Dutch colleagues (Zheng et al. 2010) 
argues that the policy network theory is generally “useful to describe and explain policy-
making in the Chinese context,” and “most, if not all, the theoretical notions developed 
around policy networks proved fruitful when applied to the fragmentation, 
interdependencies, stalemates and breakthroughs in decision-making processes in China” 
(Op cit., 17).  
Eichhorst and Bongardt (2009) suggest some adaptations be made in order to 
analyze a specific policy arrangement in China. It is worth noting that policy networks 
develop in the course of time through frequent interactions between mutually dependent 
actors in the whole process of policy cycle, not only in decision-making phase, but also in 
other phases such as agenda setting, policy implementation. The emphasis of the action 
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network development is important because the decision-making normally takes a top-
down approach in China and this process is rarely documented in detail, but this top-
down approach incorporates bargaining and negotiation among diverse state and non-
state actors at all levels in the policy making process. As Saich (2004) argues, “China’s 
size and diversity makes it especially important that policy remains flexible to account 
and that policy makers receive accurate information for policy design and on feedback 
once policy begins to be implemented”. Therefore, the examination of the features and 
evolutions of the implementation networks should be included in analyzing the policy 
process and understanding policy outcomes and changes.  
Before reviewing the literature of policy network theory in Section 2.4, Sections 
2.2 and 2.3 will review the literature related to China’s policy process and China’s 
response to the global climate change governance.  
2.2 Research on China’s Policy Process 
2.2.1 Formal Policy Process in China 
With China’s reform and opening up, its policy making process has been 
evolving, and decision-making has been more institutionalized at the top-level. The 
country has established an integrated, multilevel nationwide bureaucratic system to 
accommodate the requirements of economic reforms.  
Most literature addresses the issue by identifying the actors, and examining their 
functions and interactions. The National People’s Congress (NPC) and the State Council 
are the two key institutions in policy making at the national level. The NPC holds the 
power to make national laws, while the State Council drafts implementing rules, 
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regulations, decrees and orders. Commissions and ministers affiliated to the State Council 
can issue orders, directives and regulations, which shall be consistent with laws passed 
the NPC and with regulations of the State Council. At the local level, the local congress 
and government may draft separately additional regulations for local implementation.  
In reality, the State Council, which receives substantial input from ministries 
and commissions, holds the power in policy formulation and development, especially in 
the economic sector. The National People’s Congress, plays a marginal role in the 
drafting and consultation process, though its role for policy advisory and supervision has 
been growing (Andrews-Speed 2004). In most cases, the agencies responsible for the 
policy implementation in a specific sector may also take responsibility in drafting the 
policies for that sector (Andrews-Speed 2004). Pang and Zou (2008) show a general 
process of developing a policy in China.  First, relevant experts and government officials 
work on preparing policy drafts. The drafts will then be circulated among different 
governmental departments to obtain comments and revisions. Next, the competent 
departments submit a finalized draft to the State Council for approval. Some of the 
policies will be promulgated in the form of laws that require the approval by the National 
People’s Congress. Once approved, either the State Council or the relevant departments is 
charged with implementing and refining regulations and measures. 
China has tried to decentralize its decision making. The decentralization, 
characterized by local governments and officials assuming more power and responsibility 
in stimulating local economic growth, to some extent, weakens the authority of the 
central government, which results in inconsistency, conflict and ambiguity of the policies. 
To achieve compromise between competing agencies, China normally makes special 
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organizational arrangements by forming leadership groups or committees that bring 
together the functionally-related bureaucracies (Lieberthal 2004, 217). 
The major stakeholders in China’s policy process include the government, 
industrial sectors, academic institutions, media, the public and non-government 
organizations (NGOs). The government in China is the dominant player in policy making, 
while the NGOs have the weakest roles (Pang and Zou 2008). Although, in China, the 
NGOs have been expanding and becoming more active, especially in environmental 
issues; comparatively speaking, NGOs and the public voices are not loud and clear 
enough in the policy making process (Op cit.).    
Within the government system, the State Council, supported by its affiliated 
ministries and local governmental administration, leads the policy making, puts into 
effect the national economic plan, and oversees policy implementation and enforcement. 
However, the implementation of policies in China runs into a series of obstacles, such as 
insufficient institutional capacity, shortage of human resources, conflict and ambiguity of 
policies, influence of informal rules, and personal relations (Chen 2003). Some 
researchers point out that in China, there are other approaches to facilitate the policy 
implementation led by the administrative agencies: one is the utilization of the power of 
the Communist Party to set guidelines for policy making (Peng 2003, 45; Constantin 
2007); the other is a trend towards greater legislative involvement in policy making and 
implementation instead of political command, as the NPC has strengthened its institution 
and improved its professionalization (Peng 2003; Saich 2004). 
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2.2.2 Models of Analyzing China’s Policy Making Process 
Several models have been developed and used to analyze the policy making 
process in China. The first one is the broad rationality model. The model postulates that 
decision makers attempt to pursue strategies that can maximize the expected outcomes of 
the choices they could make (Howlett et al. 2009). When used to analyze China’s policy 
process, it views China’s central state as a rational, unitary and coherent actor and 
assumes that top-level leaders can exert considerable power over the political system and 
can choose the most efficient means in achieving policy goals and advancing the national 
interest (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988, 9-12; Constantin 2007; Lieberthal 1992).  
The pure rationality model is regarded as nonrealistic and has serious limitations, 
thus Herbert Simon (1955) puts forward an alternate notion of “bounded rationality.” In 
general, the rationality model could not well capture the realistic complex dimensions of 
the system. For example, the decision makers may have limited information and time 
available; the policy might not be a direct response to the underlying problem; and the 
efficiency of policy options is dependent on changing circumstances. In addition, the 
closed nature of the Chinese political regime limits the study of the degree to which the 
rationality of decisions is limited or bounded. Therefore, the rationality model cannot 
“provide sufficiently powerful explanatory value to be used in isolation from other 
approaches” (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988, 14).  
The second model is the power model, which assumes the policy outcomes are 
the result of “struggles among the top leaders who are sensitive to the implications of 
alternative policy choices upon their stature and power” (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988, 
14). This model has been used extensively to analyze the complex dynamics of China, 
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especially before its economic reforms when little information is available outside China. 
The power model assumes that “Chinese political behavior is the result of inter-
organizational bargaining for budgets, status, and power” (Dreyer 2006, 17). The power 
model holds that to study the bureaucratic politics, the crucial question is to identify the 
most powerful bureaucratic organizations or alliances that denominate the policy process. 
However, the model considers only the organizational constraints that have formed the 
actors’ behavior, while ignoring ideological and cultural constraints, as well as the issues 
at stake (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988, 17).  
Arguably, the most impressive and influential model of understanding China’s 
institutional setting and policy process is called the fragmented authoritarianism model, 
developed by Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988) in the late 1980s with their study of 
policy process of large-scale energy projects. The next section presents a brief overview 
of the fragmented authoritarianism model.  
2.2.3 Fragmented Authoritarianism Model 
The fragmented authoritarianism model was first developed by Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg (1988) to label the bargaining features of Chinese bureaucracy through their 
case studies of China’s energy policy process. The model acknowledges the insights from 
the rationality and the power approaches and integrates more available information to 
study the impacts of decentralization of decision-making authority brought by China’s 
economic reform in the late 1970s.  
The fragmented authoritarianism model focuses on two dimensions of 
centralization and decentralization to reflect the bureaucratic practice: one is the 
structural distribution of resources and authority; the other is the process of decision 
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making and policy implementation. The authors argues that the bureaucratic activity of 
shaping and implementing policy in China takes place under a structurally “fragmented, 
segmented and stratified” environment, and the affected institutions negotiate, bargain, 
and seek consensus to pursue their own interests in the process. Correspondingly, policy 
outcomes are shaped by the incorporation of interests of diverse actors, especially the 
implementation agencies, into the policy itself. As a result, the policy making process in 
China is governed by the “disjointed, protracted and incremental” changes. 
With the term of “fragmented authoritarianism”, Lieberthal (1992) further 
developed the idea of bureaucratic fragmentation and argues that bargaining and 
negotiation are crucial elements of the political process in China, thus it is difficult to 
predict accurately the policy outcome with one particular approach. Because of the 
decentralization of decision making, the local levels have gained power to block upward 
flows of information and frustrate the policies of the upper-level authorities. He suggests 
the policy analysis should focus on the relationship of administrative hierarchies, in 
particular between line agencies at the central level and the provinces and localities. 
Lieberthal (1992) admits that one of the limitations of the fragmented authoritarianism 
model is that it emphasizes the structural dimensions of authority and policy process and 
gives less concern on value integration which can potentially affect policy process under 
the complex political system and lacks focus on role of party.    
Although the fragmented authoritarianism is regarded as one of the most 
influential models of understanding the policy process in contemporary China (e.g., 
Dreyer 2006; Constantin 2007; Chen 2003), it has been frequently challenged by 
researchers, because this static model of labeling Chinese policy making as “protracted, 
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disjointed and incremental” fails in capturing the characteristics of current policy making 
process in China (Wang 2006; Mertha 2008; Yu 2008; Lema and Ruby 2007; Constantin 
2007). For example, Lema and Ruby (2007), through the study of wind project 
development, argue that policy reforms in China have changed largely from a state of 
fragmented authoritarianism towards policy coordination. Mertha (2008) claims that the 
policy process in China has become increasingly pluralized and more non-state actors are 
involved in the policy process. Yu (2008) argues that China's policy making in the area of 
climate change diplomacy is highly coordinated, instead of fragmented. 
2.2.4 State-Society Relationship in China 
The actors involved in the policy process can be divided into two groups: state 
actor, the one directly participates in the state policy making (Zhao 2002), and the civil 
society actor, the one endowed with human agency (Long and Long 1992). The 
relationship between the state and society is the relationship between two types of actors. 
In China, economic reforms induce the changes of state-society relations. Literature has 
given substantial attention to China’s transition of the relations between state and society, 
especially since the collapse of the Soviet system in the early 1990s. 
In general, China’s state-society relations have been undergoing a massive 
change under the reforms. As Saich (2004, 223) notes, “The economic changes (in China) 
have redefined the social structure and are changing the distribution of power between 
state and society, have altered the principles on which society is organized and the ways 
in which it interacts with the state apparatus.” However, debates continue on whether the 
civil society or alternatively the state corporatism better describes China’s circumstances. 
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Some scholars view the Chinese citizens’ more assertive behavior and the 
emergence of more associations as contributing to civil society. Adherents of this view 
argue that although there have been some setbacks, China is marching towards a vigorous 
civil society (e.g., Dean 1993; Watson 2008). However, Lieberthal (2004, 300) claims 
that evidence overall shows that in China, basic levels of the state and non-state 
organizations are lack of powers and resources in limiting the ability of higher levels of 
the state to penetrate influences, therefore the Western civil-society model does not apply 
to China’s situation to date. Frolic (1997, according to Saich 2004, 228) uses the term of 
“state-led civil society” to describe the situation that in China: “the civil society is created 
by the state to help it govern, co-opt and socialize potentially politically active elements 
in the population”. In studying the policy making process, Andrews-Speed (2004, 191) 
claims that China still gives little emphasis “on protecting voluntary economic 
agreements or on controlling the power of the state.”  
State corporatism is a commonly applied model to describe state-society 
relations. Given the limitations that in China, each non-state organization must register 
with a government body and receive approval as a legal entity, and that only one 
organization is allowed to represent each sectoral constituency, the state’s domination 
over social organizations is clear. However, the applications of the state corporatism 
model have come in various forms. Unger and Chan (2008, 48-68) view most of China’s 
major associations and groups as state corporatist, especially at the national level, 
because most of these organizations were founded by the state and firmly under the 
control of a state or Party agency. However, at the periphery, the emergence of more 
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small local organizations shows the possibility of shifts in the future toward societal 
corporatism and even civil society.  
Another scholar, Walder (1986) adopts the term of “Communist Neo-
Traditionalism” to draw distinctions with pluralism and authoritarian paradigm. It argues 
that the political loyalty is rewarded systematically with career opportunities and other 
rewards, and the evolution of the Chinese communism will create a highly 
institutionalized clientelism network.  
Although state corporatism model captures well the top-down nature of control 
in the system, some scholars question its ability in explaining the complexity of dynamics 
of the interaction between state and civil society (Foster 2008, 116; Kennedy 2008, 153-
174). Perry and Selden (2000) highlight the roles of local state institutions in controlling 
social protests and opposition that happened frequently in China. They argue that “while 
local officials frequently crack down on popular resistance, in numerous cases their 
leadership is instrumental in shaping, legitimating and articulating the demands of social 
movements, and in some cases in networking with state officials on behalf of local 
interests” (Op cit., 11). As Kennedy (2008, 174) puts it, “no one label – civil society, 
corporatism, or any other – adequately reflects the nature of government-business 
relations in China.” 
2.3 Global Climate Change Governance and China’s Response 
2.3.1 History of Global Climate Change Regime  
The development of scientific knowledge regarding causes and potential 
consequences of global climate change has led to the increased concern of global 
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warming issue. The nature of the climate change problem has made it clear that no 
country can solve this issue by itself and global scientific and political cooperation would 
be necessary to find solutions and create an effective response.  
The creation of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) by the 
United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) and the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) in 1988 marks one of the most important steps to transform the 
climate change issue from a scientific issue into a policy issue. The IPCC issued its first 
report in 1990 and reported an observed temperature increase of 0.3-0.6 °C (degree 
Celsius) over the past century and predicted a 1-3 °C during the 21st century. Soon after 
the publication of the IPCC report, the United Nations General Assembly authorized 
formal negotiations on a global climate agreement. At the 1992 Earth Summit held in Rio 
de Janeiro, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
which aims to form international climate policy architecture, was signed by 154 nations. 
The four key elements contained in the agreement include a general long-term objective 
to stabilize GHG concentrations, a near-term quantitative emission reduction goal for 
industrialized countries; the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” as 
the guidance of burden sharing; and the preference for the market-based measures. The 
four elements have largely defined the international climate change policy regime since 
1992 (Aldy and Stavins 2007). 
The UNFCCC commitments were voluntary and did little to establish firm 
governmental targets. In 1997, the Third Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 
3) met in Kyoto and adopted the Kyoto Protocol, which creates a comprehensive yet 
flexible international GHG emission reduction regime. The industrialized countries 
31 
 
agreed to reduce the GHG emissions by 5.2% below the 1990 level during the first 
commitment period from 2008 to 2012. Besides, three market-based mechanisms were 
designed to facilitate the compliance of legally-binding targets with lower costs. However, 
because the United States refused to ratify the treaty, it was not until February 2005 that 
the Kyoto Protocol gained enough ratification and finally entered into force. 
The Kyoto Protocol has been both lauded and criticized (Wiener 2007; Victor 
2004; Aldy and Stavins 2007). On the one side, it is the first step to create market-
oriented rules to comply with quantified emission reduction targets set for developed 
countries. On the other side, the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol is criticized 
because it bypasses several key GHG emitters, such as the United States, China, India, 
and has specific deficiencies in the design that make it ineffective and relatively costly to 
implement. However, both sides agree that it is imperative to negotiate a successor 
regime for the post-Kyoto period. The Thirteenth UNFCCC Conference of the Parties 
(COP 13) held in Bali 2007 set four thematic building blocks for future actions: 
mitigation, adaptation, technology, and finance. Parties agreed to establish an Adaptation 
Fund to assist developing countries to adapt to the climate change impacts. The Bali 
Roadmap also outlined a new negotiating process to be concluded in the COP 15 in 
Copenhagen to feed into post-Kyoto international agreement on climate change. However, 
in the COP 15 Copenhagen and the COP 16 Cancun climate change conferences, 
although all parties have agreed to an accord that sets a goal of limiting global warming 
to below 2°C above pre-industrial levels by 2100, no legally-binding agreement has been 
signed due to vast differences among countries.    
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Notably, there are other forms of international climate negotiations, such as the 
Asia-Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate (AP 6), the G8 Gleneagles 
Plan of Action, the GLOBE G8+5 Climate Change Dialogue (Williams 2007). These 
negotiations complement the Kyoto Protocol regime and are undertaken between key 
economies, which are also major carbon emitters. Besides, domestic climate change 
actions are taken in various forms worldwide. For example, in the United States, 
voluntary mitigation programs include the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), 
the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), and other regional and sectoral programs. 
However, the persistence of some voluntary programs could not be guaranteed. For 
example, the emission trading in the Chicago Climate Change has been closed since 
November 2010 because of the market uncertainties. 
2.3.2 Structural Features of Global Climate Change Regime 
The emergence and development of the international climate change regime has 
gradually gained attention among researchers. The structure of the international climate 
change regime has shown three features. First, not only governments, but also the other 
non-state actors, such as businesses, NGOs, scientific community, and the public, are 
involved in policy discussion and implementation, seeking to reduce the emissions of 
GHGs. Although the national states still dominate the regime negotiations, and the role of 
non-state actors remain limited to influence the action of governments, the non-state 
actors have contributed to influencing human behavior more directly, which would result 
in an improved performance in GHG emission reductions (Raustiala 2001).  
Second, vast differences exist between developing countries and developed 
countries; and within the two groups, coordinated actions could not be taken. The sources 
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of differences are complex and include “levels of development, sources of GHG 
emissions, national energy policies, key economic sectors, and expected impacts of 
climate change” (Downie et al. 2009, 122). In developed countries, only the EU member 
countries have committed to meeting emission reduction targets set by Kyoto Protocol. 
The US refuses to participate unless other emerging economies, such as China, India, 
Brazil, would accept quantified GHG emission reduction targets. On the other hand, the 
developing countries argue that the priority for these countries is economic development, 
and the developed countries should take on historical, legal and moral responsibilities to 
reduce their emissions first, and provide financial and technical assistance to developing 
countries.  
Third, governance of climate change across all levels of government and 
relevant stakeholders has emerged. According to Corfee-Morlot et al. (2009), the 
multilevel governance encompasses two dimensions of action: vertical dimension and 
horizontal dimension. Under the vertical dimension, government at the national level 
cannot effectively deal with the climate change challenges alone without cooperation 
with the international community and participation of lower levels of government; while 
under the horizontal dimension, climate change issues and solutions overlap with other 
global environmental and development issues, thus calling for policy integration and 
coordination between departments and institutions when developing relevant policies.    
2.3.3 The Adoption of Climate Change Mitigation Policy  
The climate change mitigation policy arrangement is a portfolio of policies and 
measures that fit specific national circumstances and aim to reduce or limit GHG 
emissions across all sectors. Different policies and measures could have induced different 
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outcomes, and the impacts may last for a long time. These policies can be broadly 
divided into the climate-specific and the climate-related. Such a division has been widely 
employed in discussing climate change issues and their connections with energy and 
environmental issues (Willems and Baumert 2003; Burtraw and Toman 2001; Gallagher 
2008; NDRC 2007; Richerzhagen and Scholz 2008). 
Climate-specific policies refer to GHG emission reduction oriented policies. 
The United Nations (UN)-sponsored climate mitigation mechanisms, i.e., the three 
mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, fall into this category. Much literature has 
addressed China’s policies and actions that respond to the UN-sponsored mechanism, in 
particular its performance in taking the CDM activities. Other climate-specific mitigation 
actions include China’s participation in China-EU Climate Change Partnership, Asia-
Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate (AP 6), and some bilateral 
cooperative agreements (Pew 2007; IEA 2010).    
The climate-related mitigation policies refer to the policies, regulations, and 
measures that, though not directly driven by climate change concerns, treat GHG 
emission reduction as a by-product activity of economic development. Compared with 
climate-specific policies, these policies are much more inclusive (Burtraw and Toman 
2001). They are broadly adopted in areas of energy production and transformation, 
energy efficiency improvement and conservation, transportation, industrial processes, 
forestry, and other sectors (NDRC 2007). Other policies, such as those affecting trade, 
foreign investment, social development, can also affect emissions, but their relations with 
mitigation are not direct, thus not taken as mitigation policies (IPCC 2007).  
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Since the 1990s, and especially over the past decade, China has begun adopting 
a number of policies and taking various measures to address GHG emissions. These 
policies and measures come in response to concerns about several interrelated issues, 
including climate change, energy efficiency, air pollution, long-range planning, and 
international opinion (Downie et al. 2009, 105). The International Energy Agency (IEA 
2010) lists the climate change mitigation policies and measures that China has adopted 
and that are in force. Of the 27 domestic mitigation policies, 6 were implemented during 
1996-2004 period; 11 were taken during 2005-2006; 10 were taken after 2007. These 
policies are taken in various forms: regulations and standards, taxes and charges, 
subsidies, financial incentives, voluntary agreements, etc. Many of the policies and 
measures have been laid out and reemphasized in the Renewable Energy Law of 2005, 
the Energy Conservation Law of 2008, the Medium- and Long-Term Development Plan 
for Renewable Energy of 2007, and the 11th Five-Year Program (2006-2010). 
The most important climate change policy adopted is the National Climate 
Change Program released by the Chinese government in July 2007. The Program outlined 
activities that China has been planning to undertake in mitigating GHG emissions and 
adapting to the consequences of potential climate change. However, some critics note that 
it has only a symbolic role, because China does not set emission reduction goals and/or a 
timeline. One year later, China issued a white paper titled China’s Policies and Actions 
for Addressing Climate Change, indicating that China will actively participate in 
worldwide efforts to address climate mitigation and adaptation, earnestly observe the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, and play a constructive role in international 
cooperation (State Council 2008).  
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2.3.4 China’s Climate Mitigation Performance  
There have been many debates and controversies about China’s performance in 
mitigating climate change impacts. Regarding the impacts of climate change on China, 
some hold that there are potential net gains to China from a warmer world (Nordhaus and 
Boyer 2000; Weiner 2007), while other studies show that China will be one of the worst-
impacted countries in the world if the climate changes as predicted (NDRC 2007; IPCC 
2007).  
Concerning how China has made contributions to the climate change mitigation, 
based on Weiner (2007), some researchers claim that China would not limit its GHG 
emissions, because, under the current Kyoto Protocol, it has no binding obligations and 
politically, reducing GHG emissions will harm its economic development and influence 
social stability. The only solution, therefore, is to promote international cooperation, and 
provide incentives to China for mitigation actions. In contrast to that, others claim that 
China has been more proactive on climate change actions and has made great efforts in 
reducing carbon. A Pew report shows that the energy intensity and GHG intensity (GHG 
emissions per unit of GDP) in China have fallen significantly over the past few decades, 
largely through energy efficiency plan development and institutional effort. Weber et al. 
(2008) show that with China becoming world’s manufacturing center, up to one third of 
Chinese emissions were actually due to production of exports, rising from 12% in 1987. 
This means that the importer countries, primarily industrialized countries, have exported 
their emissions with large scale movement of manufacturing to China. In fact, there have 
been a lot of debates that between exporters and importers, who should be responsible for 
carbon dioxide emissions of the Chinese-made goods (Wang 2008; BBC 2009; Johnson 
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2009). By comparing China’s involvement in three UN environmental programs, 
Heggelund and Beacker (2007) claim that, although China is currently providing no 
leadership, it has emerged as an active participant and stakeholder in the international 
environmental arena. 
Various scholars hold different opinions about the level of China’s climate 
mitigative capacity. Gallagher (2007) argues that China still lacks many of the 
institutions, policies and enforcement mechanisms, especially at provincial and local 
levels; while Richerzhagen and Scholz (2008) argue that China’s climate mitigative 
capacity has been considerably improved in areas of climate science and policy 
coordination, but the main problem is that China’s climate-related mitigation actions are 
not driven by climate consideration, but based on the desire to maintain economic growth. 
It is almost impossible to generalize about China’s climate mitigation 
performance from evaluating a single policy or program. Much literature has addressed 
China’s participation in the UN-sponsored CDM scheme, in which the Chinese entities 
can develop carbon emission reduction projects and trade the accredited emission 
reduction credits with industrialized countries for funds and technology. The studies 
cover a variety of aspects, such as sustainable development, institutional capacity 
building, technology transfer, carbon market and finance (Saner 2005; Heggelund 2007; 
Ganapati and Liu 2008; WWF 2008; Seres 2007; Hall 2007). Since 2007, China has 
surpassed India and Brazil as the largest CDM credit supplier in the world, with 42% of 
the issued CDM credits coming from China, almost twice the number in India (CD4CDM 
2010).  Researchers have identified some reasons that can explain China’s success, such 
as lower abatement costs, more effective administrative arrangements, governmental 
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manipulation, large emission reduction potential, as well as the flaws of this scheme 
(Michaelowa 2007; Wiener 2008; Duan 2008; Lloyd and Subbarao 2009; Ganapati and 
Liu 2009). 
2.4 Policy Network Theory  
Policy making takes place in policy domain-specific subsystems, which 
“consists of a large number of state and non-state actors dealing with specific policy 
issues” (Adam and Kriesi 2007). To have a closer examination of the emergence, 
development and change of climate change mitigation policy in China’s political system, 
an analytical framework is needed to build links between various factors and investigate 
the relations between actors in China’s climate change mitigation policy process. In this 
research, the policy network approach is employed to guide empirical inquiry, analyze 
the development of China’s climate change mitigation policy, and explain the 
mechanisms of policy making process. Relevant literature on the policy network 
approach is reviewed in this section.  
2.4.1 Concept of Policy Network 
The concept of policy network has its roots in organizational studies, economics, 
sociology, anthropology, public policy, political science, etc. (Hudson and Lowe 2004; 
Berry et al. 2004). The term has been used in the study of political processes since 1970s, 
and refers to “the set of political actors inside and outside government who are involved 
in, or take an interest in, the making of public policy, and/or or relations between these 
actors” (Compston 2009). Policy network theory holds that a large number of actors 
(individuals and organizations) are dealing with specific policy issues. The political 
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process is not controlled by state actors alone, but rather by the interactions of state and 
non-state actors at all levels (Adam and Kriesi 2007; Marsh and Smith 2000; Hudson and 
Lowe 2004). As an open and flexible system of relationships of actors, the policy 
network integrates both macro-level trends and the impact of the implementation of 
policy at the micro-level (Adam and Kriesi 2007). 
There are different understandings and applications of the policy network 
concept. In general, three major approaches exist (Borzel 1988; Adam and Kriesi 2007). 
The first approach treats the policy networks as a specific form of governance that is 
different from the conventional market and hierarchy. Networks, characterized by the 
predominance of informal, decentralized, and horizontal relations, are autonomous and 
self-governing in that they resist government manipulation.  
The second approach analyzes the network structure through formalized and 
quantitative procedures and often uses software. The quantitative analysis results in 
images of network structures and summary indexes; however, this approach gives little 
concern for actors’ characteristics, nor on the origins of the dynamic change of networks.  
The third approach applies the network concept to different types of interactions 
among actors in a policy subsystem. This approach interprets policy networks as a type of 
interest intermediation between public and private actors in which resources are 
exchanged. The basic assumption of this approach is that “the existence of policy 
networks, which reflect the relative status or power of particular interests in a policy area, 
influences (though thus not determine) policy outcomes” (Borzel 1998). Adam and Kriesi 
(2007, 130) note that “These typologies often rely on the classic distinction between 
pluralist and corporatist systems of interest intermediation.” and “Whereas pluralist 
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concepts stress the wide range of actors involved in policy making and the resulting 
competition among them, corporatist concepts point to the cooperation between a few 
central actors.”  
On the basis of the degree of integration, the restriction to the memberships and 
distribution level of resources, Marsh and Rhodes (1992, 249) place policy network in a 
specific sector on a continuum with two ending points: policy community and issue 
networks. Policy community is a tightly integrated, well organized and access restricted 
structure, which is often linked to the corporatist arrangements and characterized by 
cooperation between a few dominant actors; while issue network is a loosely-organized, 
more open and less coherent structure, which is associated with pluralist arrangements. 
Thus the study of policy network on a policy community- issue network continuum has 
been linked with the discussion of state-society relations. From the discussion on 
contemporary China’s state-society relationship in Section 2.2.3, it is more appropriate to 
broadly categorize China’s policy network as a form more prone to policy community; 
however, the number and types of actors involved in the policy process have been 
expanded under the reform and vary with the specific policy domains.  
Policy network can also be defined by other classified dimensions. For example, 
Van Waarden (1992) indentifies seven major dimensions, including the number and type 
of actors involved, their functions, structures, degree of institutionalization, rules of 
conduct, power relations, and strategies. Lieffererink et al. (2001) characterize policy 
network with three dimensions: the distribution, mobilization and exchange of resources, 
policy issues and actors, and interactions in the network.  
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2.4.2 Network Approach in Analyzing Policy Process 
The use of the policy network concept has been doubted by some scholars 
because of its shaky theoretical basis (Dowding 1995, 2001; Richardson 2000). However, 
some important progress has been made to strengthen the ability to explain policy 
processes, especially over the past decade. Marsh and Rhode (1992, 262) argue that the 
policy community is associated with policy continuity, and “the existence of a policy 
network, or more particularly a policy community, constrains the policy agenda and 
shapes the policy outcomes”. They also claim policy networks are central to 
understanding the policy change and the ways in which political institutions and practices 
adapt (Op cit., 267). 
Marsh and Smith (2000) further develop a dialectical model to explain the role 
of the policy network in the policy process. They point out that the relationship between 
the network and outcomes is not simple and unidimensional, but interactive that “each 
affects the other in a continuing iterative process” (Op cit., 5). They accordingly identify 
three dialectical relationships: between the network and the context within which it 
operates; between the structure of the network and the actors operating within them; and 
between the network and the policy outcome. 
Adam and Kriesi (2007, 129-149) treat the policy network approach more as an 
analytical toolbox than a theory. In their model, a complete policy process is separated 
into two causal events linked by the policy network: as dependent variables, the 
structures of policy networks are determined by the external factors, namely the 
transnational context, national context and policy-domain specific context; as 
independent variables, the structures of policy networks, which capture two basic 
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elements of networks – actors and their relations, affect policy outcomes. In particular, 
the distribution of power determines the potential for policy change and the type of 
interactions between actors influence the types of policy change.   
The causal links of policy network features and policy change have been used 
by some scholars to explain policy process and analyze the impacts of actor networks. 
For example, Lynn et al. (2000) present a causal model of governance, where the 
governance outcomes are explained by a set of “network” factors, such as environmental 
contexts, actors, structures, treatments, and managerial roles and action. Mol et al. (2001) 
use the policy network approach to examine the driving forces behind the emergence of 
joint-environmental policy making through three case studies across three EU countries. 
In addition, there have been a growing number of empirical case studies that adopt the 
policy network approach to explain the policy outcomes and changes in specific policy 
sectors (Jost and Jacob 2004; Zhou and Mori 2008; Compston 2009). 
2.5 Policy Network as Analytic Framework 
The aim of the present study is to gain a better understanding of how a set of 
state and non-state actors in China have engaged in climate change policy making and 
development. An analytic framework is adapted from the policy network model by Adam 
and Kriesi (2007) to guide the empirical inquiry. The analytic framework frames the key 
variables and is used to explain the dynamics of China’s climate change mitigation policy 
process. In this framework, three components are highlighted. The first component 
incorporates contextual factors that will lead to the focused issues and shape the specific 
climate change policy network. The second focuses on structural and interactive features 
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of the policy network as intervening variable. The third is the policy outcomes and 
possible changes influenced by the policy network. Figure 2.1 presents a schematic 
overview of the model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1   Policy Network Analytical Framework 
Source: adapted from Adam and Kriesi (2007) 
2.5.1 Contextual Factors of the Policy Network 
A variety of factors influences the emergence and form of a policy network. 
These environmental factors “vary with the territorial and functional specificities of the 
policy network under study” (Adam and Kriesi 2007, 137).  Adam and Kriesi (Op cit.) 
suggest three contextual factors based on macro-political and domain-specific scope: 
international, domestic, and the policy-domain specific contexts.  
• International Contexts 
Whereas international contexts alone are not sufficient to explain the features of 
policy networks (Cowles et al. 2001), the “internationalized policy environments” have 
become important factors that influence the formation of policy networks and the shaping 
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of domestic policies (Coleman and Perl 1999; Adam and Kriesi 2007). In the study of 
climate change policy making process, global climate change regime forms the main and 
direct internationalized policy environments, and should be given considerations when 
analyzing of specific mitigation policy process. Section 2.3 has reviewed relevant 
literature on historical development of global climate change regime and its main 
characteristics.   
• Domestic Contexts 
According to Adam and Kriesi (2007), the structural and interactive features of 
policy network are influenced by the formal national institutional structure. Two 
perspectives, namely corporatism and pluralism, are commonly used to analyze the 
domestic institutional regime (Mol et al. 2001, 16). Katzenstein (1978) argues that the 
level of centralization in state-society relations, and the degree of differentiation of 
between the state and society are two critical variables in the establishment of policy 
networks. In addition, some studies show the importance of informal domestic structures 
for explaining the development of policy networks (e.g., Kenis 1991; Knoke et al. 1996). 
Again, as regards climate change, the domestic institutional contexts are not sufficient 
factors for the emergence and development of policies (Mol et al. 2001). Literature on 
China’s policy process, including its institutional structures and ongoing changes under 
the economic reform, has been reviewed in Section 2.2. 
• Policy-Specific Contexts 
Even within the same country, the structure and function of policy networks 
differ from sector to sector and from policy to policy (Atkinson and Coleman 1995). 
Therefore, it is important to take a closer look at the policy-specific influences to the 
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policy networks in different sectors and at different times. Researchers (Adam and Kriesi 
2007, 141; Thacher 1998; Colman et al. 1997) claim that there are general and situational 
policy-specific variables that need to be considered. General policy-specific variables 
include policy incentives, the expectation, visibility/salience and traceability of the 
effects; while situational variables focus on the reasons for change within policy network, 
such as economic and technological development, and changes in ideas, values and 
knowledge.  
It should be noted that complex interactions of three contextual factors affect 
the development of policy networks, and the influences of these contexts cannot be 
distinctly separated. Furthermore, not all factors have the same weight, and some factors 
are conditional upon others (Kenis 1991). Adam and Kriesi (2007, 143) suggest the 
research should “look at the combined impact of different types of determinants”. In this 
study of China’s climate change mitigation policy process, the development of the 
international climate change regime and the development of Chinese political economy 
are treated as independent contextual variables that occur before other variables and 
impact the policy process; while policy-specific factor is treated as a “moderator” 
variable that set conditions or modify basic relationships under which an independent 
variable (policy network) exerts effects on a dependent variable (policy outcomes). 
2.5.2 Network of Actors  
The policy making process involves many actors. The actors come from three 
key institutional sectors: government, market and civil society (Metz et al. 2007). 
However, their roles, responsibilities and powers have changed in relation to social and 
economic changes over the past two decades. Whereas the government, defined strictly 
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by the nation state, remains the central actor in policy making, businesses and civil 
society actors are playing more prominent roles, although the specific level of 
involvement remains a hotly contested subject. In addition, the concept of government 
has become more inclusive and thus recognizes the contributions of various levels of 
government. Figure 2.2 shows the three components that constitutes the entirety of a 
society (state, market and civil society) and their actor compositions. Market and civil 
society actors form the non-state group. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2  Structure of a Society and its Actors 
Source: Metz et al. 2007; Howlett et al. 2007 
In practice, the boundaries between state, market and civil society are often 
complex, blurred and negotiated, reflecting the changing environmental contexts and the 
actors’ changing roles and functions. In addition, the definitions often run into difficulty 
when they are applied universally. For example, mass media play an important indirect 
influence on public policy making and are taken as crucial links between the state and 
society (Howlett et al. 2007).  Unlike most other liberal-domestic countries, in China, the 
Business actors include the commercial institutions which compete in 
the market for profits. In this study, it mainly refers to the regulated 
industrial companies of varying sizes, including public and private 
businesses.    
Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced, voluntary collective 
action around shared interests, purposes and values (Metz et al. 2007, 
713). Civil society actors include business associations, NGOs, 
coalitions, trade unions, self-help groups, mass media, professional 
associations, registered charities, etc.  
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mass media are mostly created by the state; therefore, the media are most often led by 
government officials and sometimes neglect their positions and voices. Another example 
is the widespread existence of the GONGOs (Government Organized Non-Governmental 
Organizations). In the Chinese context, they include trade unions, women’s organizations 
and some registered charities. They also include industrial associations, some of which 
are closely tied to industrial ministries, as well as public research institutes, which may be 
finically independent but organizationally are still attached to ministries (Wu 2003).  
The international system is increasingly influencing domestic political and 
policy processes and consequently changing the nature and style of the civil society 
actors involved in policy developments. For example, the IPCC is an international 
organization that assesses the human-induced impacts of climate change. It also 
facilitates discussions of domestic climate change polices and the development of 
important epistemic or knowledge communities (Metz et al. 2007). However, to put 
epistemic community as civil society actors is not without controversy. Biagiotti (2002) 
views epistemic community as a separate non-state group, as opposed to civil society 
actors and corporate actors.  
2.5.3 Impacts of Policy Network  
The policy network plays a crucial role in shaping and constructing responses to 
external factors and creating policy outcomes (Adam and Kriesi 2007). In the empirical 
study, researchers identify various dimensions for depicting policy networks and link 
them with policy outcomes. For example, in Mol and his colleagues’ model (Mol et al. 
2001, 26), network dimensions include resource dependence, boundaries of the network, 
and interaction. In Compston’s (2009) model, policy changes are caused by network 
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changes in dimensions of resources, preferences and strategies of network members, 
perceived problems and solutions, as well as formal and informal rules. Adam and Kriesi 
(2007) suggest the structural and interactive features within a network determine the form 
of policy change. The present study follows Adam and Kriesi’s approach and takes the 
actor identification, structure, and interaction as key dimensions in measuring features of 
policy networks.  
Policy outcomes, as the third component of the model, are measured with 
different indicators. Mol and his colleagues (2001) use effectiveness and legitimacy to 
evaluate the policy outcomes. Effectiveness is to evaluate the extent in which policy 
arrangements reflect more general policy goals and the extent to which these objectives 
are actually achieved. Legitimacy refers to the analysis of the fairness and 
communicative qualities of participation. Policy change can also be classified into 
different types. For example, Hall (1993) differentiates three orders of policy change: the 
maintenance of status quo, incremental change, and the dramatic shift in policy goals and 
arrangements. 
Climate change mitigation policy development is a continued and evolutionary 
process. The eventual effectiveness of policy design also depends on the implementation 
of policy instruments, and policy outcomes induce impacts on the future policy change. 
This study will incorporate the policy implementation into account and treat policy 
making as a cyclical process. Such “dialectical” policy network – policy outcome 
relations, as depicted by Marsh and Smith (2000), is diagramed with dotted arrow lines in 
Figure 2.1.  
49 
 
Notably, although such a model has not been used in the name of “policy 
networks” to analyze China’s climate change policy process, scholars have given the 
similar focus on the roles of the structures and interactions of public and private actors in 
studying China’s energy and climate change policies (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; 
Richerzhagen and Scholz 2008; Downs 2008; Zhou and Mori 2008; Bjørkum 2005; 
Constantin 2007).  
2.6 Hypotheses of the Research  
As mentioned above, this research will employ the policy network analytic 
framework illustrated in Figure 2.1 as a toolbox to guide empirical evidence acquisition 
and interpret relevant findings of China’s climate mitigation policy making process. In 
addition, the causal framework also provides insights on formulating research questions 
and working hypotheses, leading to in-depth investigation and verification. 
The policy network analytic framework, as shown in Figure 2.1 highlights three 
components of policy networks in conducting analysis of policy processes: the 
environmental context, the composition and features of policy networks, and the 
corresponding policy outcomes. The research questions and working hypotheses are 
drawn from some fundamental understanding of the interrelationships of these three 
component factors on the basis of previous observations, experience and understanding of 
China’s policy making process in general. Table 2.1 illustrates how the concern issues are 
translated into research questions, and what hypotheses are generated to address these 
questions.  
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Table 2.1   Concern Issues, Research Questions and Hypotheses 
2.7 Summary 
In the first part of this chapter, literature of policy process theory, global climate 
change regime, and China’s climate change policy development has been reviewed. To 
better understand the dynamics of China’s policy process in general and climate change 
mitigation policy process in particular, it is important to accept the fact that China has 
experienced significant changes under the reforms in aspects of the center-locality 
relationship and the state-society relationship. With regard to the study of climate change 
policy process, the actors involved in the policy process are not exclusively limited to the 
government regulators and decision-makers; rather, since climate change initiative is a 
No. Concern Issues Research Questions Working Hypotheses 
1 The functioning of the 
climate mitigation policy 
network 
How do the policy networks 
influence the proactiveness of 
developing climate change 
mitigation policies in China?   
 
Increasing interaction between 
government, business, and civil 
society actors will increase the 
likelihood of China’s taking a 
more proactive approach to 
develop effective climate 
change mitigation policy. 
2 The contextual factors of the 
policy network 
How does the political reform 
influence the choices of 
innovative mitigation policy 
tools, such as market-based 
measures and voluntary 
agreements?  
More fragmentation in the 
distribution of regulative power 
will increase the likelihood of 
China’s utilizing more 
innovative policy instruments 
and measures. 
3 The involvement of non-
state actors in the policy 
network 
How are the non-state actors 
involved in China’s climate 
change policy making 
process? 
Decreasing political control in 
policy development and 
implementation will encourage 
other actors, in particular non-
state actors, to exert greater 
effort in shaping mitigation 
policy.     
4 The operation of the policy 
network  
Under the rapidly changing 
international and domestic 
context, how does China 
arrange its institutions to 
organize and coordinate 
climate change mitigation 
actions?  
Increasing demand for shared 
responsibilities among 
ministries and provincial 
governments will increase the 
likelihood of stronger 
coordination by the central 
government.  
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dynamic and ongoing process, the more appropriate approach is to incorporate other key 
state and non-state actors who participate in policy implementation and may have 
influences in policy making. These actors, including government actors at central and 
local levels, business actors (e.g., regulated businesses, in particular large-scale energy 
companies), and civil society actors (e.g., industrial associations, NGOs, academic 
institutions, mass media), get involved in network due to the specific policy needs and 
may later influence the policy process through their interactions with others. 
On the basis of the relevant theories of policy network, in particular the causal 
policy network model proposed by Adam and Kriesi (2007), an analytic framework is 
developed in Section 2.5. The framework conceptualized the policy making as a process 
involving a wide range of actors who are mutually interdependent, and they form 
networks to address the external factors and determine policy outcomes and changes. 
This causal model is used to guide the empirical investigation and explain the working 
mechanism of China’s climate change mitigation policy making process. Before 
conducting the empirical inquiry of the mitigation policy process, the next chapter 
outlines the research design and methodology that have been adopted in the research.  
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Chapter 1 has identified the area of study as the dynamic process in China’s 
climate change mitigation policy making and implementation. In Chapter 2, an analytic 
framework built on policy network concept and theory has been developed to guide the 
empirical data collection and analysis. Chapter 3 describes the methodology issue used in 
my research. In general, the methodology employed is a combination of grounded theory 
and case study approach, which is qualitative and inductive in nature and evidenced by 
data from interviews, observations and relevant literature. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.1 describes the overall research 
design of this qualitative study. Section 3.2 presents the case study approach, including 
the purpose, the case selection criteria, and a brief description of the three cases. Section 
3.3 addresses the variable measurement issues and explains the dimensions in measuring 
the concept of policy network. Section 3.4 outlines how the data are collected and used 
for the research. Finally, Section 3.5 summarizes this chapter. 
3.1 Overall Research Approach 
To simplify understanding, Creswell (2007) has identified five approaches to 
qualitative research, including narrative research, phenomenology, grounded theory, case 
study, and ethnography. However, in real research, it is “possible to find two or more 
variations or combinations of these approaches within a single study” (Fraenkel and 
Wallen 2009, 427).    
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The overall research approach can be categorized as combinations of grounded 
theory and case study approach. Since few studies have addressed China’s climate 
change mitigation policy process; therefore, one of the purposes of this study is to 
generate grounded theories inductively from the collected data of China’s climate policy 
development as a part of the study. Under grounded theory approach, the “substantive 
and formal” theories are built and grounded in data of social inquiry through inductive 
and exploratory process. Grounded theory approach relies on a set of clearly formulated 
procedures for developing theory (Crotty 1998). According to Glaser and Strauss (1967, 
3-5), grounded theory is the best way of generating “initial, systematic discovery of the 
theory from the data of social research”, which helps to forestall the opportunistic use of 
logic-deductive theories that have dubious fit and working capacity. In this study, the 
propositions that reflect climate change mitigation policy making process in China will 
be explored by testing the hypotheses through empirical inquiry. The results will be 
referred and compared with the fragmented authoritarianism model, which has been 
widely taken as the most important model in studying Chinese policy process. Case study 
approach will be presented in detail in Section 3.2. 
To enhance explanatory functions of the policy network approach, researchers 
have tried to establish causal models to study relations between policy networks and 
policy outcomes. This study follows this logic to conduct the empirical work. Through 
inductive reasoning applied to three cases and guided by research questions, the research 
tries to generalize some essential features of China’s climate change policy network and 
understand how these features have influenced the outcomes of mitigation policies or 
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programs. Such an exploratory approach aims to conceptualize the similarities of an 
aggregate of individual cases and develop a set of logically-interrelated propositions.   
Three cases have been selected to facilitate elaboration of the mitigation policy 
arrangements under the Chinese specific circumstances. They are the national climate 
change mitigation policy in general, the CDM management rules adopted in 2004; and 
the Top-1000 Industrial Energy Conservation Program initiated in 2006. All three policy 
arrangements experience some changes, but remain in force till now. The next section 
addresses case selection issues in more detail. 
3.2 Case Study Approach 
The aim of this research is to examine China’s climate change mitigation policy 
making process and explain its working mechanisms. Employing the policy network 
approach, it will study the features of the policy actor networks and explain how the 
networks contribute to policy development. This section discusses the case study design 
and the appropriateness of this approach.  
3.2.1 Reasons for Case Study 
There are several reasons why the case study method has been chosen for the 
study. First, as discussed in the previous chapter, China has experienced rapid change in 
the past three decades due to reforms, and its state-society relationship has experienced 
profound changes accordingly. Despite substantial research on China-related issues, there 
are few studies that have focused on the policy process, and none on the climate change 
policy making process. Therefore, this study is largely exploratory in nature, and 
consequently, a case study approach is more appropriate for this inquiry. 
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Second, studying the policy process is a highly complex matter that requires 
tracing the process of policy development to understand the interactions of various 
factors. A quantitative approach based on statistics cannot cope with complex causal 
patterns and is limited by the number of homogenous cases; while case study method is 
sensitive to contextual factors and allows examining the multiple causes and interaction 
effects of the complex social world in detail (Ragin 2005).  
Third, on the basis of the International Energy Agency (IEA) information (IEA 
2010), the adopted climate change mitigation policies in China are still relatively small in 
number. Although all these policies aggregately contribute to the reduction of carbon 
emissions, each of them is unique in nature and difficult to compare. From the network 
perspective, each policy arrangement is matched with unique structures and interactions 
of state and non-state actors. According to George and Bennett (2005, 19), the case study 
method is generally strong to “closely examine the hypothesized role of causal 
mechanisms in the context of individual cases”.  
Finally, although the policy network analytic framework mentioned above has 
reflected causal mechanism among contextual factors, policy networks and policy 
outcomes in policy making process, it is still challenging to measure the indicators that 
best represent these components. Instead of using statistical methods that lump together 
dissimilar cases and rigidly require quantifiable variables, a case study approach “allows 
for conceptual refinement with a higher level of validity over a smaller number of cases” 
(Op cit., 19).  
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3.2.2 Case Selection  
In a country as large and diverse as China, the design of case study research in 
climate change mitigation policy process presents special challenges. These challenges 
come from the following four aspects. First, although China established the inter-
ministerial committee to address climate policy coordination issues as early as the 1980s, 
the great majority of the climate mitigation policies had not been formulated in the form 
of laws, regulations and guidelines until around 2005, the year when the Kyoto Protocol 
entered into force. Most of the policy statements are in forms of speeches or articles, 
presented by government officials, especially by those working with the inter-ministerial 
committee (Qi et al. 2007).  
Second, climate change-related policies overlap with other policies relating to 
economic development, environment protection and energy development. These policies 
are not climate oriented, but they treat the limitation and reduction of GHG effects as 
accessory benefits. Evidence shows that with the increased concerns on climate 
mitigation issues, governments at the central level and at the local level have paid more 
attention on the improvement of policy coordination and integration. Third, in China, the 
central government weighs much higher in initiating climate mitigation activities than 
local governments. Finally, there is a geographical mismatch in mitigation capacity and 
obligations among the regions. Provinces and regions in the western part of China that 
suffer from climate change negative impacts most have weaker capacities and resources 
to reduce GHG emissions compared with the coastal provinces and municipalities.   
The sample case/cases shall be the subset of the population, which are the 
climate change mitigation policies that have been adopted by the Chinese national 
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government. As a reference, IEA (2010) has identified dozens of climate mitigation 
policies, measures, and programs. These policies, in different forms, have mobilized a 
wide variety of actors to interact in taking mitigation actions.  
Stake (1995) claims that the case study should maximize what we can learn. 
This means to ensure the sample case/cases be more representative of the population and 
achieve maximum variability. Since the adopted climate mitigation policies, measures 
and program are unique and involve diverse actors, multiple case study design is 
preferable to a single case study. Each single case should be instrumental to learning 
about particular effects of the policy networks, and generalization will be refined through 
collective case studies.  
Due to the time and resource constraints for this research, it is only feasible to 
conduct a limited number of case studies. Criteria to select cases are important, especially 
given the inherent complexities associated with the policy types, scales, involved actors 
and time period under which mitigation policies take place. Given that many government 
programs cover interrelated subjects and involve multiple levels of government, market 
and civil society actors in operation, policy subsystem or domain is suggested as an 
appropriate unit of analysis (Sabatier 2007a, 4). Accordingly, the study will take the 
general national climate change mitigation policy development as a single case. The other 
cases will be nested within this broad case, and aim to provide unique evidence linking 
policy networks and outcomes. This arrangement generally belongs to the “hierarchical 
time-series and comparative-historical” type of case research design developed by 
Gerring (2004).  
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Two nested cases for in-depth empirical inquiry within the research were 
selected. The selection criteria are as follow: 
- Independence of the case. Independence is an important criterion of case 
selection (George and Bennett 2005). To this end, it is more feasible and appropriate to 
select a mitigation program, which is a focused arrangement aiming to realize specific 
policy goals and normally has a clear starting and ending points.  
- Involvement of actors. To maximize the independence, the cases with the 
“high degree of automaticity” (Salamon and Lund 1989) will be ruled out. These cases 
normally do not require detailed administrative action. For example, tax incentives are 
largely self-executing because individuals or entities will seek them out and make 
corresponding changes. In this study, the better cases are the ones that attract actor 
involvement, and incorporate relatively independent decision makings and a substantial 
degree of management efforts.  
- Representativeness of policy types. Since climate change mitigation policy can 
be broadly divided into two types: the one taking carbon emissions reduction as key 
objective (climate-specific) and the one taking it as accessory action (climate-related), the 
case selection thus will follow this typology.  
- Geographical and sector coverage. It is preferable that the nested cases are 
programs that are comprehensive and involves actions from more than one sector. In 
addition, the case policies are preferably policies that are formulated by the national 
government and implemented nationwide.  
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- Site and data accessibility. The selected cases should have achieved 
observable and measurable mitigation results.  The secondary data sources are accessible 
and individuals knowledgeable about the cases are willing to be interviewed. 
After the screening of China’s climate mitigation activities taken in the past few 
years, three cases have been selected: China’s national climate change mitigation action, 
China’s involvement in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) regime and the Top-
1000 Industrial Energy Conservation Program. The main features of the three cases are 
summarized in Table 3.1.   
Table 3.1   Main Features of the Three Identified Cases 
Policy/Progra
m 
Category/ 
Sector 
Domestic 
Governmental 
Actors 
Types Time Period 
Level of 
Actor 
Participation 
Policy 
Linkage 
(Scales of 
Action) 
Case1: 
National 
Climate 
Change 
Mitigation 
Action 
Frame 
policy 
State Council, 
NDRC, MOST, 
MOFA and 
other ministries, 
provincial 
governments 
Domestic 
mitigation 
policies, 
and 
measures 
From 
1988 to 
present 
 
From low 
actor 
involvement 
to high actor 
involvement 
International
-national-
subnational- 
local 
Case2: Clean 
Development 
Mechanism 
(CDM) 
Project 
Management 
(in force) 
Climate 
specific 
policy/ 
variety 
NDRC, MOST, 
MOFA, and 
other 15 
ministries; 
(limited local 
government 
involvement) 
Market-
based 
approach 
From 
2004 to 
present  
From low 
actor 
involvement 
to high actor 
involvement  
International
-national-
subnational 
Case3: Top-
1000 
Industrial 
Energy 
Conservation 
Program (in 
force) 
Climate-
related 
policy/ 
variety 
(industry) 
State Council, 
NDRC, NBS, 
Provincial 
government, 
associations 
(high local 
government 
involvement) 
Voluntary 
agreement 
03/2006 
- 
10/2008 
From low 
actor 
involvement 
to high actor 
involvement 
National-
subnational- 
local 
Voluntary 
agreement 
with strong 
regulations 
10/2008
- 
present 
According to Sabatier (2007a, 3), the policy process usually “involves time 
spans of a decade or more, as that is the minimum duration of most policy cycles.” For 
the climate change mitigation policy development in China, although the history is not 
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long (almost two decades if counted from the time that China approved the UNFCCC in 
1992), there have been substantial evolution with regard to policy development. Since 
this study focuses on the evolutionary process of policy development and network 
formation, the timeframe of each case can be broadly divided into several phases, instead 
of only a static analysis on network actors and their interactions. Next section briefly 
describes three cases. 
3.2.3 Description of the Cases 
Of three selected cases, Case 1 provides a holistic perspective of the 
development of climate change mitigation policy and action in China. It focuses on the 
regulatory evolution and the current advocacy for market-based instruments of China’s 
climate change mitigation policy making. The case is also characterized by the rapid 
growth of policy networks, in which a wide variety of government, business and civil 
society actors have closely linked and interacted. The time period, ranging from 1988 to 
the present, is divided into four phases, corresponding with the most important 
development in the international climate change regime (The establishment of the 
UNFCCC in 1992, the creation of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, and its entry into force in 
2005, are set as demarcation lines). The first case also sets a broader context in which the 
two other cases are nested.  
Case 2 of the CDM management policy development is a case of a policy 
subsystem, in which China is joining the international climate governance network and 
developing market-based approach to mitigate domestic emissions. The Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) is a project-based climate mitigation scheme under the 
Kyoto Protocol, which entered into force in 2005. The dual goals of the CDM are to 
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promote sustainable development in host developing countries and to allow industrialized 
countries to trade the emissions credits from their investments in emission-reducing 
projects in developing countries. The CDM allows China to develop emission reduction 
projects and trade credits in international carbon market. The future development of the 
CDM scheme depends on the international climate change regime after 2012. After 
several years’ capacity building experience, in 2004, Chinese government promulgated 
interim CDM management rules, established administrative institutions, and formally 
initiated CDM project development. One year later, the interim rules was rescinded and 
replaced by an updated one, which specifies new rules for actors involved in the project 
activities.  
The third case of the Top-1000 Industrial Energy Conservation Program deals 
with joint development of climate-related program in industrial sectors. Under this 
program, governments at provincial level sign contracts with local enterprises and 
oversee the enterprises to reach the contracted energy efficiency goals. Modeled on 
international target-setting programs, the Program has been implemented since March 
2006 and is frequently referred to as a voluntary program. The industries included in the 
program are large-scale, financially independent enterprises widely dispersed in the 
country, representing more than 33% of China's total energy demand and 47% of the total 
industrial energy consumption in 2004 (Price and Wang 2007). Notably, this is the first 
time that the central government has incorporated provincial governments to supervise 
and monitor program implementation. Initially, only limited policies and incentives were 
provided to the involved enterprises. However, realizing the goal of reducing energy 
intensity by 4% per year was difficult to meet, from September 2008, China has adopted 
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new financial and administrative measure to strengthen the enforcement, and expand the 
program to a larger scale.  
3.3 Dimensions to Measure the Policy Network  
As shown in the analytic framework in Figure 2.1 of Chapter 2, the policy 
network is shaped by the environmental contexts and will determine the policy outputs 
and outcomes. Considering there are different approaches to use the policy network 
concept and in order to guide data collection in three case studies, it is of importance to 
define dimensions that can characterize the main features of policy networks.  
Three dimensions are distinguished to identify the features of policy networks. 
Since policy networks are a collection of mutually dependent actors, the first dimension 
often refers to specifying the boundaries of the system, which include the membership of 
the network and the attributes of these actors. The members are those actors that take part 
in the exchange of resources (Liefferink et al. 2000). They can be institutional actors, as 
well as the individual actors. The attributes of actors may include the goals, perceptions 
of the issues, and the strategies the actors employed (Zheng et al. 2010; Adam and Kriesi 
2007).  
The second dimension of policy network deals with structural features, which 
characterize the distribution and mobilization of power among the set of actors within a 
policy subsystem (Adam and Kriesi 2007, 134). The dimension is “concerned with 
whether power is concentrated in the hands of one dominant actor or coalition of actors 
or whether it is shared between actors or coalitions of actors” (Op cit., 134). The relations 
of power and resources inside the network are the core element of the policy network; 
however, the policy process may also be affected by links with networks around adjacent 
63 
 
policy issues, which are labeled by some scholars as “horizontal” element of the network 
structure (Liefferink et al. 2000). In the case of studying national climate change policy, 
not only the structural features of key state and non-state actors will be studied, but also 
network structural links with other related policy issues will be included, such as issues 
of economic development, environmental protection and energy management. 
The interactions in policy networks, which are presented by the degree of 
cooperation among actors, constitute the third dimension. Adam and Kriesi (2007, 134) 
define three forms of interactions between network actors and put them into a continuum: 
conflict/competition, bargaining/negotiation, and cooperation, in which “bargaining 
constitutes an intermediate or ambivalent type characterized by both conflict/competition 
and cooperation”. The interaction dimension allows a better connection of 
“configurations of policy networks to policy dynamics” (Op cit. 134). 
With the help of these three dimensions, the shape and functioning of China’s 
climate change mitigation policy networks will be empirically investigated in the coming 
chapters. At the same time, the features of the policy networks will be linked to the 
analysis the policy contexts and policy outcomes.  
3.4 Data Collection and Analysis 
3.4.1 Data Collection Methods 
The data collection and analysis are to provide sufficient and reliable 
information to support project study. On the basis of the analytic framework, the 
empirical data have been collected focusing on the three aspects of the policy processes: 
policy contexts (international, domestic and policy-related), policy networks, and policy 
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outcomes. Both primary data and secondary data have been used. They are from archival 
records, documental research, in-depth interviews, and field research.  
The major source of information for this study is from different kinds of 
literature: books, newspaper, journal papers, articles, government documents about the 
climate change regime, Chinese politics, and Chinese climate change policy. The reason 
of taking literature as major source of information is because of its advantages in 
accessibility and coverage. On the other hand, in China, interviewing relevant officials 
inside the system has been proven hard, and governmental officials are reluctant to be 
interviewed. However, some of the sources from literature should be used with caution, 
given the fact that information is sometimes subject to governmental control in China, 
and the reliability of Chinese data has frequently been questioned. It is not possible to 
avoid these problems when doing research about China, therefore, in this study, 
information from multiple resources has been triangulated to improve the reliability of 
data.   
In addition to literature, a series of semi-structured interviews have been taken 
to collect primary data and deepen the understanding of empirical inquiry. The interviews 
were conducted from November 2009 to February 2010 during the course of three-month 
of fieldwork in two Chinese cities: Beijing and Shenyang. Beijing was selected because 
of its position as the political center where key government agencies are located, as well 
as the place where a variety of international and domestic society and organizational 
actors are found. Shenyang is the capital city of Liaoning province, which is the home of 
many of the heavy industries and has high stakes in implementing climate change 
policies. The visited sites included regulatory agencies and participatory (or regulated) 
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units related to the key climate mitigation policy making and implementation. The 
interviewees were government officials, research scholars, business consultants, and 
other practitioners from relevant governmental agencies, international organizations, 
research institutions, and businesses. Interviews conducted in the two cities have 
provided very useful background information about how the national climate change 
mitigation policy is oriented to fit into local interests.   
3.4.2 Within-case Analysis and Cross-case Analysis 
In reality, it is almost impossible to apply experimental methods or make 
perfectly controlled comparison to analyze processes and outcomes of policies, which 
weakens the rigorous application of comparative method (George and Bennett 2005, 151-
153). However, within-case analysis provides an alternative approach that “compensates 
for the limits of both statistical and comparative case analyses” (Op cit., 178).  
To examine the institutional and historical development of China’s climate 
change mitigation policy process in individual cases, the central task is to link numerous 
observations within a case in particular ways to make them possible for casual inferences. 
The policy network analytical framework developed in previous chapter provides a 
causal linkage of some key factors to guide for empirical evidence acquisition. The 
employment of the within case approach is thus to trace key policy changes in each of the 
three cases, test hypotheses concerning roles and functions of policy networks, and 
uncover a causal mechanism posited by the analytic framework.   
On the other hand, since there is a paucity of research on the process of China’s 
climate change mitigation policy making and implementation, it is expected that the 
study can generalize some commonalities from the three cases through the cross-case 
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analysis. The cross-case approach is taken as an alternative approach of within-case 
analysis which focuses on examining individual causal links (Eisenhardt 1989). Although 
the multiple case study design may implicitly enhance the representativeness of the study, 
making case studies more generalizable, the cross-case analysis also suggests a weakness 
of comparability. As Gerring (2004) claims, the tradeoff between comparability and 
representativeness is intrinsic to the case study choice of research design. Given that three 
selected cases are different but mutually related mitigation arrangements, it should be 
noted that in the study, the cross-case analysis is used to comparatively generalize some 
commonalities of key features in processing climate mitigation policies in China.  
In a word, when analyzing empirical evidence, the within-case analysis is in 
conjunction with cross-case analysis, in order to generate and verify some propositions at 
the abstract level for theory testing and development. The within-case and cross-case 
analyses will be taken in Chapter 8.  
3.5 Summary  
This chapter has presented the methodology to be used in conducting the 
research. In general, the study is exploratory and inductive in nature. To study China’s 
climate change mitigation policy process from the perspective of policy network 
development, the multiple case study method has been employed.  
Three cases have been selected from a pool of the climate change mitigation 
policies that have been implemented and are still in force. These cases were used to 
illuminate the main features of the specific policy network settings in shaping different 
policy arrangements and influencing the outcomes in the Chinese context. The first case 
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examines the regulatory evolution of China’s climate change mitigation policy making 
since the late 1980s. The second and the third cases deal with sub-policies. Case 2 
focuses on China’s involvement in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) regime, 
and Case 3 studies China’s attempt to initiate industrial voluntary-agreement program: 
the Top-1000 Industrial Energy Conservation Program. 
The main data source was documentary literature published in English and/or 
Chinese, including government documents, books, journals, newsletters, newspapers, 
research reports, and other materials on the internet. Fieldwork and interviews were taken 
as supplementary sources of information. Important data are checked to improve the 
reliability of information for analysis. In addition, within-case analysis is taken to test 
relevant hypotheses; while cross-case analysis is taken to generalize some findings to 
verify the prevailing understanding of policy process.   
Before presenting the findings from the three cases, next chapter provides a 
historical overview of China’s climate change policy development. Considering that Case 
1 deals with generic evolution of China’s climate change mitigation policy making, and 
Case 2 and 3 are nested within it, the presentation of overall policy development not only 
traces substantive information for Case 1, but also provides contextual background for 
the discussion of the other two cases. 
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CHAPTER IV 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA’S CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION 
This chapter presents historical development of China’s national climate change 
mitigation policy making and action, which is also taken as contextual background of the 
three cases. The historical development is usefully divided into four phases: (1) the 
Institutional Preparation Period, from 1988-1992, when climate change had been 
transformed into a policy issue, and the Chinese central government began to establish its 
first inter-ministerial committee to prepare for international climate negotiations and 
cooperation; (2) the Pre-Kyoto Period, from 1993-1997, when international community 
centered on negotiating a legally binding commitment that can be more broadly accepted 
by involved parties; (3) the Kyoto Ratification Period, from 1997 to 2005, when the 
Kyoto Protocol was stalled from its signing in 1997 and finally entered into force, and 
when China had been hesitatively involved in pilot mitigation project cooperation; (4) the 
New Development Period since 2005, when China began to adjust its strategies to be 
more proactive in promoting mitigation policies and participating in international 
negotiations.  
4.1 Formulating Climate Institutions, 1988- 1992 
In the late 1980s, climate change entered into the international political agenda. 
As an intergovernmental scientific group to provide authoritative assessment of the 
potential risks of climate change caused by human activity, the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) was created in August 1988 by the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP). In 
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response to the international scientific effort, at the same year, the Chinese government 
established its first research group to coordinate participation in the IPCC-related work. 
The Environmental Protection Commission of the State Council brought together four 
agencies: the State Meteorological Administration (SMA), the State Science and 
Technology Commission (SSTC), the National Environmental Protection Agency 
(NEPA), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). Among the four agencies, the 
SMA played the leading role in directing the studies on the science of climate change; the 
SSTC was in charge of the development of relevant response strategies; the NEPA was 
responsible for the assessment of the climate impacts; and finally, the MOFA coordinated 
the international climate negotiations. At this early stage, the climate change issue was 
taken more as a scientific and international relations issue, rather than an economic 
development issue (Economy 1997, 24).  
Substantial administrative reforms also were undertaken in 1988. The Ministry 
of Energy (MOE) was reestablished, and the National Environmental Protection Agency 
(NEPA) was separated from the Ministry of Urban-Rural Construction, forming as a 
vice-ministerial agency. However, during this period, economic growth in China 
experienced a big fluctuation under unstable political conditions. The serious inflation in 
1988 was followed by a program of economic retrenchment imposed in late 1988 and 
tightened after the Tiananmen event in June 1989, which led to serious economic 
recession and subsequent social dislocation (Saich 2004, 74). Chinese decision makers 
had to reconsider development strategies for economic growth, and at the same time, deal 
with greater challenges of international relations with the end of the Cold War. In late 
70 
 
June of 1989, Jiang Zemin was appointed to replace Zhao Ziyang as the General 
Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party.   
  In 1990, the IPCC released its First Assessment Report, reporting that global 
temperatures having increased by 0.3 to 0.6 C over the previous century. The scientific 
discussions concerning climate change began and proceeded with more political 
negotiations. In 1991, Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) for Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (INC/FCCC) was established by the UN General 
Assembly, with the aim of negotiating a convention containing commitments before the 
UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), scheduled for June 1992. 
At the same time, Global Environmental Facility (GEF) was established to help 
developing countries fund projects and programs in the areas of climate change, 
biodiversity, international waters, and stratospheric ozone protection. 
Correspondingly, in China, the National Climate Change Coordination Group 
(NCCCG) was established under the Environmental Protection Commission of the State 
Council. The coordination group was chaired by Song Jian, then State Councilor, as well 
as the Minister of the SSTC. The core member agencies included the four initially-
appointed agencies working for IPCC tasks, and two newly added ministerial agencies, 
namely the MOE and the State Planning Commission (SPC). The Secretariat of the 
NCCCG was placed within the State Meteorological Administration (SMA).  
The functioning of the NCCCG was greatly driven by the international climate 
scientific discussions and political negotiations. Three issues emerged as especially 
critical for China. The first issue was the scientific uncertainties of climate change. The 
scientific debates of climate change provided Chinese scientists an opportunity to 
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participate in international cooperation. The SSTC and the SPC negotiated a five-year 
global climate change research program, which encompassed 40 projects and involved 
about 20 ministries and 500 experts (Economy 1997, 24). More importantly, under the 
auspices of the IPCC process, the scientific community in China had gained tremendous 
funding and technical assistance from international organizations, such as the World 
Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the United Nations Environmental Program 
(UNEP) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (Op cit., 24).  
The second issue concerned the relationship between carbon reduction and the 
country’s energy and economic development. By 1990, with 10.6% of the global carbon 
dioxide emission, China had become the third largest emitter in the world (EIA emission 
database). China had felt pressures to respond to the climate change issues. It had to 
adjust its coal-dependent energy structure, improve energy efficiency, and slow its 
economic growth rate. Differences existed among the ministries within the NCCCG, in 
which the MOE and the SPC gave more priority on the economic development, rather 
than energy restructuring. Apparently, after the economic recession in 1989, the national 
economic policy during 1990-1992 was set to increase the economic growth rate.  
The third issue was the position and readiness that China would formulate for 
the international climate change negotiations. Allying with other developing countries as 
one group (G77 and China), China resisted any claims of the mandatory commitment of 
reducing carbon emissions. The group argued that commitments should be differentiated 
between developing countries and developed countries, because of the historical 
responsibility and per capita emissions; and the developed countries should undertake the 
responsibility to reduce emissions first; transfer energy-efficient technologies; and 
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provide financial assistance to developing countries for capacity development. In addition, 
the developing countries worried that strong institutional and implementation 
mechanisms (such as detailed reporting requirements, noncompliance procedures) might 
infringe on their sovereignty. Within the NCCCG of China, the traditionally powerful 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Planning Commission dominated the political 
discussions.      
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) 
was held in June 1992 in Rio De Janeiro, Brazil, with the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (FCCC) signed. Industrialized countries were required to adopt policies 
that aimed to return emissions to 1990 levels by the end of the century. Aiming to 
stabilize the GHG concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system, the FCCC set an overall framework for 
intergovernmental efforts to tackle climate change. It calls on the international 
cooperation on sharing information on GHG emissions, national policies and best 
practices, as well as preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change. The FCCC 
adopts the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities”, which requires the developed countries to take the lead in combating 
climate change and the adverse effects thereof, and gives no specific responsibilities to 
developing countries. The successful opposition of the differentiation among developing 
countries based on their different levels of development matched very well with Chinese 
interests (Bjørkum 2005).  
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4.2 Pre-Kyoto Preparations, 1992-1997  
Internationally, after the Rio Earth Summit, six more INC meetings had been 
held till the FCCC finally entered into force in 1994. One year later, at the First 
Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 1), some significant outcomes were reached, 
including the negotiation of a protocol that contains legally binding commitments for 
developed countries for post-2000 period, and a initiation of a pilot phase of “joint 
activities”, called the Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ). 
The core issue of the COP 1 was the proposal of negotiating a protocol. On this 
issue, the Chinese delegation was skeptical of the new proposal to follow up the 
Convention, and expressed that it was not interested in negotiating it before the Annex I 
Parties had implemented all their commitments in accordance with the Convention (ENB 
1995, 4). In addition, together with the G77, China expressed their skepticism of the 
proposed AIJ activities, fearing the AIJ scheme would launch mandatory commitments 
for developing countries, thus shifting the responsibility of developed countries (ENB 
1996).   
Domestically, the year 1992 also proved to be a watershed of large-scale 
transformation from planned economy to market-oriented economy. Shortly after Deng 
Xiaoping’s south-tour speech on economic growth, a new round of economic reform was 
launched, leading to a dramatic economic boom. In late 1993, the Third Plenum of the 
Fourteenth Party Congress adopted the document of establishing a “Socialist Market 
Economic System”. The reform, under the formulation of “socialist market reform”, 
allowed market forces to play a great role in allocating commodities while retaining the 
state the capacity to make macro-level adjustments and control (Saich 2004, 78).  
74 
 
The rapid economic boom caused another round of overheating, forcing the 
government to adopt some retrenchment policies to achieve an economic soft-landing. To 
adapt to the needs of the market economy, the economic reform document adopted in 
1993 proposed the need for restructuring the central-local financial system, which 
signified a renewed role of central government in revising de facto economic 
decentralization. At the same year, the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) 
was set up and the Ministry of Energy was abolished. With these efforts, the economic 
growth rate has been calmed from 13.4% in 1993 to 8.8% in 1997, and inflation rate 
reduced from 30% by the end of 1994 to 0.8% by the end of 1997. However, China’s 
share in the global carbon emissions kept on growing, creeping up from 11.5% in 1992 to 
13.4% in 1997 (EIA 2010).   
During this period, the responsibilities of the NCCCG were diversified into four 
groups, consistent with the group division of IPCC operation. These four working groups 
dealt with specific tasks that link international climate change regime negotiations. The 
four groups were (1) the Working Group for Scientific Assessments co-chaired by the 
State Meteorological Administration (SMA) and the Chinese Academy of Sciences 
(CAS); (2) the Working Group for Impacts and Response Strategies, co-chaired by the 
SSTC and the NEPA; (3) the Working Group for Economic Analyses co-chaired by SPC 
and Ministry of Eclectic Power; and (4) the Working Group for Negotiation co-chaired 
by MFA and the SSTC (Tiempo 1997). Other ministries and agencies were also involved 
in the relevant domestic policy discussions dependent on specific requirements of each 
working group within the NCCCG. In January 1995, the National Climate Center was 
established under the SMA and aimed at cooperating with international counterparts to 
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enhance the research work of climate change. Whereas the SMA remains the nominal 
leading agency of the NCCCG, its authority in policy coordination had been greatly 
weakened. The structure of the NCCCG framed the future institutional arrangements for 
China’s climate change governance.   
A related program with the climate change negotiations is the Agenda 21, which 
was agreed in the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and set blueprints for sustainable development 
into the 21st century. In China, the State Council delegated the NDRC and the SSTC as 
two leading agencies in coordinating activities for sustainable development. In March 
1994, for guiding the implementation of projects under China’s Agenda 21, the 
administration office was established under the SSTC (predecessor of the Ministry of 
Science and Techonology).  However, the institutional establishment of China’s Agenda 
21 Program and its evolution are separate from the arrangements for climate change 
issues (Zhou and Mori 2008, 196). With the entry of the new millennium, the roles of this 
program have been gradually marginalized in practice.  
In 1995, the First Conference of the Parties (COP 1) to the UNFCCC convened 
in Berlin, negotiating detailed and binding commitments for industrialized countries to 
reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. After nearly three years’ intense negotiations, 
in December 1997, at the COP 3 in Kyoto, Japan, an agreement, called Kyoto Protocol 
was adopted, which required industrialized countries (Annex I countries) to reduce their 
collective emissions of the six most important GHGs by an average 5.2% below the 1990 
level by 2008-2012. Within this group, countries are committed with differentiated 
targets. To facilitate developed countries in achieving targets with lower costs and 
promoting the sustainable development in developing countries, the Kyoto Protocol 
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contains three flexibility mechanisms: the International Emission Trading (IET) scheme 
which creates a market to trade surplus emission credits; the Joint Implementation (JI), 
which allows developed countries to cooperate in carbon reduction projects and transmit 
emission credits on the basis of such projects; the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), which allows developed countries to invest in emission reduction projects in 
developing countries and count the reduction against their own commitments. Although 
the details on operation of these mechanisms were not set out at the COP 3 and required 
further negotiations, the Kyoto Protocol creates a comprehensive, yet flexible GHG 
emission reduction regime and signifies the beginning of a long-term international effort 
to address climate change. 
During the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, China, together with the G77, resisted 
any proposal that requires commitments from developing countries. They argued strongly 
for obeying the principle of “common but differentiated responsibility” that has been 
explicitly formulated in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (Bjørkum 
2005). China and other developing countries also objected to the emission trading 
approach, stating that it would be an instrument that would make developed countries 
exempt from domestic mitigation actions. In general, the developing countries proved to 
be quite influential in Kyoto. No timetable and emission reduction targets were mandated 
for developing countries (ENB 1997, 15). 
4.3 Piloting for the Kyoto Protocol, 1997-2005 
After the Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997, the subsequent negotiations have 
evolved around its rules of procedure and how to make the Protocol ready to enter into 
77 
 
force. Although this had been more of a matter of how to make the agreement acceptable 
for certain developed countries, China continued to argue against on any compulsory 
emission reduction commitments to developing countries by emphasizing that its CO2 
emissions per capita were sill 61% of the world average level and 21% of the OECD 
countries1
To set up an administrative system adapting to market economy, in March 1998, 
a new round of administrative reform was launched, marked by a more powerful 
restructuring of governmental institutions. In the reform, the number of 
ministries/commissions decreased from 40 to 29. The SPC was reshuffled as State 
Development and Planning Commission (SDPC), the NEPA was updated to a ministerial-
 (He et al. 2007). Furthermore, being aware of the limited weight of acting in 
isolation, China tried to strengthen its solidarity with the G-77 group to enhance their 
joint negotiating capacity on all major issues. For the Chinese government, another 
concern was how China could deal with the CDM scheme, once the Kyoto Protocol could 
have been ratified (Harris and Yu 2005, 53). China took two approaches to seek some 
breakthrough. On the one hand, it stressed that the emission trading through CDM is a 
way for developed countries to avoid their responsibility and has the potential to exploit 
the developing countries’ rights of ownership to the credits. On the other hand, China 
initiated four Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) projects (precedent of the CDM 
projects) by cooperating with Japan and Norway. The pilot phase of AIJ provided a 
practical opportunity for developing methodologies and accumulating project 
management experience (CCChina 2002). 
                                                 
1  OECD stands for the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, an international 
organization of 34 countries founded in 1961to stimulate economic progress and world trade. Most OECD 
member countries are high-income economies and are regarded as developed countries.   
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level agency: the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA). Numerous industrial 
ministries were dissolved or reshuffled as industrial bureaus attached to the State 
Economic and Trade Commission (SETC). The grand administrative reform also 
triggered the boom in the number of industrial associations at national level and 
provincial level. These associations, in the form of Government Organized Non-
governmental Organizations (GONGOs), not only served as service delivery agencies for 
the state, but also absorbed governmental officials who were laid off during the reform 
(Wu 2003). At the same time, China worked hard to resume its membership under the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). In November 1999, China signed agreement with the 
United States on the terms of WTO entry.  
A few months following the State Council’s institutional reconfiguration in 
1998, the inter-ministerial climate change coordination committee was restructured, with 
a view of improving the capacity of climate change related policy coordination. The new 
committee, the National Coordination Committee on Climate Change (NCCCC) was 
chaired by the SDPC. Other leading agencies included the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MOST), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the State Meteorological 
Administration (SMA), and the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA). The 
move indicated a shift of decision makers’ viewpoint of climate change from a scientific 
issue to a development issue. Zeng Peiyan, then director of the SDPC, held the position 
of leader of the coordination committee. The Secretariat of the NCCCC was set in the 
Department of the Regional Development of the SDPC.  
In 2001, The IPCC released the Third Assessment Report on climate change, 
indicating the evidence of human influences on the global climate is stronger than ever. 
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In November, at the COP 7 in Marrakech, Morocco, the Marrakech Accords were 
adopted, clarifying the modalities, guidelines and procedures for the implementation of 
the mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol. The Marrakech Accords paved the way for 
Annex I Parties (developed countries) to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and thus bring it into 
force. This was seen as a significant event after the newly-elected US President George 
W. Bush had just announced in March that his administration would not support the 
Kyoto Protocol because it does not limit the emissions from developing countries and 
would be too costly to implement2
The imminence of the Kyoto Protocol implementation was clearly felt by the 
Chinese government, which began to change its strategy from “reactive” to more 
adaptive. In 2002, at the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in 
Johannesburg South Africa, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji announced China’s ratification 
of the Kyoto Protocol. After that, a number of capacity building projects were approved 
by the National Climate Change Coordination Committee (NCCCC). Most of these 
projects were focused on CDM project development and sponsored by international 
donors and foreign governments through bilateral agreements. To ensure a balanced 
distribution of these capacity building projects, the NDRC and the MOST negotiated with 
the donors to ensure that the case studies in these CDM projects would focus on emission 
reduction activities in different sectors and regions. Some of these pilot projects were 
later developed into real CDM projects. 
.  
                                                 
2 Notably, in 2002, U.S. President Bush announced a voluntary commitment to reduce the GHG intensity 
by 18% in 10 years as an alternative to the mandatory reductions under the Kyoto Protocol.  
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Although China had performed remarkably in quadrupling its GDP (Gross 
Domestic Product) while only doubling its energy use between 1980 and 2000, a new 
problem emerged at the turn of the century.  After a steadily decreasing trend of Chinese 
energy demand during 1997-2001, the figure bounced back from 2002; and the energy 
demand grew more quickly than GDP. The principle driver of this rise is an increase in 
the share of GDP provided by heavy industry, driven by the economic incentives (Downs 
2010). As Hochman and Zilberman (2010) argue, globalization and capital flows have 
lifted overall investment in China and contributed to China’s economic growth, which 
leads to more demand for energy. In 2002, the year subsequent of China’s entry into the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in China reached 
52.7 billion US dollars, increasing 12.6% compared with that of the previous year. China 
had surpassed the US and become the largest economy to attract foreign investment. 
Correspondingly, carbon emission has increased sharply. During 2001 to 2005, China’s 
share in the global GHG emission had increased from 12% to 19.5%, getting close to the 
United States, the traditional largest GHG emitter (EIA 2010). In 2005, China became the 
world’s fourth largest economy and its third largest trading power.    
The impacts of China’s rapid economic development were profound. 
Domestically, China realized that it is essential to adapt to these new economic, social 
and technological situations. With the new leadership under Hu Jintao (General Secretary 
of the Chinese Communist Party and President) and Wen Jiabao (Premier), a new round 
of administrative reform started in 2003 in order to accommodate the requirements of the 
country’s entry into the WTO. New ministerial agencies, such as the Commission of 
State-owned Assets Supervision and the Ministry of Commerce were established. The 
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SETC (State Economic and Trading Commission), which had been responsible for 
industrial sector activities, were integrated into the renamed National Development and 
Reform Commission (formally named as the SDPC). In 2004, the Chinese Authority 
raised the goal of “building a resource-efficient and environment-friendly society”, which 
signified the leaders’ serious concerns on China’s resources and environment issues for 
sustainable development. This led to a number of policies, programs and activities being 
initiated to restructure the energy mix and improve energy efficiency. 
The domestic climate change coordination committee was subsequently 
reorganized and expanded, increasing its members from 7 to 12. In 2004, under the 
NCCCC, the National CDM Board (NCB) was established, chaired by the NDRC and the 
MOST. The NDRC was also appointed as the Designated National Agency (DNA), the 
unit for approving CDM projects and coordinating international communication and 
cooperation. In mid-2004, the NDRC, along with the MOST and the MOFA jointly 
promulgated the Interim Measures for Operation and Management of Clean Development 
Mechanism Projects in China,  signifying China’s readiness for the implementation of the 
Kyoto Protocol mechanisms. It soon approved its first CDM project. In August 2004, the 
State Council approved the Initial National Communication on Climate Change. The 
Initial Communication provides a detailed picture of the country’s emission inventories 
and its activities within the context of climate change.  
More flexibility has been witnessed in Chinese climate change diplomacy 
during this phase. As an example, in July 2005, China negotiated a new climate pact with 
the United States, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and India known as the “Asia Pacific 
Partnership for Clean Development and Climate Change”. Six countries agreed to 
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cooperation on developing and transferring technology to reduce GHG emissions. The 
pact was non-binding and was announced to complement the Kyoto Protocol, not to 
replace it (APP 2010). 
4.4 Managing Changes, Post-2005 
With Russia’s ratification despite the US nonparticipation, the Kyoto Protocol 
reached the threshold and entered into force in February 2005. The entry into force 
strengthened the global mitigation effort by committing the Annex I countries to the 
legally-binding targets to limit or reduce their GHG emissions. The subsequent 
international negotiations have been focusing on long-term GHG reduction targets and 
timeframe, as well as agreement for the post-2012 period. As a party to the Kyoto 
Protocol, China has been actively involved in climate change negotiations aiming at 
creating a successor agreement. It stresses its lower per capita GHG emissions, and its 
special development stage of industrialization and urbanization.  
Although the CDM development had a relatively late start in China, this 
position has changed dramatically after 2006. The CDM has been seen as a vehicle that 
not only stimulates foreign investment in GHG mitigation projects, but also allows China 
to be seen as a proactive country on climate issues. In 2005, China revised its CDM rules. 
Three priority types of projects were identified: development of new and renewable 
energy, energy efficiency improvement, and methane recovery and utilization. The 
administrative approval procedures were also streamlined, making project development 
and approval more efficient. Since 2007, China has become the leading CDM host 
country in the world (As a single case, China’s CDM involvement will be studied as the 
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second case in Chapter 6). The market-oriented emission trading system has become 
accepted in China. In 2008, an emission trading exchange was established in Tianjin. The 
exchange, duplicating the model of Chicago Climate Exchange, intends to develop and 
promote the GHG emission trading in China. It aims to build partnerships with research 
institutions, financial agencies, accreditation units, and industrial associations in China. 
Continued economic growth in China has led to greater energy use and carbon 
emissions. A number of policies and programs have been adopted since 2004 to reverse 
the trend that energy consumption grew faster than economic growth. These domestic 
policies were aimed at adjusting energy and industrial structure and improving energy 
efficiency thus leading to the choice of energy intensity (energy consumption per unit of 
GDP) as the key indicator to measure policy effectiveness. In 2005, China announced a 
plan to increase the use of renewable energy from 7% to 15% of total energy production 
till 2020. In China’s 11th Five-year Plan adopted in 2006, China pledged to realize the 
reduction of energy intensity by 20% from 2005 levels during 2005-2010.  
With the new slogan of “scientific development perspective”, the new 
leadership under Hu and Wen has shown a higher degree of concerns about economic 
development, resource management, and environmental protection. In August 2005, the 
State Council issued the Notification on the Immediate Priorities for Building a 
Conservation-oriented Society and Several Opinions on Accelerating the Development of 
Circular Economy. In December, the State Council issued the Decision to Implement the 
Interim Provisions on Promoting Industrial Restructuring and the Decision to Strengthen 
Environmental Protection with Scientific Development Perspective. Various types of 
reports have been formulated and publicized through inter-ministerial cooperation to 
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reflect China’s concerns on sustainable development and strategies to address climate and 
environmental change.  Some of these reports include: Climate and Environmental 
Change in China (2005); National Assessment Report on Climate Change (2006);   
China’s Scientific & Technological Actions on Climate Change (2007); China’s Policies 
and Actions for Addressing Climate Change (2008); China’s Policies and Actions for 
Addressing Climate Change —The Progress Report (2009); and Resolution on Making 
Active Responses to Climate Change. 
It is reported that since 2006, China has surpassed the United States as the 
world's largest carbon emitter (EIA 2008). China realized the importance to explicitly 
explain its stance on climate change and its interests in international cooperation. After 
several years of gestation, in June 2007, China formally announced the National Climate 
Change Program, which conveyed consensus among Chinese top leaders on climate 
change mitigation issues (Li 2007). This new policy package focused on five key areas, 
namely, mitigation, adaptation, technology, international cooperation, and participation in 
the regional efforts. The program did not include mandatory quota and a timetable for 
aggregate GHG emission reductions; but it tried to integrate existing policies that 
appeared in relevant energy policies and the 11th Five Year Plan (personal interview with 
NDRC official).  
In the 11th National People’s Congress held in 2008, aiming to improve 
efficiency, reduce the cost of policy making and its execution, and straighten out 
problematic chains of command, several ministries were consolidated to form “Super 
Ministries”. Five super-ministries respectively overseeing industry, transport, housing 
and construction, human resources and the environment were restructured, including the 
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Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), which was upgraded from the State 
Environmental Protection Administration.  
Under the leadership of the State Council, institutions dealing with energy 
conservation and emission reduction were reformed to strengthen policy coordination and 
enforcement. The new national climate change coordination institution, the National 
Climate Change Leading Group (NCCLG), is chaired by Premier Wen Jiabao. The 
Groups members are commissioners and ministers from 20 different ministerial agencies. 
The NCCLG also acts as the highest-level policy coordination organ of energy 
conservation and emission reductions, with the name of National Energy Conservation 
and Emission Reduction Leading Group (NECERLG). These arrangements indicate the 
central government puts three issues of energy saving, pollution reduction, and climate 
change together and gives them parallel significance (Qi et al. 2008). The secretariat of 
the NCCLG was set in the reshuffled Department of Climate Change. Su Wei, a veteran 
climate change negotiator from the MOFA, was appointed to head the department (Wang 
2008). The commissioner of the NDRC, Ma Kai, heads the secretariats of two leading 
groups. 
Another milestone in China’s climate policy development is the gradual 
involvement of local governments. A series of capacity building projects or pilot projects, 
covering mitigation and adaptation activities, have been initiated in selected provinces 
and localities, under the supervision of local governments. The most prominent capacity 
building program is the Program for Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation in China, 
initiated first in 7 pilot provinces in June 2008 and extended to 20 more provinces. In 
addition, to ensure the achievement of intensity and pollutant reduction goals set in the 
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11th Five-year Plan, the reduction targets have been delegated to provinces and their 
related industrial businesses (to be studied in detail in the case of the Top-1000 Industrial 
Energy Conservation Program). Through such a traditional top-down approach, the 
government agencies beyond the center have been involved. 
From late 2007, the global economy has undergone recession. International 
climate change mitigation has confronted new challenges. With China‘s economy 
maintaining stable growth, it successively overtook Germany and Japan as the second 
largest economy after the US. Its position in international climate change negotiations has 
received more attention. Although China declines to accept any mandatory commitments, 
it has been mobilizing all forces at local, provincial and national level to address climate 
change and develop low carbon economy. In November 2009, shortly before the COP 17 
Conference in Copenhagen, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao announced that China would 
reduce its carbon GDP intensity by 40% - 45% by the 2020, compared with 2005 levels, 
and increase its renewable energy share to 15% of its total energy by 2020. This is 
another ambitious goal after its 20% energy intensity reduction goal set five years ago. 
Though it will not limit the possible increase in carbon emissions, it is the first time the 
issues of carbon emissions and economic development will be linked. In the speech at the 
Copenhagen Climate Summit, Wen Jiabao stressed Chinese efforts in carbon emission 
cuts, “This is a voluntary action China has taken in the light of its national 
circumstances. …… We have not attached any condition to the target, nor have we linked 
it to the target of any other country. We will honor our word with real action. Whatever 
outcome this conference may produce, we will be fully committed to achieving and even 
exceeding the target.” 
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Statistics showed that energy intensity was reduced by 19.2% during 11th Five 
Year Plan period. With a view of completing the 40-50% carbon intensity reduction goal 
by 2020, in March 2011, the reduction goal has been separated into energy and carbon 
intensity goals and addressed in the 12th Five-year Plan: during 2011 to 2015, China 
plans to reduce its energy intensity by 16% and its carbon intensity by 17%. This is new 
progress of Chinese climate change mitigation policy.   
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CHAPTER V 
CASE 1: CHINA’S CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION INITIATIVE  
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 has presented a historical overview of China’s climate change policy 
development, which provides contextual background information for the case of China’s 
climate change mitigation action. In the first case study, policy development is perceived 
as a process in which a variety of actors have formed networks and become increasingly 
involved in shaping and promoting climate mitigation policies through institutional 
improvement and policy coordination, in response to increased international and 
domestic concerns on climate change issues.  
According to the policy network analytic framework, the policy process is 
manifested in the evolvement of policy networks, in which the structures and functions of 
policy networks are shaped by the interplay of transnational factors, national factors, as 
well as policy-domain specific factors. In addition, structural and interactive features of 
policy networks influence policy outcomes and possible policy changes.  
Subsequent to the overview of the evolution of China’s climate change 
mitigation policy, this chapter focuses on the study of features and roles of networks in 
climate change mitigation policy process, and analyzes relationship between policy 
contexts, networks and outcomes. Such arrangements generally follow the logic of the 
policy network analytic framework. The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 5.2, the 
actors involved in the policy process are identified; and their roles and network features 
89 
 
are presented. Next, the outcomes of China’s climate change mitigation policy and 
initiative are addressed in Section 5.3. Finally, Section 5.4 concludes the case.   
5.2 Network Actors, Structures, and Interactions 
5.2.1 Actors at Central Level 
The most important and consistent players in developing China’s climate 
change policy are the State Council and its affiliated ministries and departments. They 
formed networks to address contextual requirements. Over recent years, the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the National People’s Congress 
(NPC) have actively promoted climate change mitigation policies and activities.  
Since 1990, an inter-ministerial committee has taken on the role as the state 
institution that participates in climate change negotiations and coordinates climate related 
policies. Ministries and agencies within the committee vary in their degrees of influence. 
Before the restructuring in 1998, responsibility for the coordination was with the Chinese 
Meteorological Administration. After 1998, the NDRC, which represents the economic 
development interests, has played the role of pivotal agency in the coordination 
committee. Currently, the State Council leads national policy making and coordination 
among around 20 ministerial agencies involved in the policy making process. Table 5.1 
gives an overview of the evolution of the coordination committee. 
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Table 5.1   Evolution of China's Climate Change Coordination Committee 
Name of 
the Inter-
ministerial 
Committee 
Year of 
Form-
ation 
Chairperson 
Leading Agencies and 
other Operational 
Agencies 
Mandates/Functions 
National 
Climate 
Change 
Coordi-
nation 
Group 
(NCCCG) 
1990 Song Jian 
(State 
Councilor/ 
Minister of 
MOST) 
SMA; SSTC 
(Predecessor of MOST), 
NEPA, MOFA, SPC 
(predecessor of NDRC), 
MOE (dissolved in 
1998). Executive Office 
at the SMA. 
-Participate in 
international 
cooperation on climate 
impact assessment 
- Frame China’s 
position in climate 
negotiations 
National 
Coordinatio
n 
Committee 
on Climate 
Change 
(NCCCC) 
1998 Zeng Peiyan 
(Director of 
SDPC) 
SDPC (NDRC after 
2003) as chair agency; 
MOFA, SMA, MOST, 
SEPA, MOFA; and 
other seven agencies. 
Executive office at the 
SDPC/NDRC.  
-Arrange and 
coordinate related 
capacity building 
projects 
-Building consensus 
among agencies; 
-Frame national 
interests in negotiations 
2003 Ma Kai 
(Director of 
NDRC) 
National 
Climate 
Change 
Leading 
Group 
(NCCLG) 
2007 Wen Jiabao 
(Premier of 
the State 
Council); 
Vice Premier 
and State 
Councilor as 
Vice Chairs. 
External function of 
climate change 
negotiations is led by 
NDRC, along with 
MOFA, MOST, MEP 
(SEPA prior to 2008), 
and SMA. Internal 
function of energy 
conservation and 
emission reduction is led 
by the NDRC and the 
MEP, with involvement 
of other 20-odd 
agencies. Executive 
office at the NDRC. 
-Study and draft 
national strategies, 
policies and programs 
- Review and develop 
climate negotiation 
strategies 
-Implement programs 
in energy conservation 
and emission reduction 
 
It can be seen from the table above that the powerful macroeconomic agencies, 
in particular the NDRC, have dominated the climate change policy making over the past 
decade. And since the mid-2000s, with the implementation and enforcement of domestic 
climate-related policies been given a parallel significance with other priority issues of 
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energy saving, and environmental pollution control, the State Council has led the policy 
integration and inter-agency coordination (Qi et al. 2008).  
Among agencies within the coordination committee, there are clear divisions, 
which have been formed by the requirements of international climate change cooperation 
and negotiations, and domestic economic development. Five agencies, namely the NDRC, 
the MOST, the MOFA, the MEP, and the SMA, are the most important ministerial 
agencies that influence the national climate change policy process. Their divisions are 
summarized in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2   Division within the Inter-ministerial Coordination Committee 
Theme Working Group Chair Agency 
International Climate Change 
Negotiations, Cooperation 
and Policy Development 
Scientific Assessment  SMA and CAS 
Impact Assessment and 
Technological Response 
Strategies 
MOST and MEP 
Economic Implications NDRC 
FCCC-related Matters MOFA and MOST 
Domestic Climate-related 
Policy Formulation and 
Implementation 
Energy Conservation and 
Emission Reduction 
NDRC and MEP 
 
It is worth mentioning that besides the State Council and its departments, the 
Chinese Communist Party and the National People’s Congress have shown their positive 
position toward proactive mitigation activities. At the 17th Party Congress held in 2007, 
the party secretary Hu Jintao addressed that, in order to promote economic development, 
China should “improve energy, resources, ecological and environmental conservation and 
enhance China's capacity for sustainable development. … …, (and) enhance the capacity 
to respond to climate change and make new contributions to protecting the global climate” 
(Hu 2007). At the UN Summit on Climate Change in 2009, President Hu pledged China’s 
92 
 
continued efforts on addressing climate change and emphasizes  that “climate change is 
an environment issue, but also, and more importantly, a development issue” (Hu 2009).   
Two workshops have been arranged for Politburo members of the Central Party 
Committee during 2009-2010. The lecturers are influential Chinese scholars from 
universities and institutions, who have been highly engaged in international climate 
change negotiations and domestic policy discussions.  
In addition, in August 2009, ahead of the COP 15 Conference in December in 
Copenhagen, a resolution on climate change, named as the Resolution on Making Active 
Responses to Climate Change, was approved by China’s top legislature, the Standing 
Committee of the 11th National People's Congress (NPC). The resolution praised the 
effectiveness of the State Council’s work on climate change, emphasized the importance 
of the issue, and clarified guidelines, basic policies, as well as China's stance (NPC 2009). 
In early 2010, Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, reemphasized 
the importance of strengthening the legislative work in promoting green economy and 
developing low-carbon economy in China (China News 2010).   
5.2.2 Local Governments 
For a long time, climate change issues were treated as being well beyond the 
responsibility of local governments. The trajectory has changed since the mid-2000s. Qi 
et al. (2008) observed that three factors have caused the change: mandates from the 
central government, internalized needs, and the international market. After two 
mandatory targets (i.e., energy intensity and main pollutant emissions) were set in the 
11th Five-year Plan in 2006, a majority of  provincial governments have issued local 
regulations and set up provincial Energy-Saving and Emission- Reduction Coordination 
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Groups, with similar composition to the national one since late 2007 (Op cit.). Provincial 
governments also established target responsibility and performance assessment systems. 
Government at local levels (provincial, municipal and county) signed target contracts 
with higher-tier government. Their performance will be evaluated annually to determine 
the appointment of the relevant officials. For local governments, the activities to enhance 
energy efficiency and renewable energy provide an opportunity to gain mitigation 
benefits without compromising its local economic priority. Furthermore, CDM market 
development has driven Chinese project developers to invest in carbon reduction projects. 
The local governments and their agencies (such as local Development and Reform 
Commissions, CDM promotion centers) have been important supporters and supervisors 
of the CDM projects.  
5.2.3 Academic Institutions, Industrial Associations and Individual Experts 
A growing number of research institutions and academic organizations have 
been involved in climate change policy cycles. Some of these institutions are entities 
directly attached to the State Council, such as the Chinese Academy of Sciences; the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Some of the academic institutions have close 
relations with member agencies of coordination committee, such as the Energy Research 
Institute and the National Climate Center. In China, almost all ministries and agencies at 
the central level have research institutes attached to them. These institutes are 
traditionally government-sponsored, and now restructured as Government Organized 
Non-Governmental Organizations (GONGOs). With the new status, these research 
institutions undertake independent research normally delegated and financially supported 
by decision-making agencies. Table 5.3 lists the key research institutes attached to 
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leading agencies that deal with climate change issues. Their research broadly focuses on 
two areas: one is climate change sciences and technologies; the other is the impacts on 
development and China’s corresponding strategies. Since climate change covers a wide 
variety of issues, in practice, there is much cooperation and information exchange among 
these research institutions. They provide decision makers suggestions from different but 
complementary perspectives.   
Table 5.3   Research Institutes Involved in China's Climate Change Discussion 
 
Universities also make great contributions to the research on climate change 
policies. Some prominent contributors include Beijing University; Tsinghua University; 
Research Institutions Higher Authority Main research areas 
Chinese Academy of Sciences 
(a number of relevant 
institutes) 
State Council Scientific issues, and science-policy 
interaction issues  
Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences (In particular, the 
Research Center for 
Sustainable Development) 
State Council Policy issues, sustainable development 
strategy, climate change diplomacy, 
international cooperation 
Academy of Macro-economic 
Research (in particular the 
Energy Research Institute) 
NDRC Comprehensive climate change policy 
issues, energy policy advisory, energy 
development strategy, international 
cooperation   
The Administrative Center for 
China’s Agenda 21 
MOST Sustainable development policy 
research, national science and 
technology policy 
National Climate Center; 
Academy of Meteorological 
Sciences 
SMA Climate change impacts, climate 
adaptation policy advisory, IPCC-
related task work  
China Institute of International 
Studies 
MOFA Climate diplomacy, climate change 
and international relations 
Chinese Academy for 
Environmental Planning 
MEP Environmental protection and 
economic development, environmental 
impact assessment 
Chinese Academy of Forestry; 
Chinese Academy of 
Agricultural Science 
State Forestry 
Administration; 
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
Afforestation and Reforestation 
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Renmin University of China, Fudan University, etc. Sensing the great importance of 
explaining China’s climate policy to the outside world, since the COP 6 in 2001, China 
has sharply increased the share of delegates coming from academic agencies for 
participating in the FCCC conferences. A top-level climate change expert panel, 
consisting of 12 scientists from key Chinese research institutions was established in early 
2007 to provide strategic scientific support for decision making at the central level 
(personal interview). Another example is that for preparing the national communication 
report, under the joint guidance of the SMA, the MOST and the CAS, six government-
affiliated research institutes have jointly conducted national GHG inventory Project 
(Zhou et al. 2008).   
In China, industrial associations act as intermediaries linking government with 
industrial businesses. These sectoral associations, in the form of GONGOs, have received 
large amount of governmental resources, but the state also pushes them to be self-
sufficient and partially separate from the government. Most influential industrial 
associations evolve from industrial ministries and still have strong influences on 
industries. Sectoral associations contribute more practically to the information exchange 
and policy consultation on the study of climate change. For example, the Association of 
Energy Conservation has been actively involved in the design and implementation of 
industrial energy conservation programs.   
In general, researchers, experts and the public have enjoyed more freedom to 
voice their opinions which can reflect their individual ideologies and interests. Although 
individual experts tend to receive less attention than the authoritative organizations, their 
opinions can sometimes bring vibrant policy discussions. An example is that before the 
96 
 
Copenhagen conference in 2009, there was a heated debate initiated by Hu Angang, a 
famous scholar from Tsinghua University. With a more cosmopolitan perspective, he 
challenged China’s unwillingness to accept a mandatory mitigation commitment during 
the Post-2012 period (Liu and Yi 2009); however, his proposition was soon questioned 
by others, including some from the Chinese climate delegation. Hu insisted that he would 
not change his proposition and argued that was a better solution for China’s future 
development.    
5.2.4 Other Non-state Actors 
Besides academic institutions and industrial associations, there are other 
important non-state actors, including energy-intensive businesses, NGOs (Non-
Governmental Organizations), mass media. In general, these actors are relatively weak 
actors who have constrained space to play and limited resources to influence the state 
actors.    
Business groups have a wide variety of stakes in climate change policy 
development. The major industries of interest are energy intensive companies in fields of 
fossil fuels, automobiles, power generation, among others. However, the corporatization 
reforms since 1990s have decentralized much authority of supervision from the central 
government to provincial and other local-level governments and the state would no 
longer subsidize enterprises that were unprofitable (Richerzhagen and Scholz 2008). 
Because climate change policies are limitedly debated outside central government and 
potential conflicts exist between local economic interests and mitigation measures, 
industrial companies’ role in climate policy process has been marginalized. Still, about 
100 large-scaled industrial businesses are under the leadership and supervision of the 
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central government, represented by the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) established in 2003. These companies have closer 
linkage with central government agencies; but like the other companies, they are more 
concerned with the impact of potential climate regulations on their economic 
performance.    
In Western democratic countries, NGOs can play a variety of roles, including 
setting the policy agenda, providing policy advices recommendations, applying political 
pressure, monitoring government actions, and assisting policy implementation (Raustiala 
2001); while in China, the NGOs, especially the grassroots NGOs are not significant 
actors in the policy making process, because of being constrained by government 
administrative regulations and lack of funds and human resources (Economy 1997; 
Richerzhagen and Scholz 2008). Over recent years, there has been some improvement in 
that the NGOs in China are allowed and encouraged to initiate some awareness building 
programs, providing a complement to official actions. According to Zhao and Mori 
(2008), eight environmental NGOs have jointly proposed an action plan for combating 
climate change. In 2007, forty NGOs launched Energy Saving Citizen Actions to raise 
public awareness. 
The media coverage on climate change issues has been increasing remarkably. 
The media has been used to support official initiatives or provide supervision of policy 
implementation (Richerzhagen and Scholz 2008). Most media and NGOs regard 
themselves as cooperative partners with government, and they actively engage in 
reporting the progress of international climate negotiations and domestic policy 
development and practices.  
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5.2.5 Interactive Features of Policy Process 
The state and non-state actors identified above perform their functions in 
climate change policy development process through their interactions. The interactions, 
among and within state and non-state actors, are concentrating on major issues in which 
actors form networks in negotiating and advancing particular policy options. These 
interactions enable effective policy formulation and development. In China, climate 
policy networks are primarily driven by key government agencies at the central level, and 
can be broadly grouped into three functionally defined clusters, as shown in Table 5.4. 
Each cluster has a number of different government agencies. The market and civil society 
actors with distinctive tasks and functions are also involved in these clusters.  
Table 5.4   Composition and Focused Issues of China's Climate Policy Network 
Policy Focus 
(Cluster) 
Decision-making 
Agency 
Core Network 
Membership 
Other Key 
Government Actors 
Market and Civil 
Society Actors 
Economic 
Development 
and Mitigation The State Council, supported by the 
Central Party 
Committee and 
the National 
People’s Congress 
NDRC  
Relevant member 
agencies within 
NCCLG; local 
government  
Academic research 
institutions and 
universities; business 
actors; grassroots 
NGOs, mass media  
Climate 
Diplomacy 
MOFA, 
NDRC 
Relevant member 
agencies within 
NCCLG 
Academic research 
institutions and 
universities 
Climate Impacts 
and Technical 
Strategies 
SMA, MOST, 
CAS, NDRC 
Relevant member 
agencies within 
NCCLG 
Academic research 
institutions and 
universities 
 
The interactions among actors of policy networks have been evolving, reflecting 
the changes and interactive play of domestic and international contests. In general, the 
interactions of the policy networks are characterized by following features: 
(1) The State Council has led climate change policy making and implementation, 
as well as policy coordination. Consistent with other findings of the Chinese policy 
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process (Peng 2003; Pang and Zou 2008), in climate change mitigation policy making, 
the administrative measures and relevant policies developed by the State Council are 
reinforced by the political advocacy of the Central Committee of the Party. For example, 
at the Politburo study meeting in the early 2010, President and also the Party General 
Secretary Hu Jintao stressed that China must recognize the importance, urgency and 
difficulty of dealing with climate change, and the leadership will be working hard to steer 
efforts to realize the goal of 40-45% reduction of carbon intensity, of which China has 
shortly promised at the Copenhagen Climate Summit (ChinaDaily, 2010). In addition, the 
domestic climate policies and regulations have been facilitated by more legislative 
involvement of the National People’s Congress, as shown by the passage of a resolution 
on responding to climate change in 2009 (NPC 2009).  
 (2) The NDRC maintains a pivotal position at the ministerial level in 
coordinating and advancing the domestic climate policy process. Institutional and 
personnel arrangements within the NDRC are continuously adjusted in response to 
international and domestic political and policy needs. For example, in 2008, two new 
departments were established within the NDRC, i.e., the Department of Climate Change 
and the Department of Resource Conservation and Environmental Protection. The two 
departments are responsible for external and internal climate-related issues respectively 
(personal interview). In order to strength communication and dialogue in international 
climate change negotiations and cooperation, China also adjusted its personnel 
arrangements. Xie Zhenhua, former minister of the SEPA, became the vice-minister of 
the NDRC and the chief climate change negotiator. Su Wei, a veteran climate change 
negotiator from the Department of Laws and Regulations of the Ministry of Foreign 
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Affairs (MOFA), now acts as the chief of the Department of Climate Change and 
participates intensely in international climate negotiations.  
(3) Although climate change policy is primarily discussed within a small 
number of institutions (Liu and Yi 2009), expert consultation has gained more weight. 
Numerous academic institutions, universities, associations and think-tanks are involved 
in the process and contribute to the policy agenda setting, alternative policy discussions, 
public awareness building, and capacity development activities.    
(4) The climate change actor network in China has expanded to cover local 
governments, businesses and civil society actors, who have diversified interests and 
capacity; however, they are still peripheral actors. With the implementation of more 
climate mitigation policies and programs, more active performance of network actors can 
be expected, which interacts with the ongoing political and administrative reform 
initiatives.  
5.3 Climate Change Policy Outcomes  
5.3.1 Policy Outputs 
In the early phases of climate policy development, China’s climate mitigation 
policy was not found in forms of laws, regulations or guidelines by government, most of 
the policy statements existed in speeches and articles of government officials, with a view 
of clarifying the national position on climate change issues (Qi et al. 2007). Although 
China still rejects a mandatory mitigation cap on the ground of its unchanged status as a 
developing country, with mounting pressures on its growing contribution on carbon 
emissions and its climate stances, the central government has shifted its perspective of 
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climate change challenges from more of a scientific and environmental issue to 
predominantly a development issues. Without sacrificing the economic development 
which may cause higher unemployment and social instability, an important measure is to 
decouple the link between development and energy use, and to integrate the climate 
change into national development plans. In 2002, in the Communist Party Congress, 
China’s leaders outlined a goal of quadrupling the country’s 2000 Gross Domestic 
Products (GDP) by 2020, while only doubling energy consumption.  
Over the past decade, a number of policies and measures have been adopted and 
implementation, which involved a variety of state and non-state actors in the process. 
Table 5.5 shows major climate change policies and measures adopted that contribute to 
mitigation benefits.  
Some of these policies cover a wide range of sectoral areas that require a group 
of specialized agencies to negotiate a policy solution, and the Eleventh Five-year Plan 
provides a comprehensive development framework to guide relevant ministries or local 
governments to develop policies  in a reasonably coherent way. Another feature is that 
diverse policy tools have been introduced, such as regulative measures, administrative 
rules, laws, voluntary action, and market-based measures. The policy goals set by these 
policies and measures have been used as reference scenario for evaluating policy 
performance and analyzing future potential. In addition, the participation of climate 
mitigation activities has permeated to local areas, and local governments work in 
matching climate change issue with the local priorities.   
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Table 5.5   Major Climate Change Policies and Measures Adopted in China 
Policy/Measure Name Agency Objectives/ Mitigation Targets Type Year 
China’s Targets on 
Carbon Emission Cuts 
beyond the Kyoto 
State 
Council 
Reducing carbon intensity (carbon 
emission per unit of GDP) by 40-
45%, below 2005 levels by 2020 
Policy 
Statements 2009 
Program for Climate 
Change Mitigation and 
Adaptation in China 
NDRC 
Helping local governments build 
capacity; Drafting local climate 
strategies in accordance with the 
national program. 
Pilot 
Projects 
(from 7 
provinces) 
2008 
China’s Policies and 
Actions for Addressing 
Climate Change 
State 
Council 
Proposing a coordinated response 
toward national and international 
challenges 
Framework 
Policy 2008 
National Building Codes 
for Residential and 
Commercial Buildings 
Ministry of 
Construc-
tion Plan 
a 50% reduction of building's total 
operation load based on a building's 
energy consumption during the 1980s 
Regulatory 
Instruments 2008 
National Climate Change 
Program 
State 
Council 
Outlining activities both to mitigate 
GHG emissions and to adapt to the 
impacts of potential climate change 
Framework 
Policy 2007 
Closing Inefficient 
Industrial Plants 
NDRC 
Plan 
Closing inefficient cement and steel 
factories with outdated production 
capacity of 250 million tons and 55 
million tons, respectively, by 2010. 
Regulatory 
Instruments 2007 
Medium and Long Term 
Development Plan for 
Renewable Energy  
NDRC 
Plan 
An investment of 263 billion USD by 
2020 on renewable energy, and raise 
the percentage of renewable energy 
to 10% of total energy consumption 
by 2010 and 15% by 2020. 
Policy 
Framework 2007 
Energy Efficiency 
Appliance Standards 
NDRC 
Plan 
Reduce residential electricity use by 
10% by 2010, by promoting 
mandatory minimum efficiency 
standards 
Regulatory 
Instruments 2007 
Top-1000 Industrial 
Energy Conservation 
Program (presented as 
Case 3 in Chapter. 7) 
Inter-
agency 
plan, led by 
the NDRC 
Cutting energy use of the 1,000 most 
energy-intensive enterprises from 9 
industrial sectors 
Voluntary/ 
Regulatory 
Program 
2006 
China’s 11th Five-Year 
Plan 
National 
People’s 
Congress 
Reducing energy intensity by 20%, 
and reducing the main pollutants by 
10% below 2005 levels by 2010 
Framework 
Policy 2006 
Vehicle Fuel Economy 
Standards 
NDRC 
Plan 
The standards will be implemented in 
two phases. By 2008, average 
domestic passenger vehicles are 
required to meet 36 mpg 
requirement. 
Regulatory 
Instruments 
2005; 
2008 
(Phase 
Two) 
Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) 
Management Rules 
(Presented as Case 2 in 
Chapter 6) 
Inter-
agency 
committee 
led by the 
NDRC 
Regulate the CDM project 
Management (entry requirement, 
priority projects, approval 
procedures) 
Regulatory 
rules for 
carbon 
market 
trading  
2004; 
revised 
in 
2005 
Source: Pew 2007; Leggett et al. 2008; IEA 2010 
103 
 
With the experience accumulated, China has identified focused areas of 
mitigation-related action, as shown in China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing 
Climate Change, issued by the State Council in 2008. These action areas include (1) 
Restructuring the economy and enhancing industrial competitiveness; (2) saving energy 
and improving energy efficiency; (3) developing renewable energy and optimizing 
energy mix; (4) developing recycling economy to reduce GHG emissions; (5) promoting 
afforestation campaign and enhancing carbon sequestration capacity; and (6) intensifying 
R&D efforts (State Council 2008). 
5.3.2 Policy Performance  
As discussed above, the main climate change mitigation actions promoted over 
the last decade was largely due to the increased international pressures and domestic 
concerns on the impacts of resource and environmental constraints on sustained 
economic development. However, with rapid GDP growth, in absolute values, China’s 
energy consumption and carbon emissions have been continuously on the rising trend. 
Figure 5.1 shows China’s carbon emissions during 1990-2008, compared with the US and 
the EU countries. Before 2001, carbon emissions in China were 45-55% of the US level 
and 60-75% of the EU countries. However, driven by its rapid and persistent economic 
growth, especially after entering into the WTO, China’s carbon dioxide emissions 
increased quickly and overtook the emissions of the EU in 2003 and those of the US in 
2006.  
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Figure 5.1   Growth of China's Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
Source: EIA 2010 
In fact, what made Chinese leaders worried most since early 2000s was the 
situation that the energy consumptions, as well as accessory carbon emissions may have 
risks of increasing at higher rates than the GDP growth rates (see Figure 5.2 below).   
 
 
Figure 5.2   Annual Growth Rate Changes of GDP and Carbon Emissions in China 
Source: EIA 2010; NBS 2009 
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Seen from the Figure above, the annual GDP growth rate in China stabilized 
around 10% in recent years, while carbon emissions have undergone a sharp growth 
during 2001-2005. With a number of policies and measures implemented during this 
period, from 2006, the abrupt carbon growth trend has been stopped.   
The Chinese government has employed carbon intensity as key indicator to 
measure its energy-saving and corresponding mitigation performance. The decrease of 
carbon intensity shows the country’s achievements in energy efficiency improvement and 
its strategy in avoiding the economic slowdown. The central government seriously treats 
energy intensity reduction (20% reduction during 2006-2010) as a political target and 
requires relevant agencies, localities and sectors to strictly follow it. 
Internationally, China confronts increased pressure to reduce absolute GHG 
emissions. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) project development provides 
such a scheme that China can voluntarily participate and the GHG reductions are 
measured in absolute terms. Although disputes exist, the credits from CDM are 
measureable, reportable and verifiable. The CDM institutional arrangements in China 
effectively strengthened its competence in the global carbon market (Ganapati and Liu 
2008). With more experience gained, China attempts to establish its own cap-and-trade 
system domestically. Two carbon-trading exchanges have been put into operation in 
Tianjin and Beijing, which are supposed to provide an innovative platform for trading 
surplus credits among regulated businesses domestically, and successfully linking with 
other international carbon trading schemes. 
The absolute carbon emission reductions are also calculated to demonstrate 
China’s efforts in reducing or slowing down the GHG emissions. For example, in the 
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National Climate Change Program promulgated in 2007 (NDRC 2007), China announced 
that an accumulated 800 million tce (tons of coal equivalent) of energy were saved by 
economy restructuring and technical improvement during 1990-2005, which is equivalent 
to a reduction of 1.8 billion tons of CO2 emissions. Besides, through promoting new 
energy efficiency policies, a further 670 million reduction of CO2 emissions has been 
achieved during 2006-2008 in China (State Council 2009).  
However, using absolute CO2 emission reduction figures to evaluate policy 
performance is not without problems. One is credibility of the identification of reference 
scenarios. Can the historical development trends be taken as reference scenario or the 
targets set in the policies taken as the reference? The selection and measurement is still 
murky. The other problem is the lack of transparency and capacity in reporting some 
sensitive emission data in China. For example, research conducted by the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences (CAS) in October 2008 projected that China’s GHG emissions may 
more than double within the next two decades; however, Tu (2009) notes that the current 
GHG emission data was not given in the research. In addition, Seligsohn (2010) claims 
that China has less experience in GHG emission data collection and analysis, so it is 
urgent to improve its capacity primarily in emission data analysis and in creating a 
replicable and updatable system.  
5.4 Conclusive Summary 
China has been involved in global climate change scientific discussions and 
political negotiations since late 1980s. Consistent with the development of international 
climate change regime, the focus of domestic policy discussions on climate change has 
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shifted from a scientific issue to a development issue. More bureaucratic agencies have 
been involved in policy making and implementation; and the NDRC, the MOFA, and the 
MOST have gradually become the leading ministerial agencies in shaping China’s 
climate change mitigation policies. Most formal climate change mitigation policies were 
adopted and implemented after the mid-2000s, reflecting the requirements of 
participating in the negotiation of global climate change regime, and the constraints of 
domestic environmental and energy resources. In general, China is regarded as an active 
participator in climate change mitigation activities.  
There has been increasing interaction among government, market and civil 
society actors in participating in climate change mitigation activities. However, in China, 
the state government at central level, led by the State Council, dominates the climate 
policy making process. Local governments, private businesses, and other civil society 
actors, with diverse interests and capacities, are still weak actors. However, research 
institutions (such as universities, research institutes, and industrial associations) have 
gained more weight in policy consultation and advising. In addition, seen from the 
history of China’s climate change policy development and implementation performance, 
on the one hand, with the adoption and implementation of various types of climate 
change mitigation policies, the interactions among government, market and civil society 
actors have significantly increased; on the other hand, with the capacity enhancement and 
experience accumulation, China has demonstrated greater proactiveness and enthusiasm 
in promoting mitigation activities. However, China’s readiness and proactiveness is the 
result of joint influences of international, national, and specific-policy factors, not a 
single one.    
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China’s reforms since late 1970s have clearly led to an extremely varied pattern 
of administration and development. With economic transition towards market economy 
and economic integration with the world, structures and interactions of actor networks 
have kept on evolving. Although the extent of government’s intervention in economic 
and social development is frequently in debate, the relations between government and 
enterprises have been transforming towards more market-based, and localities have 
earned greater freedom from the higher levels. Under these contexts, innovative climate 
change mitigation policies have been allowed to pilot and diffuse to a larger scale. These 
policies include management rules that promote market-based CDM project development 
(presented as Case 2), and the Top-1000 Industrial Energy Conservation Program 
(presented as Case 3), which owns strong voluntary origins. It is fair to say that 
fragmentation of power between state and society is accompanied by the wider adoption 
of market-oriented policies and other flexible policies.  
The economic reforms in China led to a relaxation of political control over the 
economy and society, in part by design and in part by default (Saich 2004, 222). 
Accordingly, the social structure is redefined and civil society actors have gained more 
freedom and flexibilities in pursuing their own economic interests. Although a variety of 
civil society actors have been involved in the climate change mitigation activities in 
China, there is no evidence that their engagement is spontaneous and in tune with the 
mission targets set by government. Therefore, it is fair to say that roles and status of non-
state actors in ensuring effective policy implementation have been well recognized; 
however, as a group, their impacts on policy formulation and decision making are still 
limited.  
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Finally, climate change mitigation covers a wide range of sectors. With the 
development of international climate change regime, China has established a network of 
actors to conduct and coordinate national climate related action. The complexity of 
coordinating climate change mitigation and adaptation activities between diverse 
ministerial agencies, between central government and local governments, and between 
state and society has increased.  Seen from the historical restructuring of Chinese inter-
ministerial coordination committee, no single agency has such a powerful organizational 
authority to coordinate complex interests and concerns from other ministerial agencies. 
Therefore, the State Council becomes an inevitable institution to chair the institutional 
coordination and organize policy integration. Along this process, both the central party 
committee and the national congress have provided important support to the State 
Council.    
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CHAPTER VI 
CASE 2: CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM IN CHINA 
6.1 Introduction 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) regime is a project-based scheme 
under the Kyoto Protocol. It enables developed countries with emissions reduction 
commitments to use the credits generated, named as the Certified Emission Reductions 
(CERs), to count against their obligatory compliance targets through investing in 
emission reduction projects in developing countries. On the other hand, developing 
countries, through voluntarily participation, can gain access to necessary technologies 
and funds needed for sustainable development. The CER trading between developed 
countries and developing countries is realized in a global carbon market. According to the 
CDM regulations, host developing country government takes the responsibility to 
approve proposed projects based on national priorities. 
As a result of its increasing GHG emissions and great mitigation potential, 
China’s role and action in developing project-based CDM projects have been given 
serious international concern. At the same time, the CDM provides China with an 
important incentive to enhance capacity and participate in global carbon reduction effort. 
With the country becoming the world leader in gaining CER credits, China has learned 
how to use the CDM scheme to its advantage. 
This chapter uses the policy network approach to examine how the state and 
non-state actors have formed networks in promoting CDM projects in China. Following 
this introduction, the next section contextualizes the environment of CDM 
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implementation, focusing on how the CDM scheme has been initiated in China. 
Subsequently, Section 6.3 describes the further development and improvement of CDM 
institutions and actor network in China, which lead to the market performance and other 
outcomes in Section 6.4. Finally, the concluding summary is presented in Section 6.5.  
6.2 Contextual Background 
6.2.1 CDM Background  
The introduction of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) concept started 
years before the Kyoto Protocol was formally negotiated in 1997. As the precursor to 
today’s CDM and JI (Joint Implementation) projects, the Activities Implemented Jointly 
(AIJ) initiated its pilot phase from 1995 till 2000 and developed about 150 GHG 
reduction and sequestration projects in over 40 countries (Michaelowa 2002). The AIJ 
contributed to the experience learning in the GHG emission reduction activities prior to 
the Kyoto Protocol. With the AIJ’s progress in awareness building and capacity 
improvement, the CDM gained gradual recognition though the concerns on the 
procedures and risks remained (Kaupp et al. 2002; Bhandari 2003). It was not until the 
Seventh Conference of the Parties (COP 7) to the UNFCCC in 2001 that the CDM 
modalities, guidelines and procedures were adopted, which paved the way for further 
CDM institutional development.  
Under the Kyoto Protocol, the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting 
of the Parties (CoP/MoP), the Executive Board (EB), and the Designated Operational 
Entities (DOEs) are the key entities to the governance of the CDM. The CoP/MoP has the 
overall authority over matters pertaining to the CDM, in that it provides guidance to the 
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EB, makes decisions on rules of procedure, and maintains an equitable distribution of the 
CDM projects amongst non-Annex I countries. The EB is charged with the supervision 
and approval of the CDM projects through affiliated panels or working groups. The 
DOEs are accredited by the EB to specifically perform the validation, verification and 
certification functions for a CDM project. Project proponents can select one DOE to 
validate its project and another DOE for project verification and certification. 
To promote a standardized system in project approval and decide whether the 
project would generate sustainable benefits, the host country is required to establish a 
focal agency, called Designated National Authority (DNA). The DNA performs functions 
of establishing national criteria and management rules; elaborating the national guidelines 
and procedures for project approval; and ensuring the compliance of CDM projects with 
relevant national policy and regulatory regimes (UNEP 2004).  
A complete CDM project follows a number of essential steps, known as CDM 
cycle. Figure 6.1 below shows the processes of a CDM project, the needed documents 
and the responsible entities involved in the process.  
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Figure 6.1   Processes and Parties Involved in a CDM Project 
Note: PP-Project proponents/participants; DNA-Designated National Authority; DOE-Designated 
Operational Entity; EB-Executive Board; PDD-Project Design Document; CER-Certified Emission 
Reductions 
Source: UNEP 2004, 12; CCPO 2004 
Clean Development Mechanism gained momentum after the Kyoto Protocol’s 
entry into force in early 2005 and the emergence of the global carbon trading market, 
especially the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). As of March 2010, 
4968 CDM projects have been developed by 76 developing countries in the world. In 
terms of the stages of project development, 2062 projects have been registered by the EB 
and more than 600 projects have been issued the Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). 
The accumulative emission reductions from these projects are expected to be 2835.6 
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million tons of CO2 by 2012 (CD4CDM 2010). Although there is uncertainty about the 
global climate change regime after 2012, there is no indication that the enthusiasms for 
the carbon trading industry among companies and investors worldwide have been 
weakened. 
6.2.2 Capacity Building Projects in China  
As mentioned in Chapter 4, during the early international negotiations, China 
opposed many of the market-based international mechanisms and argued against a 
compulsory mitigation commitment for developing countries. China’s position is to insist 
the “common but differentiated responsibilities” principle, which can be explained that 
developed countries should take the lead in reducing GHG emissions as well as providing 
financial and technical support to developing countries, while the first priority for China 
remains sustainable development and poverty eradication. 
During this early stage, China’s attitude towards initiating CDM project was 
reluctant and noncommittal and Chinese officials repeatedly stressed the importance of 
studying potential costs and benefits of the CDM, in particular the disputable issues of 
technical risks and political risks (Szymanski 2002). During the mid-1990s, China 
initiated four AIJ pilot projects in cooperation with Japan and Norway (MOFA 2002). 
The preliminary evaluation of the four AIJ pilot projects was positive and beneficial. This 
made China realize that capacity building should be enhanced through exercises of 
learning-by-doing with regard to baseline-setting, project management, and national 
institutional processing issues.   
Capacity building is reflected in many ways, such as research and development, 
business communication and negotiations, technology transfer, product renovation, and 
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market information. After the COP 6 Conference in 2001 when the CDM modalities and 
procedures were established, numerous CDM activities were implemented in China under 
the sponsorship of international and bilateral donors. There are several reasons that 
donors were keen to support CDM capacity building in China. First, they expect great 
potential of getting carbon credits from China with lower costs. Second, the donors feel 
the significant need for China to gain more insights into the CDM. More importantly, 
such cooperation can enhance the host country’s capacity to initiate the carbon emission 
reduction activities. Table 6.1 lists several major capacity building projects.  
Table 6.1   Major CDM Capacity Building Projects in China 
Donor WB/ GTZ CIDA ADB UNDP/ UN Foundation EU 
Project Title/ 
Chinese 
Counterpart 
China CDM 
Study on  
Methodology 
and Its 
Application/ 
MOST 
Canada– 
China 
Cooperation  
in Climate 
Change/ 
NDRC 
Opportunities 
for CDM in 
the Chinese 
Energy  
Sector 
/MOST 
Building 
Capacity for 
the CDM in 
China/ NDRC 
EU/China 
Partnership in 
CDM 
Development 
Sectors 
Power sector and 
renewable 
energy field 
Renewables, 
urban 
transportation, 
and sinks 
Renewables 
Renewables, 
energy 
efficiency, and 
coal bed 
methane 
Renewables 
Project 
purposes/ 
Activities 
Methodology 
study, capacity 
building, 6 CDM 
case studies, 
assessing the 
Chinese CDM 
market  
Capacity 
building and 
poverty 
reduction  to 
meet Canada’ 
s international 
climate change 
objectives 
  
Capacity 
building, 
providing  
consulting 
service for 
small-scale 
CDM 
projects 
Capacity 
building, 
project 
approval 
process, 3 pilot 
projects, 
information 
dissemination 
Capacity 
building, 
identify 
barriers and 
opportunities, 
evaluate the 
emission 
reduction 
benefits 
Donor’s 
Contributions US$ 970,000 C$ 5,000,000 US$ 775,000 US$ 1,458,000 Euro 907,574 
Duration 2002 - 2004 2002 - 2004 2002 - 2003 2003- 2006 2003 - 2004 
Note: WB-World Bank; GTZ-German Agency for Technical Cooperation; CIDA-Canada International 
Development Agency; ADB-Asian Development Bank; UNDP-United Nations Development Program; 
EU-European Union; MOST-Ministry of Science and Technology; NDRC-National Development and 
Reform Commission 
Source: World Bank 2004; Zhang 2005 
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These projects had a wide variety of coverage, including the CDM country 
studies, capacity building activities, international workshops for awareness, CDM 
methodologies, market opportunity studies, CDM technology options, case studies, as 
well as barrier analysis and promoting policies and initiatives. The NDRC and the MOST 
were jointly responsible for program identification, site selection and relevant 
coordination activities.  
Not all the cooperative capacity building projects got access to Chinese market. 
An example was the withdrawal of Dutch CERUPT (Certified Emission Reduction Unit 
Procurement Tender) Program in 2001, because of domestic bureaucratic hurdles and the 
changing priorities by both sides (Zhang 2005). Nevertheless, the emergence of more 
capacity building projects indicated that the Chinese government attempted to make the 
best use of the projects to develop its expertise and improve the institutional and human 
capacity. In fact, some projects from these case studies became real CDM projects.   
One of the important prerequisites for CDM credit trading between developing 
countries and developed countries is the establishment of a carbon market, where the 
transaction can be operated. Although China is a party to the Kyoto Protocol as early as 
2002, making it an eligible party to participate in the CDM scheme; however, the Kyoto 
Protocol had not entered into force until 2005. Fortunately, along with the Kyoto 
Protocol’s taking into effect, the European Union (EU) commenced operation of its own 
Emission Trading System (ETS) from January 1, 2005 across the 25 member states.  
The essence of the ETS is the trading of limited EU emission allowances (EUAs) 
which were allocated to 11400 installations, accounting for around 52% of the EU’s total 
CO2 emissions or about 30% of its overall greenhouse gas emissions (EEA 2005, 28; EU 
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2005, 7 ). The National Allocation Plans for the EU ETS transferred a big share of the 
credit demand to the covered installations, so the private sectors are supposed to increase 
their demand in the future; on the other hand, the EU emission allowances (EUAs) were 
allowed to link with JI/CDM credits, making the EU emerging as the center of carbon 
trading in the world. 
At this time, China began to realize it can receive economic and political 
benefits through more involvement in CDM project development and diffusion (personal 
interview). The CDM has become a vehicle that not only stimulates investment in the 
cleaner energy technologies and economic development; it also allows China to be 
viewed as a proactive player on climate change issues. However, because of the long-
term “wait and see” climate mitigation policies, it soon found itself lagging far behind 
many developing countries, such as India, Brazil, and Mexico, in the number of pipeline 
projects. The key issue for the decision makers to tackle was to develop a set of 
institutions that can synergize its development benefits and help domestic developers 
gain market competence.  
6.3 Developing CDM Institutions and Actor Network 
6.3.1 CDM Policy Development 
With the progression of the CDM regime and the development of international 
emission reduction trading market, the Chinese government realized the imperative to 
promulgate and implement domestic CDM rules in order to strengthen effective 
management of the CDM projects, safeguard national rights and interests, and ensure the 
proper operation of project activities. 
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In June 2004, the NDRC, the MOST, and the MOFA jointly promulgated the 
Interim Measures for Operation and Management of CDM Projects in China (hereinafter 
referred to as “Interim Measures”), specifying the legal framework for CDM projects for 
the first time. According to the “Interim Measures” (NDRC 2004), Chinese CDM project 
activities should comply with Chinese laws and regulations as well as China’s sustainable 
development strategies and policies, and should meet the general requirements of national 
economic and social development planning. In addition, the CDM project activities 
should promote the transfer of environmentally sound technology to China.   
The “Interim Measures” also identified three priority areas for implementing 
domestic CDM projects: energy efficiency improvement; development and utilization of 
new and renewable energy sources; and methane recovery and utilization. Nevertheless, 
China did not stimulate specific measures to boost these projects in a CDM form. The 
reason is that the three areas are already embedded in other policies, in particular energy 
policies, so the incentive policies were not specifically made just favorable for CDM 
projects.  
The “Interim Measures”, which offers trial management rules for guiding CDM 
project implementation, had left several important issues unclear, such as credit 
ownership, possibility of unilateral CDM, royalty fee collection and usage. On October 
12, 2005, the “Interim Measures” was rescinded and replaced by Measures for Operation 
and Management of CDM Projects in China (hereinafter referred to as “Formal 
Measures”). By approval of the National Climate Change Coordination Committee 
(NCCCC), the “Formal Measures” was jointly issued by the NDRC, the MOST, and the 
MOFA, as well as the Ministry of Finance, The document has been regarded as the 
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essential CDM management policy in China, that promotes and supports the efficient 
completion and systematic progress of CDM project activities (ERI 2009, 3).    
With regard to ambiguous issues of credit ownership, possibility of the 
unilateral CDM project, royalty fees, some clarifications were made in the new measures. 
Table 6.2 compares the concerned items in the two measures, which reflected the CDM 
policy adjustment by the Chinese government. 
Table 6.2   Comparison of the CDM Measures of Two Versions 
Items Interim Measures (June 30, 2004) 
Formal Measures 
(October 12, 2005) 
Project owner 
Chinese funded or 
Chinese holding 
enterprises 
Same 
Unilateral 
CDM project Not mentioned 
If no foreigner buyer is determined when the project is 
submitted for national approval, the emission reductions 
generated by the projects will be transferred into the 
national account 
Ownership of 
CERs 
CER revenues are owned 
jointly by the government 
and the owner 
Same. (Reasons given: Emission reduction source is 
owned by the Government of China; emission reductions 
from specific CDM projects belong to the project owner.) 
Royalty fee 
(CER 
distribution) 
Be decided by the 
Government of China. 
Before the decision, 
revenue belongs to the 
project owner. 
For projects in the priority areas, royalty fees of 2% of the 
CER revenue are charged. The fee for N2O projects is 30% 
and for HFC and PFC projects, it amounts to 65%. 
Projects already approved by the DNA before October 12, 
2005 are exempt from fees. 
Use of the 
royalty fees Not mentioned Detailed provisions will be in formulation 
Source: NDRC 2004; NDRC 2005 
By comparison, the central government has not loosened the strong CDM entry 
requirements. The “Formal Measures” allows development of the unilateral CDM project, 
but with the premise of transferring the emission reductions to its national account. Also, 
the second version regulates the royalty fee that project owners must pay to the national 
government, differentiated by the project types. Obviously, the emission reductions in 
China are treated as “national resources”. All these rules facilitate the government’s 
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intervention of the CDM activities, and more importantly, government also maintains a 
say in setting the CER price, in case the CERs are traded at dumping prices (Abele 2005). 
The CDM “Formal Measures” had remained intact since its promulgation in 
2005. However, to improve the management of CDM projects and accommodate new 
development requirements, the Chinese DNA, namely the NDRC, has issued a series of 
supplementary regulations in the form of gazette or notes. Some of the important 
regulations include the improvement of CDM project application and approval 
procedures, the CDM project implementation arrangements in Hong Kong, and regional 
grid baseline emission factors (CCChina 2010).  
6.3.2 CDM Institutional Actors in China 
China adopted three-tiered model as its national CDM management structure. 
The three-tiered institutions include the National Coordination Committee on Climate 
Change (NCCCC), the National CDM Board and Designated National Authority (DNA). 
Their responsibilities and compositions are shown in Table 6.3.  
Seen from Table 6.3, on the top level of national CDM management institutions 
is the NCCCC, which is responsible for the review and coordination of CDM policies. 
The National CDM Board (NCB) lies at the second level. The NCB conducts the 
concrete CDM project review and management activities. The third level is the NDRC, 
which is appointed by the Chinese government as DNA. The NDRC plays a vitally 
important role on China’s CDM management and implementation. Both the NCCCC and 
the NCB are chaired by the NDRC, which issues formal project approval on behalf of the 
Chinese Government. The Department of Climate Change set up in the NDRC in 2008 
(the Office of Climate Change during 2003- 2008) serves as the secretariat of the 
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NCCCC and the National CDM Board, and organizes the review of the CDM application 
documents. China’s three-tiered institutional structure not only allows multiple ministries 
and actors to participate in the project review and approval processes, but also enables 
broader stakeholder participation in CDM implementation (ERI 2009; personal 
interview).  
Table 6.3   Features of China’s CDM Institutions 
Institutions Set-up Time Main Responsibilities Members 
National 
Climate 
Change 
Coordination 
Committee 
(NCCCC) 
1998 
Reshuffled 
as NCCLG 
after 2007 
 Formulate and coordinate national 
climate change policies, measures; 
 Review CDM policies, rules and 
standards; 
 Approve members of the CDM 
Board. 
Chaired by the NDRC; Vice 
Chairmen and members are 
senior officials from 14 
ministerial agencies. 
National CDM 
Board (NCB) 
2004  Examine and assess CDM 
projects; 
 Transfer CERs generated in 
unilateral projects;  
 Report to the NCCCC on the 
progress of CDM project 
activities; 
 Make recommendations on the 
operational measures. 
Co-Chairs: 
NDRC  
MOST 
Vice Chair:  
MOFA 
Board members: 
SEPA (MEP after 2008), 
SMA, MOF, MOA. 
Designated 
National 
Authority 
(DNA) 
2004  Accept CDM project application; 
 Issue national approval letter, 
based on the Board’s decision; 
 Supervise the implementation of 
CDM project activities; 
 International Communication and 
cooperation 
NDRC 
Note: NDRC-National Development and Reform Commission; MOST-Ministry of Science and 
Technology; MOFA-Ministry of Foreign Affairs; SEPA-State Environmental Protection Administration; 
SMA-State Meteorological Administration; MOF-Ministry of Finance; MOA-Ministry of Agriculture; 
NCCLG-National Climate Change Leading Group 
Source: NDRC 2004; NDRC 2005 
The national CDM management and implementation institutions have been 
gradually improved over the past few years, signified by the establishment and operation 
of two new centers: National CDM Project Management Center and China CDM Fund 
Management Center.    
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National CDM Project Management Center was established under the Energy 
Research Institute (ERI), a policy advisory organization under the NDRC. The Center is 
under the guidance of the Department of the Climate Change of the NDRC to promote 
the development of CDM and international cooperation on climate change. The 
Management Center has provided the NDRC administrative support for CDM project 
approval since 2007, including expert review, project monitoring and supervision, 
inventory registration, data management, consultative service, international cooperation.  
The CDM “Formal Measures” had introduced the use of royalty fees generated 
from CER revenues as a pool fund for encouraging specific CDM projects. The 
management and operation of the fund came into effect with the establishment of the 
CDM Fund Management Center. The Center, established in November 2007, is under the 
sponsorship of the Ministry of Finance, and serves as secretariat of the CDM Fund 
Examination Council, which comprises NDRC, MOFA, MOF and MOST and other 
relevant agencies.  
The fund comes from royalty fees collected from current CDM projects, as well 
as donations and loans from financial institutions. In ways of grant, concession loan and 
other financial instruments, the fund is used to provide support for energy efficiency and 
clean energy projects and other climate change activities, including capacity building, 
public awareness, mitigation and adaptation (ERI 2009). Since the Fund was established 
in 2007, the detailed information about fund use has not been revealed (personal 
interview).   
Although national CDM institutions dominate CDM project management, there 
has been increased involvement of local governments in CDM project promotion and 
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supervision in recent years. More than 27 provinces and municipalities have established 
CDM centers to market CDM development activities, provide capacity trainings, and 
help project proponents seek potential credit buyers (Schroeder 2009). From 2007, the 
CDM projects are required to get approval from local governments before the 
applications are sent for Board review. Industrial associations with strong government 
background have also been involved. Many of these associations have the advantages of 
close ties with the business sector and a good knowledge of governmental preferences 
and policies. 
6.3.3 Non-State CDM Actors 
The international design of CDM scheme allows for the participation of non-
state actors in rule-setting and policy implementation. As a result, constellations of non-
state actors have been involved in the CDM project development in China. The non-state 
actors under the CDM scheme mainly include project proponents (state-owned 
enterprises or private companies) and consulting companies who work together with 
project proponents in various CDM processing stages. But compared with the state actors, 
non-state actors play only minor roles in policy making and implementation process.   
Although the project developers are voluntary to participate in the CDM activity, 
many local businesses in China, lacking awareness, motivation and capacity, follow the 
will of the government to implement CDM projects. At the early stage of the project 
development, the preparation of the Project Design Document (PDD) was mainly 
prepared by a few recommended foreign businesses. Owing to governmental agencies’ 
support and the incentives from carbon market, dozens of domestic companies have 
emerged and provided comprehensive consulting services for the project proponents, 
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especially project design and document compilation. With more entrants involved, the 
market has become more competitive and the developers get more choices to choose 
cooperators and compare the offers. Although abilities to provide services by these 
consulting companies differ in terms of quality in general, their competence has greatly 
strengthened due to capacity enhancement, lower fee charging, and the advantages of  
being familiar with the local situations  (Abele 2007). 
Academic institutions also actively facilitate CDM project development by 
participating in methodology design, technical advisory, and CDM policy analysis. The 
work has expanded from focusing on natural and technological sciences to the topic of 
economics, market analysis and project management. In the case that the projects are 
consistent with national economic policies and have great potential to duplicate in CDM 
forms, but there are no existing methodologies for new CDM projects to take for 
reference, the government agencies, led primarily by the NDRC and the MOST, will 
invite and support experts from universities, research institutes, and think tanks to 
conduct relevant research and develop methodologies (personal interview). 
With more and more CDM projects entering the pipeline, the relative slowness 
of the Designated Operational Entity (DOE) and the CDM Executive Board (EB) in 
project validation, registration and verification has become the bottleneck of further 
project development (personal interview). In addition to strengthen regular 
communications with these international CDM regulatory agencies, China has cooperated 
with the EU to develop China’s own DOEs. The main purpose of such arrangement is to 
shorten project processing time and reduce the transaction costs, mainly for domestic 
projects. Currently, two entities have been selected: China Quality Certification Center 
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and China Environmental United Certification Center. Both entities have close relations 
with the ministerial agencies (ERI 2009).   
The NGOs in China are rarely involved in CDM activities. Most Chinese NGOs 
regard other environmental issues; their concern on the climate change issues has just 
begun (Schroeder 2009; Mertha 2008). Foreign investors, businesses and financial 
institutions have been active in promoting China’s CDM project development. Besides 
capacity building projects in the early stage, these actors have displayed great initiative in 
providing training and marketing service, and participating in appropriate methodology 
development. Although CDM project development and credit trading in China rely 
extensively on these foreign firms; compared with the government actors, their influence 
on the development of more favorable CDM rules is still limited. Instead, only the 
representative agencies of foreign governments are active in trying to influencing CDM 
policy making through bilateral political advisory programs (Schroeder 2009).   
6.3.4 Domestic Project Approval Procedures 
CDM project approval procedures were established in the CDM measures. The 
project developers first submit application to the DNA (the NDRC in China). The CDM 
Board then reviews CDM projects from the aspects of participation qualification; PDD 
document; baseline methodology and emission reductions; price of CERs; terms relating 
to funding and technology transfer; crediting period; monitoring plan; and expected 
sustainable development effectiveness. Figure 6.2 shows the normal CDM project 
approval procedures in China.  
The days to approve a CDM project by the NCB have been greatly shortened. 
Currently, the CDM Board holds biweekly meetings to discuss the proposed projects. 
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Before the NDRC (China’s DNA) passed on the project request for decision by the Board, 
it solicited comments by expert review. The NDRC then approves or rejects the request 
based on the decision reached by the National CDM Board in 20 days. Since 2007, when 
the projects are submitted to the NDRC for approval, the proponents also need to notify 
the local NDRC branch, so that the local governments can keep track of the development 
of local CDM projects.  
 
 
Figure 6.2   Flowchart of CDM Approval Procedures 
Source: IGES 2005 
In practice, some CDM projects are submitted for validation before they get 
approval by the DNRC. This is mainly because project developers and the partners want 
to test the validity of methodologies. Even so, the DNA’s approval is prerequisite before 
the projects are later sent for EB’s registration.  
Project Proposal 
CDM Application 
Submission to NDRC 
Expert Review 
National CDM Board 
Meeting 
No-objection letter 
issued by the NDRC 
Be reconsidered 
if made further 
improvements 
Decision Making 
Letter of Approval 
Rejection 
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6.3.5 Interactions of Network Actors 
The CDM scheme involves a variety of state and non-state actors, and it has 
initiated a new form of network that collectively contributes to the emission reduction 
activities. Generally, interactions among network actors are shaped and influenced by 
three factors. The first one is the procedures and directives of the CDM rules, formulated 
by the Executive Board of the FCCC. All the CDM project developers from developing 
countries follow the same rules. The EB has the power to review the applications and 
decide whether the project can be processed to next level of the project cycle. The second 
influencing factor comes from the carbon credit market. It is the vitality of the carbon 
market that drives non-state actors, in particular private businesses to involve in the CDM 
development in order to pursue their economic benefits. The third factor is traditional 
top-down policy process, where the higher government leads the policy making and 
implementation, and makes the decision of approval. Since the project developers have 
insufficient capacity and resources in initiating CDM projects by themselves, the relevant 
governmental agencies take initiative in providing capacity-building service, such as pilot 
projects, technical and financial assistance, and training programs. In terms of the CDM 
management in China, these three forces act together and could not be distinctly 
separated. Under the political uncertainties of international climate change regime, China 
has taken a pragmatic approach and made deliberate arrangements in maximizing the 
benefits from this carbon offset market.  
Within the Chinese CDM policy making network, government agencies at the 
central level are closely interacted. The NDRC, as a comprehensive macro-economic 
regulatory department, acts as the nexus agency in directing and coordinating the project 
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development. Such an arrangement highlights China’s centralized governance structure 
and NDRC’s dominant role in policy evaluation. It also allows central government to 
balance institutional interests among related ministries without exerting big changes. The 
involvement of multiple government entities enables a broader integration of the CDM 
scheme into national development policy making.   
In order to promote CDM projects in a larger scope, local governments have 
been assuming more responsibilities in developing CDM projects to accommodate to the 
local development priorities. This is supported by the following evidence: (1) local 
governments are responsible for disseminating the CDM information and arranging 
relevant training activities; (2) local governments should be knowledgeable of the CDM 
scheme since it can potentially generate additional benefits other than traditional benefits 
from project operation; (3) local government can participate in CDM project 
identification, and formulate incentive measures to encourage project development;   and 
(4) local NDRC branches need to present the approval letter to the proposed CDM 
projects within its jurisdiction, before the projects are submitted to the CDM Board for 
approval. Therefore, the support from local governments has become important 
prerequisite for the project approval by the National CDM Board.   
The interactions among non-state actors themselves and between state and non-
state actors are generally low in China. Two reasons have been identified (Schroeder 
2009). One is due to the nature of carbon market competition: all market actors are 
competing for economic profits, so they remain a healthy distance. The second reason is 
that with China’s transition from planned economy to market economy, the direct 
intervention from the state actors has reduced. However, the strong position of state 
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actors has forced market and civil society actors to prefer more cooperative measures, 
instead of lobbying against governmental regulations.  
6.4 CDM Project Development and Policy Adaptation 
6.4.1 CDM Market Performance 
Since the CDM is a market mechanism that embraces competition among credit 
suppliers, it is possible to outline the competence by comparing the certified credits 
among host countries. Since China has developed its rules for CDM management, the 
CDM projects have been developed under the fast track. Until October 2010, China has 
developed 2211 CDM projects at the different stages of the pipeline, accounting for 40% 
of the total projects. The expected CERs generated from these projects till 2012 are 
estimated to be 1.54 billion CERs, 54.4% of the total. In terms of CERs that have been 
issued and can be used for trading and banking, 223 million CERs have been issued, 2.8 
times of the figure of India, which ranks the second in the market (CD4CDM 2010). 
China’s CDM projects are mixture of various types. Though a great majority of 
the projects come from renewable energy projects (e.g., hydro, wind, biomass) and 
energy efficiency projects, however, industrial projects, especially 11 HFC (hydro-
fluorocarbon) projects and 27 N2O projects, generate one third of credits (CD4CDM 
2010). Although the approval of such industrial CDM projects has been abandoned since 
2007, China has been unfavorably commented for flooding the carbon market with huge 
amount easy-to-get credits. In addition, there are doubts about whether the carbon 
reduction credits generated are really additional, since there is insufficient convincing 
130 
 
evidence to prove that the project activities would not have happened without the CDM 
(e.g., Lewis et al. 2010).  
The CDM projects are dispersed widely in China. Almost all provinces have 
CDM projects developed. However, the geographic locations of projects roughly have 
two features: the industrial projects with large credits are mainly from the east, which is 
much higher in economic outputs and personal income; the majority of renewable 
projects with less credit generation are normally from the west, which is rich in natural 
resources but poor in term economy. 
6.4.2 Evolution of CDM Policy Measures  
The domestic CDM Measures, which has not been changed after its adoption in 
2005, is only a framework rule to guide CDM project approval and management. 
Although CDM is in essence a carbon offset market mechanism that is driven by carbon 
price, however, the whole project process, from its preparation to full operation and  
credit trading, is significantly influenced by a series of international and domestic 
political factors. In China, to ensure the CDM project development to achieve the 
maximum benefits and compete for larger market share, the NDRC, China’s DNA in the 
CDM project management, has made supplementary adjustments to adapt to new 
situations. These adjustments have been widely regarded, by foreign carbon market 
actors and some policy researchers, as deliberate interventions of the Chinese government 
to the market-oriented carbon reduction activities. Table 6.4 shows some of 
supplementary policy regulations in the form of notices adopted since 2005.  
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Table 6.4   Supplementary CDM Policy Regulations in China 
Name of  Notice Year Type/sector Main Content 
Standardizing CDM Project’s 
Consultation Service and 
Evaluation 
2006 
 
Market 
regulations 
 
Regulate the CDM Consultation 
Service and consulting fee 
collection 
Examination and Approval 
Procedures Concerning CDM 
Project Application 
2006, 2007  Procedure 
improvement 
Standardize CDM project 
approval procedure; involve local 
government in the process 
Determining Baseline Annual 
Emission Factors of Power Grids  
2006, 2007 
 
Electricity  
 
Set baseline for electricity 
generating CDM projects 
Adding RMB into the CER Price 
Unit 
2008 Market 
regulations 
Counteract the impacts of 
continued change of exchange 
rates on the project examination 
Arrangement of CDM Projects in 
Hong Kong SAR 
2008 Market entry 
regulations 
Encourage Hong Kong   to 
develop CDM projects 
Informing the NDRC of CDM 
Projects after 2 August 2008. 
2008 Procedure 
improvement 
Demonstrate the prior 
consideration of the CDM before 
undertaking project 
Income Tax Policies concerning 
the CDM Fund and the Involved 
Project Enterprises 
2009 Market 
regulations 
Provide corporate income tax 
incentives available to CDM 
enterprises and China CDM Fund 
Explanation to Issues concerning 
China’s Wind Power Capacity 
Discount 
2009 Renewable 
energy 
Explain the pricing system of 
wind projects in China 
Source: ERI 2009; CCChina 2010 
There have been many debates about China’s CDM regulations. For example, 
during 2005-2007, eleven HFC (Hydro-fluorocarbons) CDM projects were approved and 
registered. The HFC-23, a by-product of HCFC-22 (Hydro-chlorofluorocarbons) 
manufacturing, is a potential greenhouse gas trapping 11700 times more heat per unit 
than CO2. The international community criticized the projects of contributing little to 
sustainable development. China subsequently argued that a rate of 65% of the revenue 
from HFC CDM projects would be charged for supporting priority projects in the future. 
On the other hand, starting from 2007, no HFC abatement projects have been approved 
by the central government.  
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Another example is the entry requirements for the CDM development. 
According to the CDM Measures, only Chinese funded or Chinese-holding joint-venture 
enterprises within the territory of China are eligible to develop CDM projects with 
foreign buyers. This has been regarded as an important constraint to foreign investors’ 
involvement in the emissions reduction activity promotion and willingness in technology 
transfer (ERI 2009; Schroeder 2009). After a few years’ insistence by the Chinese 
government, a new measure was promoted recently that Hong Kong enterprises are 
allowed to implement CDM projects on the Mainland (China5e 2010).  
Theoretically, the price of CER credits from CDM projects shall be determined 
by the credit demand and supply. However, since China leads in the CDM registration 
and CER supply, to avoid vicious price competition among domestic developers, the 
NDRC has set the unofficial contract price for the CER credits, unwilling to approve 
CDM projects valuing CERs below 7-9 Euros per ton, depending on the types of projects 
(ERI 2009).  Although this has induced many complaints from investors of developed 
countries and to some extent limited domestic developers’ interests, the government’s 
reply was to keep transaction fair for domestic firms and no vying-for-lower-prices is 
allowed. Since China is the dominant supplier in the CDM credit market, many countries 
began to use China’s pricing for negotiating equivalent prices with credit buyers.  
6.4.3 Sustainable Benefits 
Although sustainable development is much reiterated in China’s political and 
economic life, there is no officially recognized set of indicators for a quantified 
assessment of a project’s contribution to sustainable development. The proposed CDM 
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projects are evaluated more on the basis of their impacts within clearly defined priority 
areas than strictly by a quantified measurement of sustainable development (IGES 2005).  
Sustainable development goals are arguably met in China’s CDM projects. The 
project which could contribute more to the local communities is less competitive and not 
specially treated with preferential fiscal and taxation conditions at the moment. The large 
industrial emission reduction projects, to some extent, have restrained the development of 
small priority projects. This is not unusual because CDM is basically a market-based 
mechanism and the cheaper credits from industrial projects are more cost-competitive 
and more attractive to market buyers. 
6.5 Conclusive Summary  
China’s participation in the CDM scheme significantly contributes to the global 
climate mitigation activities. Although it initially resisted the scheme, arguing that 
developed countries may shift carbon emission reduction burdens to developing countries 
through this trading system; however, with the implementation of some pilot projects and 
final establishment of CDM operating regulations, China has gradually accepted this 
market-based scheme. Like other developing countries, no cap targets are set for China’s 
emissions under the Kyoto Protocol, meaning that emission reductions generated 
voluntarily from CDM projects can be traded with developed countries. For the Chinese 
government and relevant project developers, the CDM scheme is regarded as an 
opportunity to make full use of its incomparable emission reduction potential and low 
abatement costs. The effective management of CDM projects means to promote 
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mitigation efforts for sustainable development and enhance competence in the carbon 
trading market.   
Though a latecomer, China has led the CDM project development since 2007. 
Well-organized networks consisting of a wide range of state and non-state actors have 
contributed to China’s leading status in the CDM governance and market competition. In 
the early stage of the CDM development, relevant agencies at central level promoted pilot 
projects in selected provinces and sectors under the technical and financial assistance 
from international donors. Later, awareness and capacity building projects had been 
established nationwide to effectively disseminate relevant knowledge and expertise of 
CDM development and carbon trading to actors involved. With the Kyoto Protocol’s 
entry into force, it is the vitality of the carbon market that attracts project proponents and 
local governments to involve in the CDM development and pursue economic benefits. 
Meanwhile, the National CDM Board concentrates on the identification of priority 
projects, and ensures the project development in line with the national sustainable 
development needs. In general, China’s CDM governance network facilitates its higher 
manageability in promoting CDM and reallocating funds for maximizing national 
interests. 
Seen from the current CDM development in China, administrative and market 
forces are two major forces that affect the CDM development process. The NDRC in 
China acts as the nexus agency in the action network for project review and approval. 
Such an arrangement highlights China’s traditional centralized governance structure and 
the NDRC’s dominant role in domestic CDM-related policy making. It also allows 
central government to balance the institutional and sectoral interests without incurring 
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more uncomfortable changes. With the aim of gaining maximized economic and social 
benefits from CDM development, the relationship between the NDRC and other Board 
agencies is generally collaborative.  
CDM is a market mechanism that allows China to trade certified credits with 
developed countries. Although the carbon credit trading is among businesses; however, in 
China, the governments at central and local levels have both been highly involved in the 
process of CDM development. At the local level, governments act much like profit-
seeking businesses (Qi et al. 2008). Though a streamlined project approval system has 
been established and more domestic actors have gained more competence, there is no 
indication from this case that shows the activeness of the project development is due to 
the decreased political control in the policy process.   
China adopts the three-tiered system to manage CDM activity. The ad hoc 
management committee, the National CDM Board, which is co-chaired by the NDRC and 
the MOST, ranks between the national climate change coordinating committee and the 
Designated National Agency (i.e., the NDRC). The members of the Board are relevant 
departments from member ministries and agencies. There are regular communications 
within ministries, and for important issues, to be discussed among coordinating 
committee members. In 2007, the coordinating committee at the top-tier was reshuffled 
and the State Council has been chairing the committee since then. Therefore, the 
authority and power to coordinate CDM project development have enhanced.    
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CHAPTER VII 
CASE 3: TOP-1000 INDUSTIRAL ENERGY CONSERVATION PROGRAM 
7.1 Introduction 
The early 1990s witnessed the explosive growth of voluntary environmental 
programs in industrialized countries, which reflects the changing relations between 
government and business and political recognition of this less intrusive approach (Mol et 
al. 2000). Voluntary environmental programs can affect behavior and provide 
environmental benefits. However, the importance, form, and results of such policy 
arrangement differ according to countries and political-institutional settings (Mol et al. 
2000). Though still characterized by its centralized regulative tradition, however, 
modeled on international sectoral target-setting programs, China formally adopted a pilot 
voluntary program in 2003 and attempted to diffuse it countrywide through the Top-1000 
Industrial Energy Conservation Program (Top-1000 Program).  
Chapter 7 examines the emergence, shape and functioning of China’s Top-1000 
Industrial Energy Conservation Program, as the second case. The program, implemented 
since March 2006, covers China’s 1000 largest industrial enterprises from nine energy-
intensive sectors, which account for one-third of China’s prime energy consumption. The 
program requires the provincial governments to sign contracts with local enterprises and 
supervise the enterprises to reach the energy efficiency goals. 
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.2, the contextual background 
of the program is presented, which mainly focuses on issues of international development 
of industrial voluntary programs, and domestic contexts of promoting energy 
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conservation activities. Section 7.3 documents the development the Top-1000 Program 
and the features of the policy networks. The Program has generated from an initial pilot 
project in Shangdong Province, and evolved to a nation-wide relevant large-scaled 
enterprises, and finally became a comprehensive target-setting program that involves 
governments at provincial and local levels. Section 7.4 studies outcomes of formulating 
and implementing the Top-1000 Program. Finally, conclusions of the case are drawn in 
Section 7.5. 
7.2 Contextual Background of the Program 
The contextual environment poses impacts on policy making and development. 
Framed by the policy network approach, this section outlines three contextual factors that 
have influenced the emergence and shaping of China’s voluntary energy efficiency 
program, in particular, the Top-1000 Program. These three factors are: (1) the practice of 
international voluntary agreements in industries; (2) domestic industrial administrative 
structures; and (3) the needs to improve energy efficiency in industrial sectors.   
7.2.1 International Voluntary Agreements  
Many industrialized countries have adopted wide variety of policies and 
programs to improve energy efficiency and reduce carbon emissions in industrial sectors. 
These policies include: regulations and standards, taxes and charges, voluntary 
agreements, subsidies, financial incentives, research and development programs and 
information dissemination (IPCC 2007). In practice, these policy instruments are 
integrated to address various industrial energy efficiency improvement needs (Price and 
Jiang 2001). Since 1990s, Voluntary agreement programs has emerged as a pragmatic 
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and flexible way to the need of dealing with energy efficiency challenges in many 
industrialized countries in Europe, Japan and North America (Price 2005; Mol et al. 2000; 
Morgenstern et al. 2007). 
Voluntary agreements take on many forms with varying levels of scope and 
stringency; however, virtually all voluntary agreements involve some agreements 
between government and industry to facilitate voluntary actions to achieve desirable 
environmental and social objectives beyond compliance to regulated obligations 
(Morgenstern et al. 2007; Storey 1996). Some drivers of promoting voluntary agreements 
include offering flexibility both to participating firms and to government agencies; 
increasing the cost efficiency; reducing production costs; improving corporate reputation; 
accelerating the  application of best available technology and avoiding a strong political 
opposition (Eichhorst and Bongardt 2009).  
Although the voluntary agreements can potentially affect the participants’ 
behaviors and offer environmental and social gains, and they are normally set at the same 
or slightly stricter than the business-as-usual scenario, evaluating and comparing the 
effectiveness of voluntary agreements proved to be difficult, because of the lack of 
realistic, agreed-upon baseline, overlapping of relevant activities, different metrics and 
evaluative criteria employed (Price 2005; Morgenstern et al. 2007). A series of 
evaluations show that most voluntary agreements have failed in achieving significant 
reductions in emissions beyond business-as-usual scenario and contributing to the major 
changes in behavior (Johannsen 2002; Helby 2002; Darnall and Carmin 2003; 
Morgenstern et al. 2007). Based on some comparative studies among countries, voluntary 
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agreements can be better developed in the countries with a history of good cooperation 
between government and industry (De Clercq 2002; Mol et al. 2000).  
7.2.2 Administrative Structure in Industrial Sectors 
China has established an integrated, multilevel bureaucratic system to regulate 
and supervise the industrial activities. In China, the most important hierarchical 
relationship in industrial economic development is between the center and localities, 
which is supposed to be a relationship of leading and implementation (Zhao 2002). In 
reality, however, two forms of hierarchy co-exist in the Chinese bureaucratic system, 
which are commonly termed as “line and area relationships”. Line relationships refer to 
the direct vertical relations between higher and lower level functional units of regulative 
administrative hierarchies. For example, the provincial bureaus of environmental 
protection replicate the functions of the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), and 
receive directions from the MEP. Area relationships represent administrative hierarchical 
relations between local governments and administrative units within their jurisdiction, 
with the local government holding full authority for administrative management and 
economic development at local levels. For example, the provincial-level bureaus of 
environmental protection are financed by provincial government, which also holds the 
power to determine the key leaders of the agency. The dominance of line relationships 
leads to the development of industrial systems; while the dominance of area relationships 
supports a policy of local self sufficiency. Although the line and area relationships vary 
over time in China, the localities have gained greater independence and influence through 
the reforms to “pursue their own development strategies within broadly defined 
guidelines” (Saich 2004, 123).  
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Administrative reforms of central government have been conducted to make it 
more suitable for a market economy. In 1998, most of the ministries that traditionally 
feature command and control policies in industrial sectors merged into one newly 
established institution: the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC). In 2003, the 
SETC was abolished and many of its functions were transferred to the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which is mainly responsible for 
comprehensive planning and policy coordination. Some disbanded industrial ministries 
were transformed into industrial associations and currently function as linking agent 
between the government and industry.   
The enterprises are important economic and corporate actors in China, but 
traditionally, they are owned and organized by the government. The state-run enterprises, 
normally in manufacturing and large in scale, were divided into two types: ministerial 
enterprise and local government enterprise. The reform has transformed more ministerial 
enterprises into the local government enterprise group. In the case of the Top-1000 
Program, almost all the enterprises were traditionally owned and managed by industrial 
ministries; however, currently only 20% of these enterprises are under direct control of 
central government, while 80% of them are owned by provincial governments.  
The design and implementation of the industrial management programs take 
place within the webs of relatively stable and ongoing relationships between some of the 
key government agencies and enterprises. Figure 7.1 frames the relations of these key 
government and corporate actors. 
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Figure 7.1   Framework of Actors in China’s Industrial Management 
 
7.2.3 Imperative for Enhancing Energy Efficiency  
From 1980 to 2000, energy intensity (the amount of energy used per unit of 
GDP) in China declined steadily at an average annual rate of 5 percent (Kan 2008). 
Despite this improvement, the overall efficiency of energy utilization is still low by 
global standards. The energy intensity in China is two times the world average, and unit 
energy consumption for major energy-consuming products is 20-40% higher than 
advanced international standards. Since early 2000s, GDP has maintained high growth 
rates, but the progress rate in energy intensity reduction has slowed. From 2003 to 2005, 
with the dramatic growth of heavy industry and energy demand, the downward trend in 
energy intensity was reversed (Table 7.1). The key environmental pollutant emissions of 
SO2 and Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD) increased fast.    
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Table 7.1   The Growth Rates of Selected Energy-related Indicators (2000-2005) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
GDP 8.4% 8.3% 9.1% 10.0% 10.1% 10.4% 
Energy 
Consumption 3.53% 3.35% 6% 15.28% 16.14% 10.56% 
Energy Intensity -4.52% -4.57% -2.82% 4.77% 5.5% 1.13% 
SO2 - -2.4% -1.1% 12.0% 4.5% 13.1% 
COD - -2.8% -2.7% -2.5% 0.5% 5.6% 
Note: GDP-Gross Domestic Product; COD-Chemical Oxygen Demand 
Source: NBS 2001-2006 
 
In response, since 2003, the Chinese government has taken new approaches to 
deepen its reforms in energy-related sectors, including the restructuring of energy 
management agencies and the adoption of a series of policy instruments (Andrew-Speed 
2009). The National Energy Leading Group under the State Council and the Energy 
Bureau of the NDRC were set up in 2003. The Department of Resource Conservation and 
Environmental Protection (DRCEP) under the NDRC was established to take over energy 
conservation oversight missions left by the disbanded SETC, as well as to strengthen the 
policy coordination with environmental protection agencies. Moreover, the central 
government introduced the key slogan of building an “environment-friendly and 
resource-saving society”.  
A disconnection between national policies and local implementation has been 
identified as the main reason that drives the increase of the energy intensity in China, 
because economic development is given a top priority, and the unwillingness or lack of 
capacity have made the implementation of top-down approach at the local levels very 
weak (Eichhorst and Bongardt 2009; Andrew-Speed 2009). To make the reform stepwise 
and incremental, implementing voluntary agreements in industrial sectors is regarded as 
important in energy efficiency improvement, at least in the near future (Hu 2007). 
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7.3 Network Development of the Top-1000 Program 
7.3.1 Pilot Voluntary Program in Shandong Province 
In 1999, the US-based Energy Foundation funded a research program to 
evaluate and develop innovative energy-efficiency policies for China’s industrial sectors. 
The program was directed by the then State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC). 
China Energy Conservation Association (CECA), an independent non-profit social entity 
under the leadership of the NDRC and the General Administration of Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and Quarantine (GAQSIQ), are responsible for the program implementation, 
with the technical assistance provided by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 
(LBNL). After assessing various domestic policies and guidelines for energy 
conservation, as well as international advanced energy efficiency policies, in 2000, the 
program team suggested to the SETC that voluntary agreements that result from the 
negotiation between government and business could provide an innovative approach 
more compatible with the market economy.  
A series of surveys and investigations had been conducted for selecting the most 
appropriate pilot projects. The iron and steel sector was chosen because of its features of 
larger energy-efficiency potential, stronger capacity in sector management, and more 
motivation for improved international competitiveness following China’s accession to the 
WTO (World Trade Organization). Regarding location, Shandong Province was chosen 
mainly due to its advantages of well-established energy efficiency regulations at the 
provincial level and the presence of a number of energy service agencies, which could 
provide assistance to pilot enterprises in the areas of energy auditing, assessment, data 
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collection, and information dissemination. Finally, Jinan Iron and Steel and Laiwu Iron 
and Steel were identified as pilot enterprises for voluntary program.  
After negotiations between the Shandong Economic and Trade Commission 
(ETC) and the two enterprises, the voluntary agreements were signed in April 2003. The 
program set a base year of 2002 and a target year of 2005, and developed performance 
targets based on physical energy intensity measured by energy consumption per ton of 
steel. According to the consensus reached, the two enterprises agreed to take measures to 
improve efficiency and realize the goal of saving 300,000 tce aggregately within three 
years, which was 137,500 tce higher than the original enterprise energy saving targets 
(Hu 2007). The Shandong ETC agreed to adopt a list of supporting policies for the two 
enterprises, including information dissemination, positive publicity, tax exemption and 
financial assistance. The CECA, as the third party, was to provide necessary technical 
support and advisory service for the enterprises and Shandong ETC. The network of the 
pilot program is shown in Figure 7.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2   Framework of Actors in Shandong Pilot Voluntary Program 
Note: SETC-State Economic and Trade Commission; ETC-Economic and Trade Commission; CECA- 
China Energy Conservation Association; LBLN-Lawrence Berkley National Laboratory (US) 
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The voluntary pilot program was considered a success due to its compliance of 
the 3-year energy efficiency targets and the experience and knowledge accumulated. 
Over this period, the energy consumption per ton of steel in two enterprises had reduced 
by 9-9.5%, and a total of 422,000 tce had been saved, 40% more than the target listed in 
the voluntary agreement (Price et al. 2010). The successful implementation of the 
voluntary pilot program in Shandong provided a stimulus for adopting this tool at the 
national level.   
7.3.2 Initiation of the Top-1000 Program 
The development of the Top-1000 Industrial Energy Consumption Program 
began as early as 2005 (Sinton 2006). The Program drew many conceptual and practical 
elements from other international and domestic energy efficiency programs, including the 
voluntary programs.  The NDRC lead the program design, with the support of the Energy 
Foundation. As one of the key initiatives of the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) for 
improving industrial energy efficiency in China, the Program was launched in April 2006 
by the Department of Resource Conservation and Environmental Protection (DRCEP) of 
the NDRC, together with some other central agencies.  
The program covered 1008 large-scaled, financially independent enterprises 
from nine major energy consuming industries (i.e., iron and steel, petroleum and 
petrochemicals, chemicals, electric power generation, non-ferrous metals, coal mining, 
construction materials, textiles, and pulp and paper) that each consumed a minimum of 
180,000 tce in 2004. The energy consumption of these enterprises accounted for more 
than 33% of national and 47% of industrial energy use in 2004 (Price and Wang 2007). 
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The goal of the Top-1000 Program was to reach the aggregate energy saving of 100 
million tce during the period of 2006-2010.  
The Program set 2005 as baseline year. The unit energy consumption levels, 
based on the domestic best practice, international best practice, and sectoral best practice, 
are considered important evidence for determining energy saving targets. On the basis of 
the analysis of the energy-saving potentials in the industries and the location of the 
enterprises, the NDRC separated the 100 million tce energy-saving targets into provinces. 
Target-setting for the Top-1000 enterprises is generally a top-down process, although 
there are constant information exchanges between NDRC, provincial functional units, 
and enterprises. In mid-2006, the targets for each enterprise were publicized. A two-tier 
contracting system was set up to ensure the program monitoring and implementation. At 
the upper tier, provincial governments signed the responsibility documents with the 
NDRC; and at the lower tier, similar to the voluntary program piloted in Shandong, 
energy-saving target contracts were signed between local governments and participating 
enterprises.  
7.3.3 Actors and Policy Network   
Although getting access to the reliable information about which agencies or 
individuals have been involved in designing the program is hard, with the implementation 
of the program, it is easier to examine the development of the action network. This also 
provides an alternative option to study the features of the policy network and its 
influences to the policy outcomes. The actors involved in implementing the Top-1000 
Program have clear divisions of responsibilities. They can be broadly categorized into 
three groups: government actors whose main responsibilities are to design the 
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management rules and supervise the program implementation; business actors which 
refer to the Top-1000 enterprises involved in the program; and civil society actors which 
include industrial associations that provide technical assistance. The number of Top-1000 
enterprises declined during 2006-2008 due to closure and combination. Table 7.2 shows 
these actors and the functions.  
Table 7.2   Actors and Their Functions in the Top-1000 Program 
Type of Actor Name Function 
Government Actors 
(Central) 
NDRC  Program design and coordination, daily administration 
NELG Overall guidance and coordination 
NBS Statistical information collection and management 
GAQSIQ Supervision of quality of the program operation  
SASAC Supervision of major state-owned enterprises (supervising 197 state-run enterprises) 
Government Actors 
(Provincial) 
Provincial 
Functional 
Units  
Tracking, supervision, and management of the energy 
saving activities of the enterprises under their jurisdictions 
(supervising 811 enterprises) 
Civil Society Actors 
(Government operated) 
Industrial  
Associations 
(e.g., CECA) 
Creating indicator and evaluation system, providing energy 
auditing service, and assessing energy-saving potentials 
Business Actors Top-1000 Enterprises  
Undertaking energy audits, reporting implementation 
progress, improving  technical and management capacity to 
reach energy saving targets  (1008 enterprises in total in 
2006)  
Note: NDRC-National Development and Reform Commission; NELG-National Energy Leading Group; 
NBS-National Bureau of Statistics; SASAC-State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission; GAQSIQ-General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine; CECA-
China Energy Conservation Association 
Source: NDRC 2006 
No supporting policies and measures were established at the commencement of 
the Top-1000 Program. The initial implementation plan developed in 2006 only provided 
general policy guidelines for energy-saving activities. In this plan, administrative 
measures were underlined to ensure the effective achievement of the energy-saving 
targets (NDRC 2006). The administrative award and punishment rules were adopted to 
regulate the province-level governments and involved enterprises. The responsible 
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government officials would be evaluated annually on whether the energy conservation 
targets have been met. The well-performing entities would be awarded and their 
achievements publicized. The enterprises which fail in meeting the targets would not be 
given the annual rewards or honorary titles, and the leaders would not be promoted. 
7.3.4 Evolution of the Top-1000 Program Network  
Over the first year of the Top-1000 Program in 2006, total energy saving of 20 
million tce had been realized (NDRC and NBS 2007). However, the national energy 
intensity reduction target set in the 11th Five Year Plan was not accomplished. National 
energy intensity reduced by 1.23% in 2006 against 4.4% per year, the equivalent annual 
reduction rate needed to meet the national plan of 20% intensity reduction between 2005 
and 2010. 
To guarantee the target accomplishment, the State Council enforced more 
rigorous measures. The national 20% energy intensity reduction targets were 
disaggregated to all provincial levels. Depending on the local conditions and capacities, 
the reduction targets in each province vary from 12% to 25%. The allocation plan of the 
targets was first drafted by the NDRC and its attached research institute, namely Energy 
Research Institute, was highly involved. After soliciting comments from all provincial 
parities, the NDRC finalized the implementation proposal and submit to the State Council 
for approval. The provincial targets were in turn broken down the required quota to a city 
level, but not to a company level (personal interview). Stronger administrative 
accountability requirements were added as the government at lower level is responsible 
for assessing the progress and reporting to the upper-level government regularly.  
149 
 
National Energy Efficiency Action 
 
Thus, the Top-1000 Program became incorporated into a much larger scale of 
energy efficiency initiatives for application in China, however, the program began to be 
less voluntary, but more obligatory. Figure 7.3 shows the policy network of actors that 
are involved in the Top-1000 Program and the later extended initiatives. In this network, 
the interactions with clearly defined targets to achieve are marked with bold lines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Bold: links with concrete targets to achieve) 
Figure 7.3   Top-1000 Program Actor Network and its Extension 
 
With the parallel implementation of the energy efficiency improvement 
initiative and the Top-1000 Program, a series of supporting policies and measures have 
been formulated and adopted by central government. The Ministry of Finance, the State 
Bureau of Taxation, the Ministry of Science and Technology and The Ministry of 
Environmental Protection, though without formal role, all participated in designing and 
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implementing supporting policies. Table 7.3 broadly categories these activities into three 
areas: capacity building activates, funding and financial incentives, and complementary 
programs and policies adopted. These policies have effectively changed the participants’ 
behavior and contributed to the target fulfillment (personal interviews with policy 
researchers from Liaoning Province). A series of legislative regulations, policies, 
measures, and programs have been developed and enforced to complement the program 
implementation, such as the Ten Key Energy Saving Projects, National Climate Change 
Program, Energy Conservation Law (revised), and Monitoring and Evaluation Measures 
for Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction Activities (Kan 2008; Price et al. 2010; 
State Council 2010).   
In addition, to ensure the effective achievement of the energy-saving targets, the 
administrative award and punishment rules were adopted to regulate the province-level 
governments and involved enterprises: the responsible government official will be 
evaluated annually on whether or not the energy conservations targets have been met. 
The well-performed entities that have typical values will be awarded and their 
achievements will be publicized.  The enterprises which fail in meeting the targets will 
not be given the annual rewards or honorary titles. The leaders in the state-owned 
enterprises will not receive the annual award and the responsible officials will not be 
promoted.  
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Table 7.3   Follow-up Activities of the Top-1000 Program 
Source: Price et al. 2009; Wu 2009 
7.4 Results of the Program 
The energy savings of the Top-1000 enterprises came from the improvement of 
energy management, retrofits of industrial processes, as well as closure of small, 
Follow-up 
Activities Description Achievements 
Capacity 
building 
activities 
• In October 2006, a series of training sessions for the 
Top-1000 enterprises in five regional locations, covering 
topics of energy conservation measurement, energy 
auditing and statistics, case study, energy-saving 
technology options.  
• A series of energy statistics training sessions were held 
by the NBS. The development of a national auditing 
standard is in process. 
• In 2007, the Top-1000 enterprises undertook energy 
audits and identified energy-saving opportunities. 
Outside experts from public and private agencies 
provided technical assistance for the energy auditing. 
• Technical assistance and on-site training  
By August 2007, a 
total of 967 energy 
audit reports and 836 
energy conservation 
plans had been 
complemented and 
submitted to the 
NDRC. 
Funding and 
financial 
incentives 
• In 2007, a total of 23.5 billion RMB ($3.4B) were 
allocated to support energy-efficiency activities. In 
2008, 41.8 billion RMB ($3.9B) were allocated.  
• The detailed rules of rewards and rebates for industrial 
energy conservation were adopted. 
•  Most provincial governments received financial support 
to develop local energy conservation centers.  
• Central government announced to reduce the tax rebates 
for exports of energy-intensive products. 
• The enterprises with higher energy intensity level will be 
charged with higher electricity prices. Since 2007, the 
local governments have gained authority to allocate the 
levied fees. 
• International donors are encouraged to invest in China’s 
energy conservation activities. 
There were strong 
incentives for energy 
conservation and 
industrial 
restructuring towards 
less energy intensive.  
Complementary 
programs and 
policies adopted 
• The Eleventh Five-Year Plan of Energy Development 
(April, 2007) 
• Comprehensive Working Scheme of Energy 
conservation and Emission Reduction (May, 2007) 
• National Climate Change Program (June, 2007) 
• Energy Conservation Law (Revised, October, 2007) 
• Statistical Monitoring and Evaluation Measures for 
Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction Activities 
(November, 2007) 
• National Climate Change Action Plan (October, 2008) 
Energy conservation 
and emission 
reduction activities 
have been identified 
as key priorities to 
support sustainable 
development.   
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inefficient production processes within enterprises. According to the official data, the 
initial program target of absolute energy saving of 100 million tce to 2010 had already 
been reached by the end of 2008 (NDRC 2009). The government at all levels then began 
to turn its attention to reaching the national energy intensity reduction targets, which is 
still hard to accomplish. Price et al. (2010) have estimated that, depending on the GDP 
growth rate, the Top-1000 Program could contribute to somewhere between 
approximately 10% and 25% of the savings required to support China’s efforts to meet a 
20% reduction in energy intensity by 2010. Table 7.4 shows the outcomes of the Top-
1000 Program, as well as overall progress of energy efficiency improvement efforts.   
Table 7.4   Progress of the Top-1000 Program and the National Program 
Note: C- target completed; OP- target on progress  
Source: NDRC and NBS 2007; NDRC 2009  
It should be noted that the Top-1000 Enterprises Energy Use Report 2007 
(NDRC and NBS 2007), jointly released by the NDRC and the National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS), includes a more complete analysis and comparison of sectoral 
performance. In the subsequent years, the NDRC has become the only body reporting on 
Program Targets during 2006 - 2010 Item 2006 2007 2008 2009 Remark 
Top-1000 
Program 
(April 2006) 
- save energy 
of 100 million 
tce  
Aggregate 
energy saved  
(million tce) 
20 70.48 106.2 - 
C Number of 
involved 
enterprises  
998 953 922 - 
National 
Action on 
Energy 
Intensity 
Reduction 
(June, 2007) 
-reduce energy 
intensity (EI) 
by 20% 
-reduce SO2 
emissions by 
10% 
-reduce COD 
by 10% 
Aggregate EI 
change rate -1.23% - -10.1% -14.4% OP 
Aggregate SO2 
change rate  1.8% 
-
3.14
% 
-8.95% -13.1% C 
Aggregate 
COD change 
rate 
1.2% 
-
4.66
% 
-6.61% -9.66% OP 
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program performance and no information on sectoral progress has been provided. 
Furthermore, according to Price et al. (2010), there is little transparency in the data 
reporting for the Top-1000 Program, and there is no third party reviewing or verifying the 
reported results at all levels. 
What has caused the Top-1000 Program deviate from the route of voluntary 
program? Liu (2010) identifies three reasons: (1) the urgency and stringency of the 
compliance of the goal set in the 11th Five-Year Plan; (2) the increased probability of 
disagreement among involved actors, who have varying interests and resources; and (3) 
the realistic complexity in arranging such a voluntary agreement in a country that is 
experiencing significant changes.  
7.5 Conclusive Summary 
The Top-1000 Industrial Energy Conservation Program was derived from the 
pilot industrial voluntary project implemented in Shandong Province, which was modeled 
on foreign practices and guided by international agencies. The original idea of 
introducing voluntary agreement was to test whether policy instruments built on the 
consensus between government and industry can be taken as an alternative approach to 
top-down controls. Although the pilot project in Shandong showed a promising start, and 
the initial design of the Top-1000 Program did enable governments at local levels and 
involved enterprises to jointly make and implement energy efficiency plans consistent 
with the national goals; however, the case study shows that the Top-1000 Program has 
deviated from the voluntary approach, and the traditional top-down regulations and 
management are treated to be more effective and irreplaceable.  
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The Top-1000 Program acts as an important policy experiment that encourages 
more communications between local governments and the enterprises in their 
jurisdictions. The program also provides incentives to local governments and involved 
enterprises to cooperate in enhancing industrial energy efficiencies. However, the 
effective implementation of the program needs to be coordinated with other relevant 
policies, and eventually depends on the capacity improvement of the involved actors. In 
addition, the network members within the program are not well-connected, due to the fact 
that all government, business, and civil society actors do little in sharing and exchanging 
information and other resources, or arranging concerted efforts for mutual goals. Instead, 
the local governments and the enterprises passively accepted the targets set by the central 
government, with little involvement from the civil society actors.     
Same as the other two cases, the economic reforms have, to a great extent, 
separated the business with the government, leaving enterprises more maneuver in 
making their own decisions according to market development. But the enterprises in 
China lack resources and powers to negotiate with the governments; even numerous 
industrial associations are incapable. As seen from the case, the resultant implementation 
and follow-up activities of the Top-1000 Program privileges central government decision 
making against negotiation of voluntary targets.  
As for the influence of political control on the participation from non-state 
actors, the decrease of the political control is seen as a trend in the development of 
Chinese political regime, and could not be clearly revealed in a case that covers a 
relatively short period of time, nor could it be taken as the causal factors that influence 
the proactiveness of non-state actor performance. As a matter of fact, in the Top-1000 
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Program, the initiatives of the non-state actors have been marginalized during the 
program process.    
Finally, the Top-1000 Program was initially designed by the NDRC and some 
other agencies at the central level, but its effective implementation could not be achieved 
without participation of provincial governments. With the expansion of the program to 
cover almost all industrial enterprises at all scales, the needs for shared responsibility and 
policy coordination between ministries and provinces increased. The case demonstrates 
that since 2007, the State Council has been leading the policy development and 
integration, and the promotion of energy conservation activities.   
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CHAPTER VIII 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
The historical and institutional development of China’s climate change 
mitigation policy process has been presented through three selected cases, namely the 
national climate change mitigation initiative in general, and two specific cases of the 
CDM project management and the Top-1000 Industrial Energy Conservation Program. 
This chapter contains a comprehensive comparative analysis of the findings presented in 
the previous three cases. Such a comparative analysis sheds light on key features of 
policy networks in different policy arrangements, which can facilitate in-depth 
understanding of the dynamics of China’s policy making processes.  
This chapter is arranged as follows. Section 8.1 conducts the within-case 
analysis, which treats each case of policy arrangements individually and tests hypotheses 
concerning relationship between environmental contexts, features of policy networks, and 
policy outcomes. Subsequently, in Section 8.2, specific policy features across cases are 
analyzed to generate some commonalities to understand China’s policy process. In the 
final section of 8.3, findings from the within-case analysis and the cross-case analysis 
will be synthesized to test the validity of the fragmented authoritarianism model 
developed by Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988). 
8.1 Hypothesis Testing through Within-case Analysis 
As shown in Section 2.6, four hypotheses have been suggested as follows based 
on the preliminary study of the policy network approach. These hypotheses highlight the 
formulation and functions of policy networks in China’s climate change mitigation policy 
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processes. The present section summarizes the hypothesis testing results from the 
empirical findings of the three cases (within-case study). Table 8.1 shows the results by 
taking three cases together. As seen in the table, the impact of state-society interaction on 
the policy proactiveness provides a good approximation in two of the three cases. 
Furthermore, the involvement of the State Council in decision making can be positively 
predicted by the complexity of responsibility sharing among state actors, although the 
degree and approach to which the State Council is involved varies in different policy 
arrangements.  
Table 8.1   Empirical Support for the Hypotheses 
Hypotheses Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
H1: Increasing interaction between government, business, and 
civil society actors will increase the likelihood of China taking a 
more proactive approach to develop effective climate change 
mitigation policy. 
+ + 0 
H2: More fragmentation in the distribution of regulative power 
will increase the likelihood of China’s utilizing more innovative 
policy instruments and measures. 
0 N/A N/A 
H3: Decreasing political control in policy development and 
implementation will encourage other actors, in particular non-
state actors, to exert greater effort in shaping mitigation policy.  
0 N/A N/A 
H4: Increasing demand for shared responsibilities between 
ministries and provincial governments will increase the 
likelihood of stronger coordination by the central government. 
+ + + 
Scale: +: confirming; -: disconfirming; 0: neither conforming or disconfirming; N/A: not applicable  
 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 are not applicably tested in Case 2 and 3. Both cases failed 
in providing enough long time to exhibit clearly the trend of fragmentation of the power 
distribution, as well as the extent of the political control. Although Case 1 is applicable in 
testing both hypotheses, however, being lack of direct causal relationship between 
underlying variables the case study neither confirms nor disconfirms the hypotheses.  
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It should be noted that although empirical studies in the three cases generally 
support the first hypothesis and the last hypothesis. But the reliability is not without 
limitations. The primary reason lies in the fact that all hypotheses are on the basis of 
personal familiarity of the practical China’s climate policy process and the understanding 
of features and roles of the working policy networks. Although the policy network 
analytic framework is in theory a casual model, it only contains some inclusive concepts 
in the model and could not capture numerous influencing variables in the real life. Given 
nonlinearity of a policy process and complex causal-effect relationships in the cycle of 
policy development, it might be more appropriate to claim that the relationship among 
variables tested in above hypotheses are  not causal, but instead, dialectic and 
correlational.   
8.2 Results of the Cross-case Analysis 
The purpose of the using multi-case study approach is to enhance the generality 
of understanding a broader phenomenon (Gerring 2004), and enhance the probability of 
capturing novel findings that may exist in data (Eisenhart 1989). The three cases of 
different policy arrangements can contribute to a better understanding of the nature of 
China’s policy making process on climate change and of roles and influences of policy 
networks involved in the process. In this section, the cross-case analysis is taken to 
summarize some commonalities and features from policy making processes of the three 
cases. 
Notably, in this study, it is risky to claim that the comparability requirement of 
doing multi-case study is favorably met, since the controlled comparison across cases is 
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almost not possible for nature events (George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2004), and the 
three cases are hierarchically at two levels (one generic case of national mitigation policy 
making and two nested cases of specific mitigation programs). However, since all the 
three cases follow the same analytic framework and share overlapping timeframe, some 
factors and features are summarized to reflect the commonality or uniqueness of China’s 
climate change policy processes.     
The section first addresses key features of policy network development in the 
three cases. The analysis, conducted from 8.2.1 to 8.2.3, is framed by the three 
components in the policy network analytic framework, namely, policy contexts, network 
features; and policy outcomes. Treating the policy making process as dynamic and 
cyclical, Section 8.2.4 summarizes key features of the mitigation policy process in China.   
8.2.1 Contextual Factors that Affect the Policy Network 
Contextual factors provide precondition for understanding the origins of policy 
networks. Although three cases vary with their scopes and functional specificities, as 
identified in the case studies, the emergence and form of policy networks are all 
influenced by three major factors of international, domestic, and policy-specific contexts. 
Policy networks evolve with the development of these contextual factors. Table 8.2 
summarizes the key contextual factors in the three cases.  
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Table 8.2   Key Factors in the Three Cases 
Environmental 
Contexts Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
International 
factors 
-Development of the 
climate change regime 
(FCCC, Kyoto 
Protocol, and other 
agreements); 
-Global economic 
development 
-Diplomacy and 
international relations 
-Development of the 
Kyoto Protocol and its 
mechanisms 
-CDM Institutional and 
organizational 
development  
-Development of global 
carbon market  
-Experience from 
international joint 
environmental policy 
making 
-Experience from target-
oriented energy efficiency 
programs 
Domestic Factors 
-Status of economic 
development  
-Progress of political 
and economic reforms 
-Administrative 
restructuring reform 
and impacts 
-Experience of adopting 
market-based measures 
-Priority areas of 
developing CDM 
projects 
-Administrative 
restructuring and impacts 
-Economic Goals set by the 
national government 
-Energy and industry related 
policies 
-Administrative 
restructuring and impacts 
Policy-Specific 
Factors 
-Coordination of 
climate policy with 
other development 
-Experience and 
capacity in 
implementing similar 
policies  
-Division of 
responsibilities among 
governmental agencies 
-Domestic CDM 
measures and changes 
-CDM approval and 
management  
-Experience of CDM 
Pilot Projects 
-Top-1000 Program design 
and improvement 
-Experience gained from 
pilot projects in Shandong 
-Imperative of enhancing 
energy efficiency in 
industrial sectors  
 
The three contextual factors are also not independent from each other. Rather, a 
complex combination of the contextual factors has led to the variations of policy 
networks. In general, the development of international climate change regime and the 
development of Chinese politics and economy are the most important determinants. 
Furthermore, these contexts do not affect policy networks in the same way. For example, 
although both the CDM project management and the Top-1000 Program were formally 
initiated in the mid-2000s, the former case is more influenced by the international factors 
of Kyoto Protocol’s entry into force and carbon market development, while the latter case 
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is more determined by the imperatives of reducing the domestic energy consumption of 
key industrial enterprises.     
Since Case 2 and 3 are nested within Case 1, the national mitigation policy 
development provides context for the cases of specific policy arrangements. Furthermore, 
experience and knowledge accumulated from international and domestic practices are 
common factors of the three cases and affect existing policy systems and actor 
relationships.  
8.2.2 Structural and Interactive Features of Policy Networks 
Policy networks play a crucial role in shaping responses to external factors. As 
presented in the cases, a variety of state, market and civil society actors have been 
involved in policy processes. The state actors include the central governing apparatus 
(mainly the State Council, and the numerous commissions and ministries affiliated with 
the State Council), the provincial and local governments, and diverse kinds of civil 
society actors (research institutions, universities, public media, NGOs, etc.). Table 8.3 
summarizes the extent of the involvement of some of the key actors presented in the three 
cases. 
Since Case 1 dealt with the general climate change policy process, the State 
Council, which receives substantial input from ministries and commissions, leads policy 
formulation and development, as well as policy implementation. Among the ministerial 
level, a coordination committee has been evolving, focusing on the issues of economic 
development, international negations, and national mitigation and adaptation strategies. 
Among ministerial agencies, the NDRC is the core agency in coordinating and advancing 
domestic climate policy process.   
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Table 8.3   Levels of Actor Involvement in Climate Policy Making in Three Cases 
Actors Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
The State Council ++ / + 
NDRC ++ ++ ++ 
MOFA ++ ++ / 
MOST + ++ / 
SEPA/MEP + / + 
SMA and CAS + / / 
Provincial governments + (after 2007) + (after 2007) ++ 
Research institutes, universities, 
think tanks, etc. + + + 
Industrial Associations + / + 
Large-scaled enterprises + + + 
Other Industrial enterprises + + / 
Public media + + + 
Traditional NGOs  / / / 
Market intermediaries + + / 
Scale: ++: very strong influence; +: moderately strong influence; /: Some influence but not strong or not 
directly   
 
Case 2 and Case 3 deal with two specific policy arrangements: Case 2 focuses 
on the national response of the international carbon emission trading system, while Case 
3 focuses on domestic industrial energy efficiency enhancement issues. Both cases were 
adopted at the same period. The two departments within the NDRC play as the key actors 
in managing the two programs: the Department of Climate Change (also the Secretariat 
of the NCCLG) for the CDM project management and the Department of Resource 
Conservation and Environmental Protection (also the Secretariat of the NECERLG) for 
the Top-1000 Program. 
The provincial governments have been playing increased roles in supervising 
the program implementation. For the CDM case, studies show that since 2007, many 
provinces have become enthusiastic in promoting CDM project development (e.g., Qi et 
al. 2008), even though the project approval decision is still made by the National CDM 
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Board at the central level. As for the case of the Top-1000 Program, the engagement of 
provincial governments in energy conservation is through contract signing with involved 
enterprises and accepting annual performance evaluation by the central government. 
Comparatively, the provincial governments have a higher involvement in the policy 
process in Case 3.  
Market and civil society actors are important policy implementers, thus their 
involvement influences policy processes and outcomes. However, their roles and levels 
of involvement vary depending on the forms of the policy arrangements. Under the CDM 
scheme, attracted by the potential benefits from carbon trading, market and some civil 
soceity actors are spontaneously involved in the activities. Their performance is affected 
by the interplaying factors of carbon prices in the market and the extent of government 
interventions. The role of the government is to regulate the trading behaviors and ensure 
that the projects contribute to sustainable development. Alternatively, under the Top-
1000 Program, the provincial governments and involved enterprises are networked by the 
mandatory targets. The members of the actor network increase when more rigorous 
targets are set to accomplish. Whereas detailed award and punishment rules have been 
made to strengthen administrative management, few market-based measures and 
incentives have been provided to strengthen the effective cooperation between local 
governments and enterprises.       
8.2.3 Policy Outcomes 
This section analyzes the policy outcomes of the three cases from two general 
criteria: effectiveness and legitimacy. Effectiveness is analyzed by the extent how the 
policy arrangements are consistent with the more general policy goals and the extent to 
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which the objectives of the policy arrangements have been achieved. Legitimacy is 
evaluated from the accessibility of actors and the communicative quality of participation.  
China does not accept a binding commitment on carbon emission reductions. Its 
climate change mitigation policy is to emphasize its position as a developing country and 
the validity of following the principle of “common but differentiated responsibility and 
capacity” in international climate negotiations. Realizing its increased carbon emissions 
due to rapid economic growth, China has made continued effort in limiting the growth of 
energy intensity, and actively participated in international climate change negotiations 
and cooperation. The CDM project development and the Top-1000 Program are 
important activities within China’s climate change policy framework. Table 8.4 shows 
the objectives and performance of the three presented cases. 
Generally, the three cases have shown China’s transition towards proactiveness 
in promoting climate change mitigation activities. Case 1 and 2 do not have compulsory 
quantitative targets to reach; therefore, China’s activities are actually voluntary. The 
implicit purpose is to balance the economic development and emissions reductions and 
gain co-benefits from them. Furthermore, China’s position towards active participation 
and international cooperation also reflects that the country is sensitive to its international 
image of a rapidly growing power. For Case 3, the Program was initially implemented 
with a clear but fixed quantitative energy-saving target; however, when the proposed 
target had been achieved, the program failed in providing further incentives to the involve 
actors to save energies. In addition, unlike the CDM project development, the calculation 
of the amounts of real energy conservation in the Top-1000 Program case lacks rigorous 
measurement and verification.  
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Table 8.4   Effectiveness of Policy Arrangements in Three Cases 
Policy 
Effectiveness Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Included 
Policies  
A series of climate-
specific and climate-
related policies  
The Interim Measures in 
2004; formal Measures in 
2005 and other related 
adjustments  
Top-1000 Industrial 
Energy Conservation 
Program and related 
measures  
Attributes 
Various types: regulatory 
instruments, incentives, 
voluntary agreements, 
public investment, etc.  
Domestic response to the 
international market-based 
emission trading scheme 
Domestic regulatory 
policy with voluntary 
features 
Policy 
Objectives 
- to promote energy 
conservation and enhance 
energy efficiency 
-to promote renewable 
energy development 
-to reduce energy 
intensity by 20% during 
2005-2010 
- to streamline the project 
approval process 
- to promote the CDM 
project development and 
contribute to sustainable 
development 
 
- the involved 1008 
enterprises should reach 
the aggregate energy 
saving of 100 million  
tons during 2006-2010 
Leading 
Agency 
The State Council and 
cabinet ministries  
The NDRC, MOST, and 
MOFA 
The NDRC 
Consistency 
with Other 
Policies 
The energy intensity 
reduction objective is 
consistent with goals set 
in the Five-year Plan.  
- the priority areas were 
identified encourage CDM 
projects 
- The Program becomes 
part of national action 
in reducing energy 
intensity 
Performance 
and 
Objective 
Accomplishme
nt 
China had reduced its 
energy intensity by 15.6% 
at the end of 2009, and 
the 20% reduction goal is 
within reach (Xie 2010). 
The final result was 
19.1% reduction by 2010.   
 
 
- No quantitative CDM 
development targets.  
- The leading CDM host 
country in the world 
- Positive impacts on 
China’s sustainable 
development 
- Be consistent with priority 
areas.  
By the end of 2008, an 
aggregate energy saving 
of 106.2 million tce has 
been reached. Thus the 
original objective was 
achieved two years in 
advance. 
Follow-up 
Activities 
The 2020 carbon emission 
intensity goals have been 
set and will be 
decomposed into 
provinces  
- Further actions depend on 
the development of 
international climate regime 
- Possibility in initialing 
domestic carbon emission 
system 
The enterprise energy 
efficiency activities will 
be incorporated in the 
provincial target setting 
 
In terms of the legitimacy of the policy arrangements, the three cases have 
shown the improved involvement of various actors in policy making processes. The 
climate change coordination committee has extended to cover more than 20 ministerial 
agencies, and effective mitigation activities have been implemented with the adoption of 
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policies and measures. The information concerning the development of climate change 
regime and its relevance to China’s policy and practices has been widely reported by 
public media and become more accessible to the public. Another significant feature is the 
growing power of local governments and government-operated research institutions in 
shaping the relevant policies and providing feedback advice for policy change. However, 
as shown in Case 2 and 3, the governmental actors are still dominating the policy 
discussion and decision making, with little participation from business actors. Important 
information about policy progress and possible disputes is lacking due to issues of 
transparency and openness.    
8.2.4 Key Features of Climate Change Mitigation Policy Process in China 
When treating policy making as a dynamic process, multiple case studies have 
reflected some key features of Chinese climate change mitigation policy process, as 
indicated in the following:.  
• Encouraging policy experiment and diffusion 
In China, climate change policy making, implementation, and coordination is 
complex and actor participation is dispersed over many different levels and sectors. To 
ensure policy practicability and consistency, China normally begins with testing policies 
or programs on a smaller scale. Once pilot projects prove to be successful, the experience 
and practices will be diffused on a large scale and will involve more actors. As needed, 
necessary improvement and adjustment will be made. The CDM project development 
takes this approach, starting from the AIJ cooperation projects and CDM capacity 
building projects and later moving to projects that can be certified and traded in the 
market. China’s Top-1000 Program adopted in 2006 represents an exemplary case. The 
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Program is derived from experience gained in two voluntary pilot projects implemented 
in Shandong Province (Price and Wang 2007). The most recent case is the launch of the 
Locality Low Carbon Pilot Program. To explore an effective low-carbon governance 
system nationwide, five provinces and eight cities have been selected by the NDRC to 
promote energy conservation and emission reduction (People’s Daily 2010).   
• Active employment of policy tools 
The importance of climate mitigation policy is seen in the adoption and 
implementation of a series of regulatory, financial and information-based climate change 
policies (NDRC 2007; Richerzhagen and Scholz 2008). New policy tools include 
voluntary agreements and carbon market trading. These reflect the changes in state-
society relations and government-market relations. The adoption of new policy tools 
exerts influence over the structure of the network, as well as the behaviors and 
interactions of the actors involved. The case studies have shown China’s proactiveness in 
promoting innovative policy tools.   
• The central government’s strong roles in the policy process 
The strong dominance of the central government ensures the state’s ability to 
develop policy in a significant and large-scale way. The cases reflect that in China, the 
transformation of the climate mitigation issue from the international level to the local 
level is highly reliant on the mandates of Chinese central government. Debates exist 
concerning to what extent localities can be freed to make decisions; however, the 
capacity building, information dissemination, and technological assistance are all reliant 
on the mobilization and support of the central government. The current climate mitigation 
policy making process has been institutionalized. Comparatively, Chinese administrative 
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bureaucracies, which influenced by the Communist Party, are less influenced or 
pressured by interests groups or other external political forces. Their institutional features 
can facilitate policy making and promote effective policy implementation, although they 
may harm the interests of other groups in an “implicit” manner by minimizing their 
ability to influence policymaking.  
• More focus on the action network development 
In China, decision making takes place from a top-down approach. However, the 
policy making process in China remains flexible, even though it may not be transparent 
to less informed outsiders; thus the analysis of structural and interactive features of actor 
networks is more focused on the policy implementation stage. The decision makers attach 
importance to the effectiveness of the policy implementation and are ready to make 
changes on the basis of past successes or failures. For this purpose, a variety of civil 
society actors, especially actors from academic institutions and universities have been 
encouraged to get involved in the policy process as a way to link policy implementation 
with potential policy changes. 
8.3 Reflections on the Fragmented Authoritarianism Model  
After having summarized findings of case studies through the within-case 
analysis and the cross-case analysis, this section addresses the general policy making 
process issue by verifying whether the widely referred to fragmented authoritarianism 
model is still viable to explain the climate change mitigation policy process in 
contemporary China.  
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As introduced in Chapter 2, the fragmented authoritarianism model was 
developed to capture the main features of the Chinese policy making process. According 
to the model, despite the authoritarian nature of the Chinese political system, in most 
cases, the bureaucratic structure of authority below the very peak of the Chinese political 
system is highly fragmented. Consensus building is central to the policy process, and the 
policy processes are protracted, disjointed and incremental (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 
1988, 22-24). Lieberthal (1992) further argues fragmentation and disjointedness in 
decision making is structurally based and has been enhanced by reform policies regarding 
procedures. In addition, the fragmented authoritarianism model recognizes the impacts of 
procedural changes on the decision making under the reform: the extent to which 
bureaucratic organs respond in disciplined fashion to instructions from higher levels has 
been reduced (Lieberthal 1992, 9).  
According to Lieberthal (1992, 10), “the fragmented authoritarianism model 
acknowledges the great insights offered from elite-oriented rational-actor approaches and 
from a cellular conception of the system.” And it “adds a third necessary ingredient to the 
equations: the structure of bureaucratic authority and the realities of bureaucratic practice 
that affect both the elite and the basic building blocks of the system”. 
However, the stereotypical characteristics of the fragmented authoritarianism 
model do not totally fit with the empirical findings from these case studies of China’s 
climate change policy development. In fact, to a significant degree, the development of 
China’s climate change mitigation policies have shown some features that might raise 
question about some aspects of the fragmented authoritarianism model.  
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First, although various bureaucracies have been involved in policy formulation 
and implementation stages, which certainly increased difficulties to achieve agreement 
among an array of bodies; however, there is clear division of responsibilities among 
government units and policy communities formed around generic and specific climate 
change mitigation policies. Government is often the initiator, and later, the manager of 
the policy networks; and the central government dominates the policy process. Such 
“networked” communities cut across formal bureaucratic lines and evolve with policy 
development. In addition, since governments at lower levels generally accepted the 
targets set by the upper-level government and have been seriously trying to accomplish 
the objectives, little evidence indicates that bureaucratic agencies involved in policy 
process are trying to promote and protect their own interests and compete with others. 
Although there remain complaints and disputes from provinces about the distribution of 
energy intensity reduction shares, the central government has responded with persuasion 
and some adjustments.  The aggregate targets have not been lowered.  
Second, the fragmented authoritarianism model, through studies of economic 
decision making in China, argues the policy making process in China is protracted, 
disjointed, and incremental because of the structural fragmentation and procedural 
bargaining. However, the case study findings showed that the policy making process is 
not always slow in China and that beyond structural and procedural features of 
government institutions, there are other factors that have influenced the responsiveness of 
decision making. These include pressures and assistance from the international 
community; actions of developed countries and some developing countries, as well as the 
environmental and resource constraints of domestic economic development.   
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Third, the model gives much focus to the decision making of authority below 
the very peak of the Chinese political system, and assumes that policies are the outcomes 
after a series of negotiations, bargaining, and resource exchanges towards consensus 
building.  Alternatively, the policy network approach employed in this study views the 
policy making process as a dynamic and iterative policy learning cycle. Due to a lack of 
experience and consensus, policy making is most often action-oriented and takes a test-
and-trial approach. As the case studies have shown, most of the Chinese climate change 
policies are shaped after long deliberation and continual improvement, derived from a 
series of pilot projects. Given the sheer size and diversity of the country, the approach, to 
some extent, breaks the deadlock of policy coordination and development. The 
government leads the development of the action network. On the basis of information 
feedback from policy implementation and advices gained from relevant actors, the 
government makes policy adjustments and changes. 
The fragmented authoritarianism model suggests that bargaining among 
bureaucracies is the approach to create consensus to mitigate the conflicts of interests. It 
makes no reference to Chinese cultural heritage. As a matter of fact, a cultural analysis 
provides some explanations of why both hierarchy and consensus can simultaneously 
apply in China. Culturally, China has the heritage of Confucius, which demands loyalty 
and obedience. Subordinate disagreement and defiance are not tolerated in order to 
maintain the image of unity. This may give the impression that the policy actor networks 
in China are distinct from those of Western democracies and are more collaborative, 
which definitely reduces the costs for policy bargaining and persuasion, but this may also 
be the result of a situation of feigned compliance (Pye 1992; Nordqvist 2007). Currently, 
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the information is still limited and less accessible as regards the extent and permanence of 
the consensus reached among all involved government, market, and civil society actors.  
It is undeniable that by adding structural and procedural ingredients into 
consideration, the fragmented authoritarianism model has enhanced our understanding of 
the Chinese policy process. However, to strengthen its explanatory power and incorporate 
important observations and conclusions from the case studies, the prescribed focus on the 
structures among government agencies shall be expanded. Gaining insights from the 
policy network approach, Figure 8.1 suggests some broader relationships that have 
emerged with China’s market-oriented reform and integration into the world economy, 
and deserve future in-depth study. In addition, the roles and influences of the Communist 
Party and cultural values should be considered.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: FA-Fragmented Authoritarianism; CCP  
Figure 8.1   Relationships among Actors in Expanded Policy Networks 
Government 
Market Civil Society 
Relations between 
Government and 
Business 
Relations between 
business and society 
Relations between 
State and Society 
Focus of the FA model: 
-Relations between center and localities 
-Relations among bureaucratic agencies 
Other factors: 
- Culture/values  
- CCP 
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It should be noted that although China has become more active in promoting 
climate change mitigation policies and action, the overall strategies to deal with 
international climate regime negotiations are still hesitant and cautious. Fearing that more 
action might cause more commitment and that the international regimes established by 
the developed countries might damage the country’s interests, the Chinese central 
government has acted strategically to protect its economic and political autonomy. This 
explains why even though many innovative policies and measures have been introduced, 
they are complementary options designed to achieve broader development goals. 
Through cooperative governance and collective action, the Chinese government believes 
it can build consensus with core economic sectors and retain core political values which it 
believes will fit its needs and the society in the long run.  
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this last chapter, a concluding analysis of the implications of the policy 
network approach and the case studies of the emergence and implementation of climate 
change mitigation policies in China will be made. This chapter is divided into four 
sections. Following this introductory section, Section 9.1 presents conclusions drawn 
from the three detailed case studies of different mitigation policy arrangements. Next, 
limitations of the study are discussed. Finally, in Section 9.3, suggestions for future 
research are presented.  
9.1 General Conclusions 
Guided by the policy network analytic framework, and through performing 
three case studies, this study examines the historical development of China’s climate 
change mitigation policy making process. The within-case analysis was conducted to 
verify the hypotheses concerning causal relationships among key policy network 
constructs. The cross-case analysis was taken to compare the key features of policy 
process related with different policy arrangements. The generalized findings were 
subsequently used to study the viability of the fragmented authoritarianism model in 
analyzing current policy process in China.  In general, major conclusions to be 
formulated on the basis of this study can be summarized as follows: 
First, although Chinese climate change mitigation policy outcomes cannot be 
claimed to be an unambiguous success, the increased openness of the policy network in 
China, reflected from the wider accessibility and involvement of the state actors and non-
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state actors, can be positively related with the proactive engagement in promoting policy 
performance. The aspect of the openness of networks proved to be improved in all three 
cases, as seen from the fact that since the mid-2000s, local governments and various non-
state actors have been more involved in the policy development, especially at the policy 
implementation stage. Generally speaking, greater openness of network relations, linked 
by either market forces or regulative forces, appeared to induce positive policy outcomes 
and they allowed for pragmatic participation and resource exchange. However, too great 
an openness of networks may potentially bring higher levels of conflicts, thus eventually 
weakening efficiency and effectiveness, and add difficulties to consensus-building and 
cooperation within the network.   
Second, under the Chinese unitary political regime, the state actors, especially 
the central government, play paternalistic roles in the climate change policy making 
process by setting up initiatives to encourage exchange and cooperation among various 
players. The Chinese government has established the coordination committee in the late 
1980s to integrate relevant policies and coordinate international negotiations and 
domestic action. To better coordinate the interests of various parties, the State Council 
has led the coordination committee and promoted energy intensity reduction activities. 
The strong dominance of central government in the policy making process, on the one 
hand, facilitates the application and diffusion of carbon emission reduction activities; on 
the other hand, it limits the full exertion of market forces and induces negative impacts on 
the formation of authentic voluntary agreements, which are jointly developed and 
implemented by government and the regulated actors.  
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Third, with respect to the emergence and functioning of climate change 
mitigation policy arrangements, it can be concluded that domestic factors weigh more 
than international contextual factors and the policy-specific factors. This should not be 
surprising in that China is still in the process of urbanization and industrialization, and 
does not accept any obligatory emission reduction commitment unless the developed 
countries take the lead in doing what it perceives to be their duties. On the other hand, the 
reforms of Chinese political system have provided more space and freedom for selecting 
innovative policy instruments and measures, and improving policy effectiveness by 
valuing policy evaluation and incremental change.  
Fourth, although the fragmented authoritarianism model, as a popular policy 
process model, depicts the impacts of China’s decision-making actor network structure 
on its policy process, it has some difficulties in explaining China’s current climate change 
policy making process, which is characterized by the fact that China has established and 
continuously been retrofitting its institutionalized policy making system. In the Chinese 
context, the climate change policy process can be seen as action-oriented, incremental, 
and heavily relying on trial and error exercises. This is because from a dynamic 
perspective, policy development is also a learning process as all the involved actors seek 
to manage conflicts and accumulate experience for achieving goals.  
Fifth, with respect to the application of the policy network approach in studying 
the policy process, it can be concluded that the approach can be used to reflect the 
institutional features of the Chinese policy making system. Although in general, the 
Chinese policy structure is fairly hierarchical, the system is adapting to the changes and 
reshaping influences. The study of the Chinese “policy network” serves as a means to 
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investigate how these actors interact and to help explain the dynamics of their functions 
in the policy development process. Networks exist when the actors have differentiated 
power and resources and they are dependent on others to reach goals. Of course, the 
policy network in China has distinctive features. Notably, the policy network approach 
does not provide the full story of policy development and change. Certain factors such as 
capacity and cultural features need to be integrated in the study. In addition, given the 
complexity and randomness of natural events, the causal relations implicit in the policy 
network model are better to be taken as “probabilistic”, rather than “deterministic”.  
Lastly, it is worth mentioning here that this comprehensive examination of 
China’s climate change mitigation policy development treats policymaking as an 
interactive and learning process, and the explanation is from a Chinese perspective.  As 
an important determinant of policy processes and changes, policy performance evaluation 
has a stake in the understanding of policy development. However, no real consensus has 
been reached as regards the evaluation of China’s performance in climate change 
mitigation policy and action. Because the relevant discussions are mixed with disputes on 
ethics, equitability, and moral values, it makes an objective evaluation of policy 
performance very difficult, if not almost impossible. China insists that because of its 
status as a developing country, priority should be given to development and developed 
countries should take the lead in terms of mitigation activities. Such a stance and 
viewpoint has been supported by a majority of Chinese government officials, researchers 
and the public; however, this viewpoint has been increasingly challenged by other 
countries. To reconcile the controversy over the evaluation of China’s actural policy 
performance, more international exchange and cooperation is likely to enhance the 
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country’s mitigative capacity and readiness to be more responsible. Similarly, more in-
depth analyses of process-oriented policy study, combining theoretical reflections and 
historical and empirical examinations are needed. In this regard, it is fair to say that this 
study provides an explanation of China’s climate change policy making process with the 
emphasis more on Chinese viewpoints and is designated to supplement the ongoing 
discourse in the Western academia.  
9.2 Limitations of the Study 
The research has made a significant step forward in explaining China’s climate 
change mitigation policy development by adopting the policy network approach and 
employing multiple-case study method. It has contributed to a better understanding of the 
dynamics of policy making process in contemporary China; however, the following 
limitations should be pointed out.       
First, the study largely relies on the case study approach, and three cases are 
selected. However, the latter two cases are nested within the first case. Although the 
CDM project management case and the Top-1000 Program case do deepen our 
understanding of the policy making process beyond generic national policy arrangements 
and contribute to the generalization of some important findings, the two cases are not 
parallel with the first one, making the cross-case comparison lack validity. In addition, 
with more policies and measures being adopted and implemented, to gain greater access 
across these specific policy arrangements could have revealed further findings of process 
features, but could have been impossible with the constraints of time and resources 
available.   
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Second, the policy network analytic framework has been employed to guide the 
search for empirical evidence in the three cases. Although the adopted framework 
provides the required structure and direction to address the research questions, it only 
covers some broad construct factors to simplify the complexity of policy processes, and 
may lose some other important messages that did not fit the model. As seen from the case 
studies, the issue of mitigation capacity in China has been neglected, but it is undoubtedly 
the basis for policy development and decision making. Moreover, the framework is 
developed as a causal model, which has strong power in making a controlled comparison 
to draw causal inferences, but it is more preferable to identify the historical juncture point 
in advance. When the long timeline of policy development is considered, policy 
outcomes are more often influenced by complicated “historical and institutional” factors 
that could not be easily identified by the model itself.  
Third, in this study, the policy network in the policy-making process is heavily 
focused on formal relationships among institutional members. In reality, the formal 
networks among institutions are intertwined with individual networks, such as kinship, 
colleagueship, and “Guanxi” (personal relationships); and the relationships between 
network members are not rigid and linked by other strands, depending on specific policy 
issues. Future research is needed to observe and study how these multi-strand networks 
are connected, interrelated, and evolved in shaping and influencing policies. 
Fourth, compared with Western democracies, the divisions of actors into 
government, private sector, and civil society in studying a Chinese “network” is not 
without controversy. How independent are these actors? Doesn’t the Chinese government 
have strong influences on business and civil society? Over-dependence on the 
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government makes the analysis of other actors’ independent attributes or behaviors (e.g., 
preference) very difficult. To what extent is or should the actor network be integrated is 
an unavoidable puzzle that the country continues to address and hopes to solve through 
its policy reforms.    
Lastly, although a series of interviews and site visits have been conducted, the 
accessibility to high-level officials proved to be difficult and a transparent policy 
processing system is still lacking and remains a very sensitive issue in China, especially 
at the decision making stage. Most Chinese interviewees showed their sympathies for 
China’s current active behavior (though they have not been better recognized by the 
international community), instead of having great interest in discussing the process issues. 
In the Chinese context, to get access to governmental officials or other key persons, 
researchers need the ability to build and develop personal relationships and gain their 
trust. At the same time, the ability to deal with the access problem will also depend on 
government’s willingness in promoting administrative reforms towards more 
accountability and transparency.       
9.3 Suggestions for Future Research  
China’s development is changing itself and influencing the world. To examine 
China’s climate change policy making process, one must go beyond the understanding of 
“what has happened”, but “how” and “why” these have happened in such manners. By 
doing so, one also provides an empirical case for further understanding the changing 
political and policy system in China. Although the study generates some useful results, 
they are not exhaustive, and it opens up a number of future research directions.  
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To understand China’s climate change policy process not only depends on the 
theories that link the potential variables, but also requires rigorous empirical evidence to 
verify relevant theories. Currently, the explanatory functions of using policy network 
theory need to be strengthened; potential variables that have impact on policy processes 
need to be identified. On the other hand, the multiplicity and complexity of causes of 
social phenomena make it difficult to explain with one single approach; therefore, it is 
important for the policy network approach to combine or complement other explanatory 
paths. 
The analysis of the policy network can be conducted in a quantitative and 
formal way, and this has induced growing academic interest. In general, such type of 
analysis, the so-called social network analysis, is descriptive in nature; but it can 
graphically portray the structures of issue-specific networks based on the collected 
attribute data of actors. Social network analysis is conductive to the understanding of 
network structures and interactions, and even the corresponding changes if dynamic 
model is used; therefore, the method deserves more attention.  
One of the foci of the research is on studying the roles and functions of 
networks. Under the context of global efforts to mitigate climate change impacts, 
comparative research on mitigation policy formulation and implementation between 
China and other countries is needed in order to share relevant experiences. In addition, 
more thorough research on comparing the outcomes of different policy arrangements 
deserves further attention.     
Another interesting topic remaining for further research is the issue of climate 
change governance, which has been heatedly discussed in recent years. Governance 
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addresses the “interrelated and increasingly integrated system of formal and informal 
rules, rule-making systems, and actor networks at all levels of human society (from local 
to global)” (Biermann et al. 2009). This study of China’s climate change mitigation 
policy process has great relevance for the governance study. Among other things, one of 
the major difficulties in governance study is that, unlike many Western developed 
countries, China is a moving target, a state undertaking radical changes. Therefore, 
further research on governance is needed to reflect the dynamics of the political regime 
and the changes within the state and the society.    
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